ASEAN-China Code of Conduct talks enter critical phase as South China Sea tensions mount

Over 60 Vietnamese sailors were killed in 1988 clashes; current fishing communities face risks from escalating maritime tensions.
They are still writing it, and the waters are growing more dangerous.
ASEAN and China have spent over two decades negotiating a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea while maritime tensions continue to rise.
Mark

So they've been talking about this for over twenty years and still haven't finished. What's actually holding them up?

Mimi

The core issue is that ASEAN and China have fundamentally different interests. China wants the agreement to be flexible and non-binding. ASEAN wants it to be legally enforceable. They also disagree on what waters it covers and how it relates to the 2002 Declaration.

Luke

But we should be clear—the source doesn't say China explicitly wants it non-binding. It says there have been disagreements over how binding it should be. That could mean different things.

Mimi

Fair point. What we know is that progress was slow for years, and the talks kept stalling. In 2018 they finally got a draft text everyone could work from.

Mark

And now they're in the third reading, tackling the hard stuff. What happens if they miss the July 2026 deadline?

Mimi

The source doesn't say. But the context is clear—tensions are rising. Philippine and Chinese vessels are encountering each other more often. Fishing communities are at risk.

Luke

Right, but the source doesn't quantify how much more often these encounters are happening. It says they're "more frequent" and "more visible," but there's no data on the actual increase.

Mark

So the deadline matters because the situation on the water is getting worse, not better.

Mimi

Exactly. The agreement itself won't solve the territorial disputes. But it could establish procedures to prevent accidents from turning into armed conflicts.

Luke

Which is significant, because the history shows what happens when there are no procedures. Sixty Vietnamese sailors died in 1988. A ninety-minute naval battle in 1996.

Mark

And those were the incidents that prompted ASEAN to push for the Declaration in the first place.

Mimi

Yes. The Declaration was a start, but it wasn't binding. The Code of Conduct is supposed to be stronger. If they can finish it.

  • Encounters between Philippine and Chinese vessels are intensifying, and fishing communities dependent on these waters face mounting danger with no enforceable rules in place.
  • The third reading has finally forced negotiators to confront the agreement's hardest questions — binding or advisory, narrow or broad in scope, and what its own language actually means.
  • Three decades of talks, one armed battle that killed over sixty Vietnamese sailors, and two decades since a non-binding Declaration was signed have all led to this moment — and the deadline is July 2026.
  • Both sides agreed in 2023 to accelerate the process, but the core disputes over legal enforceability and geographic coverage remain stubbornly open.
  • A finalized Code of Conduct would not resolve territorial claims, but it could create procedures that keep confrontations from escalating into conflicts — a narrow but vital goal.
  • The third reading is historically where negotiations either crystallize into agreement or collapse under the weight of irreconcilable interests.

For decades, the nations bordering the South China Sea have sought to transform the memory of armed conflict into the architecture of restraint. ASEAN and China are now in the third and most consequential reading of a Code of Conduct that could govern one of the world's most contested waters, with a July 2026 deadline pressing against a tide of unresolved questions about legal force, geographic reach, and shared meaning. The agreement, if it comes, will not settle who owns what — but it may determine whether disputes are managed by diplomacy or by force. History has already shown what happens when that question goes unanswered.

For more than two decades, ASEAN and China have been attempting to write a document that might prevent the next armed clash in the South China Sea. That effort is now in its most critical phase.

The dispute's history is not abstract. In 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed over Johnson South Reef, killing more than sixty Vietnamese sailors. China later occupied Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines, and in 1996 Chinese and Philippine naval vessels fought a ninety-minute battle. These were not misunderstandings — they were armed conflicts over territory that multiple nations believed was theirs.

ASEAN responded by pushing for a regional framework to establish rules and encourage restraint. In 2002, both sides signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea — non-binding, but a formal commitment to work toward something more enforceable. What followed was nearly two decades of slow, frequently stalled consultations.

A turning point came in 2018, when ASEAN and China agreed on a Single Draft Negotiating Text. A first reading was completed in 2019, a second in 2023. In July of that year, both sides set a target: finalize the Code of Conduct by July 2026.

Now in the third reading, negotiators are confronting the questions that have always defined the agreement's real stakes — will it be legally binding or merely advisory? What waters will it cover? What do terms like 'restraint' or 'incident' actually mean when written into enforceable language? These are not procedural details. They determine whether the agreement has any teeth at all.

The urgency is visible on the water. Philippine and Chinese vessels are encountering each other with increasing frequency. Fishing communities that depend on these seas are caught between overlapping claims and rising tensions. A finished Code of Conduct would not resolve who owns what — but it could create procedures for managing confrontations before they become conflicts.

Whether negotiators can agree on what that agreement should actually say, and whether they can do so before the deadline, remains the defining question of the third reading. It is also the phase where talks most often break down.

For more than twenty years, ASEAN and China have been trying to write a single document that might prevent the next armed clash in the South China Sea. They are still writing it. The talks have entered what negotiators call the third reading, and they are finally confronting the questions that have stalled progress since the mid-1990s: whether the agreement will actually be binding, what waters it covers, and how its terms will be defined. The deadline is July 2026. Meanwhile, the waters themselves are growing more dangerous.

The history of this dispute is written in blood. In 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese forces fought over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. More than sixty Vietnamese sailors died in that encounter. Seven years later, China occupied Mischief Reef, which the Philippines claimed. In 1996, Chinese naval vessels engaged Philippine gunboats in a battle that lasted ninety minutes. These were not accidents or misunderstandings. They were armed conflicts over territory that multiple nations believed belonged to them.

ASEAN responded by pushing for a regional framework—something that would establish rules of the road, encourage restraint, and keep disputes from becoming wars. In November 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It was not legally binding. It was a statement of intent. But it mattered because both sides formally committed to working toward something more detailed and more enforceable: a Code of Conduct.

What followed was two decades of slow movement. Consultations continued. Positions were clarified. But the talks kept stalling. Regional tensions would flare. National interests would diverge. Disagreements over how binding the agreement should be would resurface. Progress was measured in inches.

Then in 2018, something shifted. ASEAN and China agreed on a Single Draft Negotiating Text—a document that brought together proposals from all parties. The first reading was completed in 2019. The second reading came in 2023. These rounds helped clarify what each side wanted and where the gaps were. But the major issues remained unresolved. In July 2023, both sides adopted guidelines meant to accelerate the process and set a target: finalize the Code of Conduct by July 2026. That gave them three years.

Now, in 2025, negotiators are in the third reading, and they are finally grappling with what the agreement actually means. Will it be legally binding or merely advisory? Will it cover the entire South China Sea or only parts of it? How will it relate to the 2002 Declaration that came before it? What do key terms like "incident" or "restraint" actually mean when written into law? These are not abstract questions. They determine whether the agreement has teeth.

The urgency is real. Encounters between Philippine and Chinese vessels are happening more frequently. Fishing communities that depend on these waters are caught between overlapping claims and rising tensions. The disputes remain visible, immediate, and volatile. A finished Code of Conduct would not resolve the territorial claims themselves—that is a separate and far more difficult problem. But it could establish procedures for managing confrontations, preventing accidents from becoming incidents, and incidents from becoming conflicts. It could create space for de-escalation.

What remains unclear is whether the negotiators can agree on what that agreement should actually say, and whether they can do it before the July 2026 deadline. The third reading is where the hardest questions get answered. It is also where negotiations often break down.

ASEAN wanted a regional framework that would encourage restraint and keep disputes from turning into armed conflict
— Context from negotiations history
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