Neither side fully trusts the other. But they both need each other.
Xi Jinping's journey to Pyongyang this week is less a gesture of friendship than a quiet act of strategic retrieval — an attempt by Beijing to reclaim influence over a neighbor it has never fully trusted but cannot afford to surrender. As Russia and North Korea deepen a military partnership sealed in blood on Ukrainian battlefields, China finds itself watching its only formal defense ally drift toward a rival's orbit. The visit reflects a timeless tension in great-power politics: the difficulty of holding close what you cannot control, and the cost of letting go.
- Russia's deepening military alliance with North Korea — including a mutual defense pact and the deaths of roughly 2,300 North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine — has quietly alarmed Beijing, which fears losing its singular strategic foothold on the Korean Peninsula.
- A six-year chill between Xi and Kim left China visibly sidelined as Pyongyang warmed to Moscow, with Chinese diplomats skipping North Korean celebrations and senior exchanges going dark throughout 2024.
- Beijing is now moving urgently to reverse the drift: Xi hosted Kim at a Beijing military parade, trade with North Korea surged to a six-year high of $2.3 billion, and passenger rail between the two capitals has resumed after years of silence.
- China's leverage is constrained by its own contradictions — publicly pressuring Kim on nuclear weapons risks pushing him further toward Putin, yet tolerating the Russia-North Korea axis could trigger a stronger US-Japan-South Korea military response.
- Kim, for his part, is hedging: aware that Russia's wartime need for North Korean support may fade with any peace deal, he has reason to keep Beijing close — but on his own terms, not China's.
Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea this week is less about reviving old solidarity than about arresting a strategic loss. For Beijing, North Korea is a paradox — a neighbor it cannot control yet cannot afford to lose. The two countries share a bond described as "forged in blood" during the Korean War, but in recent years that bond has quietly frayed, even as North Korea has grown conspicuously closer to Russia.
The signs of cooling were subtle but telling. China's ambassador skipped North Korea's founding anniversary celebrations in 2024. There were no senior-level exchanges throughout the year. Meanwhile, Pyongyang and Moscow signed a mutual defense pact during Putin's 2024 visit, and North Korean troops began dying in Ukraine — approximately 2,300 of them, according to a BBC investigation. North Korea is also accused of supplying Russia with ammunition in exchange for oil and aid. Beijing watched all of this with growing unease.
China's concern is structural: it holds only one formal defense treaty in the world, and it is with North Korea. A Kim Jong Un less dependent on Beijing means reduced Chinese leverage across the entire region. So Xi moved. He invited Kim to a military parade in Beijing — their first formal summit in six years — praised the relationship in warm terms, and conspicuously said nothing about North Korea's nuclear arsenal. China also surged exports to Pyongyang and restarted passenger rail service between the two capitals, both calculated signals of renewed commitment.
Yet Beijing's position is genuinely difficult. Pressing Kim too hard on nuclear weapons risks accelerating his turn toward Putin. Tolerating the Russia-North Korea military axis, however, could provoke a stronger trilateral response from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul — an outcome Beijing fears. China and Russia jointly vetoed new UN sanctions on North Korea in 2022, but that alignment masks real Chinese ambivalence about where the partnership is heading.
The relationship between Xi and Kim has never been easy. When Kim inherited power, he moved fast to accelerate North Korea's nuclear program — overseeing more missile tests and nuclear detonations in his first six years than his father and grandfather combined. Beijing was alarmed. Xi visited South Korea before ever meeting Kim, a widely read diplomatic snub. Pyongyang responded by calling China a "turncoat and our enemy."
It was only in 2018, as sanctions began to bite, that Kim made his first foreign trip — boarding his armored train to Beijing. That cautious recalibration held through subsequent diplomacy: Kim would meet US and South Korean leaders, but always after consulting China first. The message was that Pyongyang would not negotiate without Beijing's backing.
Today, North Korea remains both buffer and burden for China. Kim wants Chinese protection without Chinese control. Neither side fully trusts the other. But both believe, for now, that they need each other — and that fragile calculation is what Xi is traveling to Pyongyang to reinforce, even as Moscow's shadow stretches longer across the peninsula.
Xi Jinping is heading to North Korea this week, and the visit is less about rekindling old friendship than it is about preventing a rival from stealing a crucial relationship. For Beijing, North Korea represents something paradoxical: a neighbour it cannot control but absolutely cannot afford to lose. The two countries invoke their shared history—"forged in blood" during the Korean War—yet in recent years, mistrust has quietly corroded the bond. Now, with Russia and North Korea growing closer by the month, China is scrambling to reassert its influence over a strategically vital yet deeply unpredictable partner.
