West African Scientists Warn of Weakening Health Systems Amid Disease Outbreak Risks

Historical Ebola outbreak (2014-2016) killed at least 11,000 people; current Bundibugyo and Ebola outbreaks in Congo have killed over 3,600 with likely three times higher actual toll.
We shouldn't wait for an epidemic to emerge before responding
A Togolese laboratory scientist warns that anticipating outbreaks is essential, as response after emergence may come too late.
Mark

So these scientists are saying West African health systems are getting worse, not better, even after Ebola and COVID?

Mimi

That's exactly it. They've seen the pattern: when there's no active crisis, funding dries up, equipment deteriorates, trained people leave. The systems that were built during emergencies start to fall apart.

Luke

But how do we know the systems are actually weaker? Is that based on specific data about diagnostic capacity, or is it more of an observation from people in the field?

Mimi

The source doesn't give us specific metrics—it's more the assessment of laboratory scientists who work in the region. They're saying maintenance has waned, but you're right that we don't have hard numbers on what that looks like.

Mark

And right now there are active outbreaks happening—Ebola and this Bundibugyo virus in Congo. So the warning isn't just theoretical.

Mimi

No. The Bundibugyo virus has killed over 3,600 people, and it spread for weeks without being detected. That's the real-world consequence of weak detection systems.

Luke

Though we should note the Africa CDC thinks the actual death toll is three times higher than reported. So we're working with incomplete information even now.

Mark

What would it actually take to fix this? Is it just money?

Mimi

The scientists say governments need to invest in diagnostic capacity and regional cooperation. But one scientist specifically said they need to invest in people as much as infrastructure—training, retention, making sure skilled workers stay in the system.

Luke

That's harder to fund and measure than buying equipment. It's also the part that tends to get cut first when budgets tighten.

Mark

So the real question is whether governments will maintain this investment when there's no outbreak happening.

Mimi

Exactly. That's what the scientists are asking them to do.

  • A congress of West African laboratory scientists in Togo's capital has issued an urgent warning: the region's disease detection systems are weakening precisely when they need to be strongest.
  • Congo's simultaneous Ebola and Bundibugyo outbreaks — with over 3,600 official deaths and a likely true toll three times higher — reveal how a virus can circulate silently for weeks before authorities even know it exists.
  • The deeper threat is a familiar cycle: governments invest during crises, then allow diagnostic equipment to decay, personnel to leave, and hard-won infrastructure to atrophy once the immediate danger fades.
  • Scientists are calling for sustained funding, trained personnel, and regional cooperation as concrete commitments — not aspirational language — arguing that the difference between containment and catastrophe is built during periods of relative calm.
  • Without a structural break from this pattern of crisis and complacency, West Africa's health systems may once again be caught unprepared when the next major outbreak crosses a border unannounced.

In Lomé, Togo, laboratory scientists from across West Africa have raised a collective alarm: the region's capacity to detect and contain disease outbreaks is quietly eroding, even as the pathogens that exploit such gaps have not. Drawing on the hard lessons of Ebola's devastating sweep through Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone between 2014 and 2016, and on the ongoing toll of Bundibugyo and Ebola in Congo, these researchers are urging governments to invest in diagnostic infrastructure and regional cooperation not in the heat of crisis, but in the calm before it — because by the time the next epidemic announces itself, the window for preparation will already have closed.

At a congress in Lomé this week, laboratory scientists from across West Africa delivered a pointed message to their governments: the region's ability to detect disease outbreaks before they spiral is deteriorating, and the consequences of that deterioration could be catastrophic. Kossi Kabo, who co-chaired the gathering and leads Togo's Association of Medical Biologists, was direct — waiting for an epidemic to emerge before responding is already too late.

