Three Constitutional Paths to Remove German Chancellor Merz Amid Record-Low Approval

Friedrich Merz is still chancellor of Germany, but the ground beneath him has grown unstable. In early September, a representative survey by Infratest-Dimap found that only 13 percent of respondents believed he was doing a good job—a record low for his tenure. The same month, his Christian Democratic Union suffered a crushing defeat in Saxony-Anhalt's state election, with the party's vote share cut in half from 2021. The losses have emboldened critics, even within his own ranks, who point to his communication style as a persistent liability. Yet Merz remains in the chancellor's office, and the question now circulating through Berlin's political circles is whether he will stay there.

Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, was designed to give chancellors staying power. The framers, writing in the shadow of Weimar's instability, built high walls around the office. There are only three ways to remove a sitting chancellor, and each one is deliberately difficult. The first is the simplest: Merz could resign. He could walk away tomorrow if he chose to. In May 1974, Willy Brandt of the Social Democrats did exactly that after a spy from East Germany was discovered in his inner circle. His coalition partners, the SPD and the Free Democrats, quickly agreed to continue governing together. Ten days later, Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt was elected chancellor with an absolute majority of Bundestag votes—what Germans call the "chancellor majority." Schmidt went on to lead the government for eight years. But Merz has shown no inclination to follow Brandt's path. He appears determined to hold on.

The second mechanism is the constructive vote of no-confidence. This is the instrument that would require a new majority in the Bundestag to coalesce around an alternative candidate. It happened in 1982, when Helmut Schmidt lost the support of his junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats, over economic policy disputes. The FDP joined forces with the opposition conservatives—the CDU and CSU—and together they put forward CDU leader Helmut Kohl as a replacement. Kohl won the vote, replaced Schmidt, and remained chancellor for sixteen years. For this to happen to Merz now, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats would have to break their coalition, or Merz's own party would have to turn against him publicly in parliament. Neither seems remotely likely. The CDU has a long tradition of loyalty to its leaders; ousting a chancellor through an open parliamentary vote is, for most conservative lawmakers, simply unthinkable. There is talk of Hendrik Wüst, the state premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, as a possible successor, but he has made no move to position himself. The probability of a constructive no-confidence vote succeeding is, by any realistic measure, very remote.

The third path is a confidence vote. Unlike some parliamentary systems, the German Bundestag cannot simply dissolve itself and call new elections. But a chancellor can ask parliament to vote on whether it still has confidence in him and his government. Several chancellors have used this mechanism strategically, coupling it with a vote on a contentious policy question. In November 2001, Gerhard Schröder linked a confidence vote to the question of whether Germany should deploy troops to Afghanistan as part of the NATO mission following the September 11 attacks. Schröder won the vote, stayed in office, and pursued his military policy. If a chancellor loses a confidence vote, the Bundestag can be dissolved and new elections called. The German President is not legally obliged to dissolve parliament, but typically does. Merz has already said he sees no point in calling for such a vote. There are no signs of significant defections from his coalition partners in parliament. Neither the SPD nor the CDU/CSU alliance has any appetite for new elections while their approval ratings remain depressed.

So the chancellor stays. For now, the machinery of government continues as it was. But Berlin's political atmosphere has grown volatile. In recent weeks and days, the dynamics have shifted rapidly enough that observers are cautious about ruling anything out entirely. Merz's record-low approval, the electoral losses, the criticism from within his own party—these are real pressures. Yet the constitutional architecture that protects German chancellors remains formidable, and the political will to activate any of the three removal mechanisms simply does not exist. The question is not whether Merz will be forced out, but whether the accumulating weight of unpopularity will eventually convince him to leave on his own.