The decision came from above, and SEPI's job was simply to justify it afterward.
Plus Ultra clearly violated fundamental rescue fund conditions: not viable, not strategic, and obtained rapid approval without proper legal/financial advisor bidding process. Former fiscal general Dolores Delgado intervened to release blocked funds; judge's investigation halted on technicality, but national court case continues with broader implications.
- Plus Ultra: 19 million euros, Venezuelan airline, single aircraft, 0.01% market share
- Air Europa: 475 million euros (repaid); Duro Felguera: 126 million euros (unlikely to be repaid)
- Judge Esperanza Collazos froze the second tranche in June 2020; temporary replacement released it after prosecutor reversed position under pressure from Attorney General Dolores Delgado
- Plus Ultra's own auditor testified it would have entered bankruptcy in 2020 without intervention; viability plan projected losses through 2023
Former PM Zapatero faces charges for allegedly orchestrating corrupt rescue of Venezuelan airline Plus Ultra during pandemic, with investigations expanding to Air Europa and Duro Felguera bailouts.
The charges against former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero landed in May 2026 like a stone dropped into still water, sending ripples backward through six years of pandemic-era decisions that had always looked suspicious but were finally, formally, corrupt. The Plus Ultra rescue—a 19 million euro bailout of a Venezuelan airline with a single aircraft and a market share so small it barely registered—had been the first domino. Now it was clear why.
When the pandemic froze Spain's economy in 2020, 2.6 million workers sat in temporary furloughs and 1.2 million companies scrambled for emergency loans just to stay alive. In that moment of desperation, the government's rescue fund chose to save Plus Ultra: unknown, tiny, and Venezuelan-connected. The red flag should have been visible from orbit. The airline violated every condition that was supposed to protect public money. It was not viable—its own auditor admitted this week in Senate testimony that the company would have entered bankruptcy proceedings in 2020 without intervention. Its viability plan, submitted to the state holding company SEPI, projected losses continuing through at least 2023. It was not strategic—with a 0.01 percent market share, losing it would have meant almost nothing to Spain's economy or employment. And it was not current on its tax obligations, carrying a 452,000 euro debt to the ministry.
Yet the rescue happened anyway, and it happened fast. The judge's investigation revealed that proper procedures were skipped entirely. The fund's legal and financial advisors were never put out to competitive bidding. The decision came from above, and SEPI's job was simply to justify it afterward. When the company's own auditor later told the Senate that the process had been rushed, a senior SEPI official named José Ángel Partearroyo contradicted him—then the judge's ruling confirmed the auditor was right. Partearroyo, it turned out, had even asked Plus Ultra to issue a press release celebrating the decision, according to court documents.
The money should have been blocked. In June 2020, Judge Esperanza Collazos saw the irregularities and froze the second tranche—34 million euros in a participating loan. But she went on vacation in August, and her temporary replacement released the funds after the prosecutor's office reversed its position. That reversal came from the top: Dolores Delgado, then Spain's attorney general, ordered the change. The airline won a subsequent appeal on a technicality when the investigation wasn't extended in time, though a separate case at the National Court continues.
What made the Plus Ultra rescue so obviously corrupt was not just that it violated the rules, but that someone had clearly designed it to. The State Counsel's office later argued that the "strategic" requirement applied to sectors, not individual companies—a reading that contradicted the fund's own written criteria, which explicitly required individual enterprises to justify their impact. It was sophistry deployed to save a decision that had already been made.
But Plus Ultra was the smallest of the three rescues now under scrutiny. Air Europa received 475 million euros in public money—which it has since repaid—and Duro Felguera, an Asturian engineering firm, got 126 million that it will almost certainly never return. Neither company met the conditions either. Air Europa has proven viable, but Duro Felguera is still fighting to avoid bankruptcy, waiting for a judge to approve yet another survival plan. If Zapatero's network orchestrated one rescue this thoroughly, the logic went, why would they stop at one? The pattern suggested something larger: a systematic operation to funnel public money to connected interests during a moment when desperation made scrutiny unlikely. The investigations into Air Europa and Duro Felguera would test whether that suspicion held.
Notable Quotes
The airline was already broken before the pandemic hit; the pandemic just provided cover for the rescue.— Court findings on Plus Ultra's financial condition
The rescue happened fast, proper procedures were skipped, and the fund's legal and financial advisors were never put out to competitive bidding.— Judge's investigation into SEPI's handling of Plus Ultra
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Plus Ultra matter so much if it was such a small airline? Couldn't the government have just let it fail?
Exactly—that's the point. With 0.01 percent market share, its collapse would have cost Spain almost nothing in economic terms. The fact that they rescued it anyway, and so quickly, is what made people ask: who was really being helped here?
The source mentions Zapatero's history as a lobbyist for socialist dictatorships. Was this about Venezuela specifically?
That's the working theory. Plus Ultra was Venezuelan-connected, and Zapatero had a long track record of advocating for left-wing regimes in Latin America and China. Someone was clearly intermediating between the airline and the government. The question was always: who and why?
But couldn't the company have just been genuinely in trouble because of the pandemic?
No—that's what makes this so damning. The airline was already broken before covid hit. Its own auditor said it would have gone bankrupt in 2020 anyway. The pandemic didn't cause its problems; it just provided cover for the rescue.
What about the tax debt? Couldn't that have disqualified it?
It should have. The rules were clear: companies had to be current on taxes. Plus Ultra owed 452,000 euros. They got an extension, and the government argued that counted as being current. It's the kind of technical argument that only works if you're determined to make it work.
Why did Dolores Delgado's intervention matter so much?
A judge had already frozen the money because something looked wrong. Then the prosecutor's office was going to keep it frozen. But Delgado, as attorney general, ordered them to change course and release it. That's not normal. That's someone at the very top making sure the money got out.
And now there are two more rescues being investigated?
Yes. Air Europa and Duro Felguera. If this was a one-off mistake, maybe you believe it. But if the same network was involved in three different rescues, all of them questionable, all of them involving connected interests—then you're looking at something systematic.