Red Sea Crisis Draws Global Powers Into Yemen Conflict as Houthis Expand Control

In September, the Iran-backed Houthi movement seized territory along the Red Sea coast that commands one of the world's most critical shipping passages. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which nearly 10 percent of global trade flows, is now under their control. That single geographic fact has transformed Yemen from a regional conflict into a matter of direct concern for Washington, the Gulf states, and powers as distant as Pakistan and Turkey.

The Houthis' advance was not incidental. They escalated militarily to break a decade-long Saudi blockade of their ports and airfields, and the timing appeared designed to support Iran's broader struggle against the United States. But the consequences rippled outward faster than anyone anticipated. On Saturday, Houthi forces launched a ballistic missile at King Khaled Airport in Riyadh, killing twelve people—including one American—and wounding three hundred civilians. They struck the same airport again on Sunday. Three days earlier, two separate Houthi attacks on the airport had killed three Saudi nationals, one of them a pilot. These were not isolated incidents; they followed days of strikes on Saudi Aramco energy facilities. The message was unmistakable: the Houthis could reach deep into Saudi territory, and they were willing to do it.

President Trump initially resisted direct involvement. When Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman requested American airstrikes against advancing Houthi units in September, Washington declined. Instead, it expanded the targeting intelligence it shared with the Saudis—a modest step that fell short of what Riyadh wanted. But the airport attack changed the calculus. Asked whether the U.S. would retaliate, Trump told journalists the administration was considering it and would "move very quickly." By Sunday, reports suggested Trump was weighing a joint U.S.-Saudi retaliatory operation.

The escalation has forced other regional powers to reconsider their own positions. The United Arab Emirates had largely withdrawn from Yemen after the grinding 2015-2022 war that left both sides exhausted. Abu Dhabi assessed, however, that Houthi momentum would eventually embolden the group to attack the UAE itself. The Emirates began directing Yemeni units it had trained to join Saudi-led ground operations against the Houthis. Yet cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remains strained. The two Gulf powers disagree on which south Yemeni factions deserve support, and Saudi Arabia views the UAE as too willing to compromise with the Houthis rather than defeat them decisively. Broader tensions complicate the partnership further: Riyadh resents Abu Dhabi's alignment with Israel and its military aid to the Rapid Support Forces militia in Sudan, where Egypt's government backs the opposing Sudan Armed Forces.

Pakistan, long a Saudi ally, had initially signaled it would stay out of Yemen despite signing a tripartite defense agreement with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in August. But the latest Houthi gains prompted Islamabad to reverse course. On Friday, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared his country would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Kingdom, though any intervention would be "purely defensive." A senior Pakistani military official confirmed to the New York Times that Pakistani warplanes are already conducting airstrikes on Houthi forces, targeting their missile and unmanned aerial vehicle installations. Pakistan will not deploy ground troops, the official said.

Saudi Arabia has also approached Syria, which only recently rejoined the Arab League after years of isolation. Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has not yet committed to sending forces to Yemen, mindful that doing so would deepen perceptions of a Sunni-Shia conflict rather than a regional power struggle. Meanwhile, on the ground in Yemen, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are attempting to push Houthi units back from the southern Red Sea positions they captured last month. The Houthis are reportedly close to encircling the key city of Ta'iz, a development that would significantly weaken the Saudi-led coalition.

The crisis is unfolding against a backdrop of other Red Sea tensions. Ethiopia's war against Tigray rebels and neighboring provinces has created spillover effects that disrupt humanitarian aid flows and refugee movements across the strait. Last week, fighting in Ethiopia expanded to include combat against Eritrean forces, which Addis Ababa accuses of supporting the rebellion. Many African nations, including landlocked Ethiopia, depend on imports flowing through Red Sea ports in Eritrea and Djibouti. At a "Consultative Quadrilateral Summit" in Egypt last week, leaders from Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea issued a declaration affirming that Red Sea governance belongs exclusively to littoral states—an indirect rebuke of the UAE's ambitions to build dominant influence on both sides of the strait. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has vowed his landlocked country will secure a Red Sea outlet, presumably Eritrea's Assab Port, a move the UAE might support to consolidate its regional position. What began as a Houthi territorial advance has become a contest among multiple powers for control of one of the world's most strategically vital waterways.