For nearly a decade, Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran have been locked in a slow war of attrition across the Levant — one that October 7th did not ignite so much as accelerate. A broad majority of Israeli Jews now believe that neither Hamas nor Hezbollah can be left intact, viewing both as instruments of an Iranian project aimed at their destruction. The escalation underway reflects not merely one leader's political survival, but a collective Israeli judgment that the cost of stopping short outweighs the cost of pressing on — even as the question of how this ends remains, dangerously, unanswered.
Understanding Israeli calculations in Lebanon escalation
Israel can win those battles. But it cannot win the war without a political exit.
Mark
So the argument here is that Netanyahu wants the war to continue for political reasons, but that's not the whole story?
Mimi
Right. Netanyahu has incentives to keep fighting, but the polling suggests a real majority of Israelis—not just his base—don't want to stop until Hezbollah and Hamas are seriously weakened. They see Iran behind both groups.
Luke
But how much of that is genuine public opinion and how much is shaped by the government's framing? We don't have the actual polling numbers in the piece.
Mimi
Fair point. We're told "a vast majority" and "many don't want to stop," but those aren't precise measurements. It's an interpretation of Israeli sentiment.
Mark
The piece keeps coming back to this idea that Israel can't win without a political exit. What does that actually mean?
Mimi
It means you can destroy Hezbollah's military capacity—Israel did something similar in 1982—but unless you have a political settlement, you haven't solved the underlying problem. The threat returns.
Luke
And the piece identifies two things needed: neutralizing Iran's threat and Palestinian self-determination. But it doesn't explain how those are supposed to happen, or who makes them happen.
Mimi
That's the missing piece. The author is saying we need to think about where we want to be in five years, but he's not laying out a concrete path.
Mark
He mentions Saudi Arabia as key. Why?
Mimi
Because Saudi Arabia has been moving toward normalization with Israel. That deal could be the leverage point for getting everyone to the table—but only if it includes real containment of Iran and actual Palestinian statehood, not just declarations.
Luke
The piece also warns that escalation could spiral unpredictably—a missile hitting an ammonia plant, an assassination attempt. But those are hypotheticals. We don't know if they're likely.
Mimi
True. He's identifying risks, not predicting what will happen. The point is that the escalation ladder has gaps in it, and small incidents could trigger something larger.
Mark
So what's the actual argument? That Israel is right to fight, or that this is all heading toward disaster?
Mimi
Neither, exactly. It's that most Israelis believe they have to fight, that belief is understandable given how they see the threat, but the current path doesn't lead anywhere good without a political strategy behind it.
Il Polso
- A decade of Iranian entrenchment across Syria and Lebanon has left Hezbollah more capable than ever, even as Israel has scored tactical victories against its supply lines — the threat has grown faster than the strikes could contain it.
- Israeli public opinion has hardened: most Jewish Israelis no longer believe negotiations can end the conflict, and polling shows they want both Hamas and Hezbollah degraded as fighting forces before any ceasefire is considered.
- Netanyahu has political incentives to prolong the war, but the pressure to fight on runs deeper than one leader — it reflects a population that sees Iran's hand behind both organizations and views the current moment as existential rather than tactical.
- The architecture of escalation is missing critical rungs — a single miscalculation, a missile striking civilian infrastructure or a high-profile assassination, could trigger a wider war that none of the parties say they want.
- Diplomatic efforts at the United Nations are largely dismissed in Tel Aviv, and without a regional framework anchored by Gulf states and a credible answer to Palestinian statehood, the current suffering risks becoming the floor, not the ceiling.
For nearly a decade, Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran have been locked in a slow war of attrition across the Levant — one that October 7th did not ignite so much as accelerate. A broad majority of Israeli Jews now believe that neither Hamas nor Hezbollah can be left intact, viewing both as instruments of an Iranian project aimed at their destruction. The escalation underway reflects not merely one leader's political survival, but a collective Israeli judgment that the cost of stopping short outweighs the cost of pressing on — even as the question of how this ends remains, dangerously, unanswered.
The current escalation between Israel and Hezbollah did not emerge suddenly. For nearly a decade, Israel has traded blows with Hezbollah across Syria and Lebanon, targeting Iranian weapons shipments and scoring tactical wins — yet Hezbollah has only grown stronger, acquiring more precise missiles and battle-tested fighters from years of combat alongside Assad's forces.
What has changed is the Israeli public's calculus. A broad majority of Jewish Israelis no longer believe negotiations will resolve the Gaza conflict, and many have abandoned hope for any ceasefire that leaves Hamas or Hezbollah intact. Netanyahu may have personal political reasons for keeping the war going, but polling shows that even Israelis who would prefer a different prime minister do not want to stop fighting until both groups have been seriously degraded. Behind both organizations, most Israelis see Iran — a state they believe is committed to their elimination. When Iran's new leadership speaks of peace at the United Nations, it is widely read in Israel as tactical maneuvering, not genuine intent.