The cooling between Beijing and Pyongyang has been visible, if subtle. When the two countries marked 75 years of diplomatic relations in October 2024, the public messaging was muted. China's ambassador skipped North Korea's founding celebrations the month before. There were no senior-level exchanges throughout the year—a stark contrast to Pyongyang's increasingly warm embrace of Moscow. That growing closeness with Russia is what has unsettled Beijing most. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has deepened military cooperation with Putin, culminating in a mutual defence pact signed during Putin's 2024 visit to Pyongyang. According to a BBC investigation, approximately 2,300 North Korean soldiers have died fighting for Russia against Ukraine. Pyongyang is also accused of supplying ammunition for Russia's war effort in exchange for oil and aid—a development that has alarmed Washington and its allies, and quietly rattled China.
Beijing's concern is straightforward: if Russia becomes the dominant influence in Pyongyang, China loses leverage. China has only one formal defence treaty in the world, and it is with North Korea. A more confident, less dependent Kim Jong Un would mean reduced Chinese power in the region. So late last year, Xi invited Kim to a military parade in Beijing, keeping him prominently by his side alongside Putin. It was their first formal summit in six years. Xi praised the two as "good neighbours, good friends and good comrades bound by a shared destiny" and called for closer strategic coordination. Notably absent from the public statements was any mention of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. Beijing has also surged its exports to North Korea to around $2.3 billion last year—the highest level in six years—and restarted passenger train services between Beijing and Pyongyang after a six-year gap. These are calculated efforts to pull Pyongyang back into China's orbit.
Yet Beijing faces a delicate calculus. If China takes a strong public stance against North Korea's nuclear programme, it risks pushing Kim further into Putin's arms. In 2022, China and Russia together vetoed a US-led United Nations resolution to impose new sanctions over North Korea's missile tests. At the same time, Beijing has "mixed feelings" about the Moscow-Pyongyang partnership. On one hand, it distracts Washington and complicates US strategy in multiple theatres, which indirectly benefits China. But expanding military cooperation between Russia and North Korea could spark a stronger trilateral military response from the United States, Japan, and South Korea—something that would deeply worry Beijing.
For Kim, the pragmatic calculation is clear. If the war in Ukraine ends, Russia's need for North Korean support could diminish. And unlike an isolated Putin, Xi has been welcoming world leaders to Beijing. So Kim needs to ensure he is not left relying on a weakening partner. But this relationship was troubled from the start. When Kim inherited power, his priorities differed sharply from his father's. While Kim Jong Il visited China repeatedly and relied on Beijing's backing, his son moved quickly to accelerate North Korea's nuclear programme. In his first six years in power, Kim oversaw around 90 ballistic missile tests and four nuclear detonations—more than his father and grandfather combined. This alarmed Beijing. The execution of Kim's uncle, Jang Song Thaek, seen by China as a stabilising figure, deepened the rift further. Xi responded with rare diplomatic signals of displeasure, visiting South Korea in 2014 before ever meeting Kim—a move widely viewed as a snub. North Korea responded by calling China a "turncoat and our enemy."
It was only in 2018, as sanctions over his nuclear programme began to bite, that Kim made his first known foreign trip. He got on his armoured train and headed to Beijing. That meeting marked the start of a cautious recalibration. Kim would go on to meet US and South Korean leaders, but it was always after consulting China. The message was clear: Pyongyang would not negotiate without Beijing's backing. Today, North Korea serves as both buffer and burden for China. It keeps US forces at arm's length, but its weapons tests destabilise the region. Kim, meanwhile, wants Chinese protection without Chinese control. Neither side fully trusts the other. But for now, they both believe they need the other, and that is enough to keep them talking. Xi's visit this week will test whether that fragile understanding can hold as Moscow's shadow grows longer over Pyongyang.
Citações Notáveis
China wants to ensure that its interests vis-à-vis North Korea are protected at a time of rapid convergence between Moscow and Pyongyang.— Ankit Panda, nuclear policy specialist at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
If China takes a strong stance against Pyongyang's nuclear programme, this would only push North Korea more into the arms of Putin.— Victor Cha, president of foreign policy department at Center for Strategic and International Studies
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does China care so much about North Korea when the relationship is so strained?
Because it's the only formal defence treaty China has with any country. Lose that, and you lose your buffer against US influence on your border. It's not about affection—it's about strategic position.
But if they don't trust each other, what's the point of Xi's visit?
It's a reminder that Beijing still has leverage. China sends money, food, oil. Russia can't replace that yet. Xi is essentially saying: don't forget who's been keeping you alive.
Is China worried about North Korea's nuclear weapons?
Deeply. But they can't say so publicly without pushing Kim toward Putin. So they stay silent while also trying to keep him close. It's a contradiction they're living with.
What happens if Russia wins in Ukraine?
That's the nightmare scenario for Beijing. If Putin emerges stronger, he becomes an even more attractive partner for Kim. China's leverage shrinks further.
So Xi is racing against time?
In a way. He's trying to reset the relationship before the calculus shifts too far. The military parade, the trade surge, the train service—all of it is saying: stay with us, we're still relevant.
Can he succeed?
Maybe. Kim is pragmatic. He knows Russia is weakened and isolated. But it depends on how long the Ukraine war lasts and whether Beijing can offer Kim something Russia can't.