If Israel killed the negotiators, there would be no one left to negotiate with
In the spring of 2026, American diplomats moved quietly through Middle Eastern capitals carrying an unusual warning: Israel may be planning to kill the very Iranian officials sitting across the negotiating table. The men at the center of this concern—Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—had already survived multiple attempts on their lives, yet continued to pursue a ceasefire that Washington feared could not survive without them. What unfolds here is a story as old as diplomacy itself: the fragile human vessels through which peace must pass, threatened by those who believe war has not yet finished its work.
- A conflict that opened with the Israeli killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei in February has left Washington and Jerusalem pursuing fundamentally incompatible visions of what Iran's future should be.
- Israel moved to strike Ghalibaf's aircraft as he returned from talks with Vice President Vance—two Israeli jets entered Iranian airspace, forcing an emergency landing in Mashhad and a road journey to Tehran.
- Senior Iranian officials seen as potential pragmatists, including Ali Larijani and Kamal Kharazi, were killed during active negotiations, narrowing the field of those willing and able to talk.
- The June framework agreement—covering the Strait of Hormuz and setting terms for nuclear discussions—was viewed by Israeli officials as a catastrophe that fell far short of their goals of regime change and proxy dismantlement.
- US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner continue to advance the peace process under Trump's direction, but the talks remain suspended over a single unresolved question: whether Washington can protect its negotiating partners from its own ally.
In the spring of 2026, as ceasefire talks between Iran and the United States began to take shape, American officials grew alarmed by a threat that could unravel everything: Israel might try to kill the Iranian negotiators sitting across the table. Washington moved quietly through Middle Eastern capitals, asking governments to pass a warning to Tehran. Two men were at the center of the concern—Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, both on Israel's target list since March.
The conflict had opened with devastating force on February 28, when an Israeli strike killed Supreme Leader Khamenei and other top officials. In the early weeks, Israel concentrated on decapitation strikes. Among the dead were Ali Larijani and Kamal Kharazi—men the Trump administration had hoped to negotiate with, both killed while engaged in talks with the United States.
By April, when ceasefire negotiations began in earnest, American and Israeli objectives had already diverged sharply. Washington wanted a deal. Israel feared the United States was stopping the war too soon, with Iran's hardline leadership only growing more entrenched. The June framework agreement—aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz and setting terms for nuclear discussions—was seen in Jerusalem as a catastrophe, falling short of goals that included regime change and the dismantling of Iran's proxy forces.
The threat to the two negotiators was not theoretical. Ghalibaf had survived being pulled from rubble twice. Returning from talks with Vice President Vance, Iranian intelligence intercepted word of an Israeli plan to strike his aircraft. Two Israeli jets entered Iranian airspace. The plane made an emergency landing in Mashhad, and Ghalibaf completed the journey to Tehran by road.
The attempts did not stop the talks. Both men traveled to Qatar and Switzerland in May, becoming central to the ceasefire effort and the broader diplomatic push led on the American side by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The question hanging over everything was whether a peace process could survive the fundamental disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem about what Iran's future should look like—and whether the men trying to negotiate that future would live to see it resolved.
In the spring of 2026, as fragile ceasefire talks between Iran and the United States began to take shape, American officials grew alarmed about a threat that could unravel everything: Israel might try to kill the very Iranian negotiators sitting across the table. The US moved quietly through Middle Eastern capitals, asking governments to pass a warning to Tehran. Two men were at the center of the concern—Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign minister, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Parliament. Both had been on Israel's target list since March, but Washington feared that removing them now would collapse the talks that had begun in early April and reignite a war that had already claimed senior Iranian leaders.
The conflict itself had opened with devastating force on February 28, when an Israeli strike killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top officials, drawing on American intelligence. In the early weeks, Israel concentrated on decapitation—killing as many senior figures as possible. Among the dead were Ali Larijani, Iran's top national security official, and Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister. Both men were considered potential pragmatists, the kind of leaders the Trump administration had hoped to negotiate with. They were killed while engaged in talks with the United States.
By April, when ceasefire negotiations began in earnest, American and Israeli objectives had already begun to diverge sharply. Washington wanted a deal. Israel remained skeptical from the moment the first two-week ceasefire took hold, with broad concern in Israeli society that the United States was stopping the war too soon. Rather than being toppled, Iran's hardline leadership had only grown more entrenched, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had tightened its grip further. Israeli officials saw the preliminary framework agreement reached in June—which aimed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and set terms for later nuclear discussions—as a catastrophe. It fell short of their war aims: regime change, dismantling Iran's proxy forces, and severe damage to the missile program. They also feared it would channel billions of dollars back into Iran, allowing rapid reconstruction without meaningful nuclear constraints.
The threat to Araghchi and Ghalibaf was not theoretical. Ghalibaf had narrowly escaped death twice since 2025—once during the previous year's twelve-day war and again after this year's conflict began. Both times, officials said, he was pulled from beneath rubble. The danger intensified when he was returning to Tehran after talks with US Vice President JD Vance. Iranian intelligence intercepted information suggesting Israel was planning to strike the aircraft carrying him. Two Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace. The plane made an emergency landing in Mashhad, Iran's closest airport to the Pakistani border, and Ghalibaf completed his journey to Tehran by road.
Yet the assassination threat did not stop the negotiations. In May, both Ghalibaf and Araghchi traveled to Qatar and then to Switzerland for peace talks. The two men had become central to the ceasefire effort and to the broader diplomatic push for a more durable peace with the United States. The talks were being led on the American side by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law. According to officials, Trump wanted the peace process to continue unfolding. The question hanging over the negotiations was whether it could survive the fundamental disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem about what Iran's future should look like—and whether the men trying to negotiate that future would live to see it resolved.
Notable Quotes
US officials believed any strike against the two negotiators would wreck the negotiations and reignite the fighting— US officials, reported by The New York Times
Israeli officials saw the preliminary framework agreement as falling short of war aims of regime change and severely damaging Iran's missile program— Israeli officials and commentators
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did the US feel compelled to warn Iran about Israeli intentions? Wasn't that a breach of the alliance?
The US was caught between two allies with incompatible goals. Israel wanted regime change. The US wanted a negotiated settlement. If Israel killed the Iranian negotiators, there would be no one left to negotiate with—the talks would collapse and the war would restart. The warning was a way of saying: we need these men alive if this is going to work.
But Israel had already killed other senior Iranian officials earlier in the war. Why would they suddenly stop?
They wouldn't, necessarily. That's the point. During the intense fighting, killing Iranian leaders was part of Israel's strategy. But once talks began, the calculus changed for Washington. The US believed any strike against Araghchi or Ghalibaf would be seen as sabotage of the peace process—and it probably would have been.
Ghalibaf had two near-death experiences. How does someone keep negotiating after that?
You keep going because the alternative is worse. He was pulled from rubble twice. Then his plane had to make an emergency landing because Israeli jets were in the airspace. But in May, he and Araghchi were both traveling to Qatar and Switzerland for talks. Fear doesn't stop necessity.
What did Israel actually want that the June agreement didn't give them?
Regime change. The dismantling of Iran's proxy forces. Severe damage to the missile program. The agreement reopened the Strait of Hormuz and set a framework for nuclear talks later. To Israel, that looked like Iran getting a reprieve—billions of dollars flowing back in, no real constraints on nuclear ambitions, the hardline government still in power.
So the US and Israel were fighting the same war but for different outcomes?
Exactly. They started aligned—the US provided intelligence for the initial strike that killed Khamenei. But very quickly, their war aims split. Israel wanted to finish what it started. The US wanted to stop the bleeding and negotiate a settlement. By June, they were working against each other.