The parallel to Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009 is instructive but imperfect. Then, as now, Israel resisted outside pressure to stop before it felt the job was done. Most Israelis today believe this conflict is categorically different — that it touches something existential — and they are prepared to absorb the costs.
Yet the hardest question goes unanswered: how does this end? Israel can degrade Hezbollah's military capacity, as it has attempted before. What it cannot do is win without a political exit. That requires two things: long-term containment of Iran, and a genuine answer to Palestinian self-determination — not as an abstraction, but as a foundation for regional stability.
None of the parties wants full-scale war. Iran believes it is winning through attrition. Hezbollah has little appetite for escalation if Israel avoids a ground invasion. But the ladder of escalation has missing rungs, and a single miscalculation — a missile striking critical infrastructure, an assassination attempt on a senior official — could trigger consequences no one intended.
Diplomatic statements carry little weight in this environment. What matters is working backward from where the region needs to be in five years. The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, will be essential to any durable framework. The promise of normalization with Israel remains attractive to Riyadh, but the price has risen — it will require real containment of Iran and a credible path to Palestinian statehood. Without that architecture, what is visible now will not be a crisis to be resolved. It will be a foundation for something worse.
The escalation between Israel and Hezbollah did not arrive without warning. For nearly a decade, a grinding standoff has defined the region—Israel, Hezbollah, Iran, and Iraqi Shia militias locked in a conflict that intensified as Iran worked to deepen its physical footprint across Syria and Lebanon, pushing toward the Golan Heights. Israeli warplanes have repeatedly targeted the supply lines carrying Iranian missiles and munitions through Syria to Hezbollah, and they have scored tactical victories. Yet Hezbollah has only grown more formidable, acquiring more precise missiles and battle-hardened fighters from years of combat alongside Assad's forces in Syria.
What has shifted is the Israeli calculation about what comes next. A broad majority of Jewish Israelis have lost faith that negotiations will end the Gaza conflict. Many have abandoned hope for a ceasefire that leaves Hamas or Hezbollah intact. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have his own political reasons for keeping the war alive, but polling suggests that even Israelis who would prefer a different leader do not want to stop fighting until both groups—particularly Hezbollah, which has explicitly tied its actions to Gaza—have been degraded as military threats. Behind both organizations, Israelis see Iran, a state they believe is committed to their destruction. When Iran's new leadership speaks of peace at the United Nations, many Israelis dismiss it as tactical maneuvering. They believe Israel cannot unilaterally end Iran's campaign of attrition against them, but if they can at least cripple Hezbollah and eliminate Hamas as a fighting force, they can reduce the threat to something manageable.
This framing echoes an earlier moment. In late 2008 and early 2009, as Operation Cast Lead unfolded in Gaza, Western diplomats scrambled at the United Nations to broker a ceasefire. Israel resisted, arguing it needed more time to finish the job. What Israeli planners meant by that was limited strikes designed to deter future attacks. The human toll was staggering, and Israel's international standing suffered. Yet most Israelis today believe this conflict is different—that it touches something existential. They are willing to absorb the costs because they see no alternative.
But the harder question remains unanswered: How does this end? Israel can degrade Hezbollah's military capacity. The Israeli Defense Forces attempted something similar in 1982, and they can win those battles. What they cannot do is win the war without a political exit. Two things are required. First, the long-term neutralization of Hezbollah as a threat—which means, in practice, containing Iran. Second, Palestinian self-determination, which is necessary not just for justice but for the region to address economic development, extremism, and climate change.
None of the parties wants a full-scale war. Iran believes it is winning through attrition and sees no reason to escalate. Hezbollah has little appetite for it, especially if Israel avoids a ground invasion. Israel has spent years preparing for this conflict and has options short of invasion. Yet the architecture of escalation is fragile. It is missing rungs. A ballistic missile striking an ammonia plant in Haifa, or an assassination attempt on a senior Israeli minister, could trigger something no one intended. Iran and Hezbollah must calculate how much damage they can absorb without losing capacity or credibility. Israel must ensure it can return 80,000 citizens to the north safely. These calculations are happening in real time, and it is unclear whether outside powers can meaningfully influence them.
Diplomatic statements at the United Nations carry little weight now. The Biden administration has made clear it will not abandon Israel during wartime, and new arms shipments and naval deployments underscore that commitment. What matters is thinking seriously about where the region should be in five years and working backward to map a path there. This time, the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—will be crucial. The promise of normalization with Israel remains attractive, but the price has risen. It will require genuine containment of Iran and its proxies, and a real answer to Palestinian statehood, not merely words about it. Without that framework, the suffering visible now will not fade. It will deepen.
Citazioni salienti
Most Israelis think that this time it really is existential— Analysis of Israeli public sentiment on the current conflict
The problem with escalation ladders is that they are usually missing several rungs— On the unpredictability of how conflicts can spiral beyond intended bounds
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War & Conflict