The warning is grounded in painful history. The 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak killed at least 11,000 people across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, exposing just how fragile the region's health infrastructure truly was. That fragility has not been resolved. Since mid-May, Congo has been battling both a new Ebola outbreak and a separate Bundibugyo virus epidemic — a rare pathogen that has killed more than 3,600 people among nearly 7,500 confirmed cases, with Africa CDC estimating the real toll is likely three times higher. Critically, the virus spread undetected for several weeks before authorities identified it. A Hantavirus detection on a cruise ship near Cape Verde added another reminder that disease moves without regard for borders or quiet seasons.

What troubles the scientists most is a pattern they know well: when no immediate epidemic looms, governments allow health systems to quietly weaken. Equipment goes unmaintained, training lapses, skilled personnel drift away. Arthur Bodurie Calvin Garber of Sierra Leone's Association of Medical Laboratory Scientists stressed that investment must extend to people — the technicians and public health workers who are the actual first line of detection.

The scientists gathered in Lomé are asking their governments to break a cycle of crisis and complacency — to treat disease detection infrastructure as something that must be built and sustained in peacetime, not assembled in panic. The next major outbreak will come. Whether the region can catch it early enough to matter depends on decisions made now, in the absence of emergency.

In Togo's capital this week, laboratory scientists from across West Africa gathered with an urgent message for their governments: the region's ability to catch disease outbreaks before they spread has eroded, and the cost of that erosion could be catastrophic.

The warning came from researchers who have watched health systems weaken even as the threats have not disappeared. Kossi Kabo, who heads Togo's Association of Medical Biologists and co-chaired the congress, put it plainly: "We need to anticipate these outbreaks. We shouldn't wait for an epidemic to emerge somewhere before responding. By then, it would be too late." The scientists called on governments to invest in diagnostic capacity, strengthen disease detection networks, and build regional cooperation—not as abstract goals, but as concrete infrastructure that could mean the difference between containment and catastrophe.

The urgency is not theoretical. Between 2014 and 2016, an Ebola outbreak killed at least 11,000 people across West Africa, with Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone bearing the heaviest toll. That outbreak exposed the fragility of the region's health systems. More recently, the region has faced new threats. Since mid-May, Congo has been battling both a fresh Ebola outbreak and a separate epidemic of Bundibugyo virus, a rare pathogen that has killed more than 3,600 people among nearly 7,500 confirmed cases. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates the actual death toll is likely three times higher than official figures. What makes this outbreak particularly alarming is that the virus circulated undetected for several weeks before authorities identified it. In May, Hantavirus was also detected on a cruise ship that docked off Cape Verde, a reminder that disease does not respect borders or the absence of major outbreaks.

The scientists' concern is rooted in a pattern they have observed: when there is no immediate epidemic threatening the region, governments and institutions allow their health systems to atrophy. Investment lapses. Diagnostic equipment goes unmaintained. Personnel are not trained or retained. The infrastructure that took years to build can deteriorate in months of neglect. Arthur Bodurie Calvin Garber, president of the Sierra Leone Association of Medical Laboratory Scientists, emphasized that governments must invest not just in equipment and facilities but in people—the scientists, technicians, and public health workers who actually detect and respond to outbreaks.

What the scientists are describing is a cycle of crisis and complacency. Ebola and COVID-19 taught hard lessons about how quickly a regional health system can be overwhelmed. Yet without sustained funding and attention during periods of relative calm, those lessons fade. The current outbreaks in Congo demonstrate that the region remains vulnerable to diseases that spread silently before detection. The scientists gathered in Lome are essentially asking their governments to break that cycle—to maintain and strengthen disease detection capacity not because an outbreak is imminent, but because one will eventually come, and the region's ability to respond depends on what is built and sustained now.

We need to anticipate these outbreaks. We shouldn't wait for an epidemic to emerge somewhere before responding. By then, it would be too late.
— Kossi Kabo, head of the Association of Medical Biologists of Togo
Governments must invest in people as much as infrastructure.
— Arthur Bodurie Calvin Garber, president of the Sierra Leone Association of Medical Laboratory Scientists
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