They have screwed each other pretty badly.
Two leaders who bound their political destinies together in the conviction that a swift war could remake the Middle East now find themselves joined instead by the weight of a shared miscalculation. Benjamin Netanyahu, who spent decades lobbying Washington to confront Iran, finally secured Donald Trump's commitment to a February assault that promised regime change in days — and delivered instead a protracted conflict, a closed strait, and a global economic tremor. The silence between them, papered over by Netanyahu's insistence on 'full coordination,' speaks more honestly than either man's public statements. History has a way of making allies into mirrors, and what these two now see reflected is not victory but mutual entrapment.
- Netanyahu broke weeks of silence to insist his relationship with Trump remains strong — a protestation that observers read as confirmation the alliance is fracturing under the weight of a failed war.
- The February assault on Iran, sold to Trump as a swift Venezuela-style regime change, collapsed on every premise: the Iranian government held, the people did not revolt, and Revolutionary Guard forces inflicted devastating damage on U.S. bases and Gulf allies while closing the Strait of Hormuz.
- The United States pursued a Pakistani-brokered ceasefire in April without inviting Israel to the table, leaving Israeli officials to learn the terms through their own intelligence assets — a humiliation compounded when Trump publicly prohibited Israel from bombing Lebanon.
- Trump is now racing to resolve the Iran conflict before a pivotal May 14 meeting with Xi Jinping, while Netanyahu, facing elections by October, is calculating how to accept a temporary ceasefire without surrendering his longer strategic ambitions.
- Neither leader can easily break from the other: Trump admitting Netanyahu misled him into war would be a confession of manipulation, while Netanyahu still needs American cover — leaving both men, as one analyst put it, having 'screwed each other pretty badly.'
Benjamin Netanyahu's video message this week — insisting on 'full coordination' with Donald Trump and near-daily phone calls — arrived after weeks of Israeli press reports describing the opposite: Israel sidelined from Iran conflict decisions and excluded entirely from Pakistani-brokered peace negotiations. Political consultant Dahlia Scheindlin voiced what many observers were thinking. 'He is doing so much talking about how great the relationship is that it makes me rather concerned about how much tension there is,' she said.
The war that produced this tension began on February 28. Netanyahu had spent decades lobbying American presidents to confront Iran, helping persuade Trump to abandon the 2015 nuclear deal and, by this February, convincing him that regime change was not only justified but achievable within days. The pitch drew on a recent American success — the surprise removal of Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro — and on intelligence assessments, developed with Mossad director David Barnea, portraying Iran's government as on the verge of collapse. Three or four days, Netanyahu suggested, and it would be over.
U.S. military and intelligence officials warned of retaliation, Hormuz closure, and economic disruption. They were overruled. Every warning proved accurate. The Iranian people did not rise. The regime did not fall. The Revolutionary Guards struck U.S. bases and Gulf monarchies with unexpected force, closed the strait, and triggered a global economic crisis. By late March, Trump had quietly stopped mentioning Netanyahu in his public statements about the war.
When ceasefire talks began in April, Israel was not invited. The emerging terms ignored Iran's missile arsenal and proxy networks — both central to Israeli security doctrine. Trump rebuked Netanyahu publicly after Israel bombed Iran's South Pars gasfield, and on April 17 posted that Israel was 'PROHIBITED' from bombing Lebanon by the United States — an extraordinary public humiliation.
Now both men are calculating their next moves under severe constraint. Trump wants the war resolved before meeting Xi Jinping on May 14, unwilling to arrive in Beijing needing Chinese leverage over Iran. Netanyahu, facing elections by October and likely defeat, is expected to accept whatever ceasefire emerges — and then wait. As former U.S. ambassador Daniel Shapiro observed, Netanyahu has learned from Gaza and Lebanon that Trump's attention eventually moves on, and that a temporary pause is not a permanent concession.
Yet the trap holding them together is real. If Trump publicly turns on Netanyahu, he concedes he was drawn into a war on false premises. If Netanyahu breaks with Trump, he loses his last source of international cover. 'They have screwed each other pretty badly,' said former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas — a verdict that may stand as the defining epitaph of an alliance built on mutual ambition and undone by shared miscalculation.
Benjamin Netanyahu broke weeks of silence this week with a video message asserting he maintained "full coordination" with Donald Trump, claiming they spoke "almost daily." The timing was conspicuous. For weeks, Israeli newspapers had been reporting that Israel was being shut out of decisions about the Iran conflict and, more pointedly, excluded from Pakistani-brokered peace negotiations that the United States was actively pursuing. The immediate reaction from observers was telling: if Netanyahu felt compelled to insist so loudly that everything was fine, perhaps everything was not fine at all.
Dahlia Scheindlin, an American-Israeli political consultant, captured the skepticism plainly. "He is doing so much talking about how great the relationship is that it makes me rather concerned about how much tension there is," she said. "I wouldn't be surprised, as the war is clearly going very poorly from all perspectives related to the original goals." The war in question began on February 28, when the United States and Israel launched a devastating assault on Iran that was meant to reshape the region. Instead, it has become a source of friction between two leaders who had bound their political fates together so tightly that neither can easily escape the consequences.
Netanyahu had spent decades lobbying successive American presidents to join Israel in confronting Iran. He had waded into U.S. domestic politics in ways few foreign leaders dare, particularly when undermining the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran that had been Barack Obama's signature foreign policy achievement. He helped persuade Trump to withdraw from that deal in 2018, a move that accelerated Iran's nuclear programme and left the country with enough highly enriched uranium for roughly a dozen warheads. By February of this year, Netanyahu had convinced Trump that war was not just justified but winnable—and quick.
The pitch was shrewd. Just weeks earlier, U.S. forces had executed a stunning operation in Venezuela, whisking away President Nicolás Maduro in a surprise raid. According to Alon Pinkas, a former Israeli diplomat, Netanyahu used that success as a template. "He said to him: 'Look what you did in Venezuela. It was painless. It was effortless. It was beautiful. You changed the regime.'" Netanyahu then flooded Trump with intelligence assessments showing Iran's expanded missile capabilities and its stockpile of enriched uranium. Working with Mossad director David Barnea, he portrayed the Iranian government as ripe for collapse. The economy was in ruins, the people were on the verge of uprising, the Revolutionary Guards were weakening. Three or four days, Netanyahu suggested, and it would be over.
U.S. intelligence and military officials warned of the risks: Iranian retaliation against Gulf allies, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, economic upheaval. But Netanyahu and Trump's defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, prevailed with their argument that Iran's military was overrated and would lack the capacity to strike back effectively. They were wrong on every count. The Iranian people did not rise. The regime did not fall. The Revolutionary Guards proved far more capable than predicted, inflicting severe damage on U.S. military bases and Gulf monarchies, closing the Hormuz Strait, and triggering a global economic crisis. By late March, roughly thirty days into the conflict, Trump's public statements about the war had shifted noticeably. He stopped mentioning Israel and Netanyahu in his relentlessly upbeat assessments.
When U.S. negotiators began talking to Iranian counterparts and Pakistani mediators in preparation for a ceasefire announcement on April 8, Israel was not invited to the table. Israeli officials had to rely on their own intelligence assets to learn what was being discussed. The emerging peace terms made no mention of Iran's missile arsenal or its use of regional proxy forces—both central to Israeli security concerns. When Trump did reference Netanyahu, it was often to rebuke him. After Israel bombed Iran's South Pars gasfield, Trump said he had explicitly told Netanyahu not to do it. "On occasion, he'll do something, and if I don't like it … we're not doing that any more," the president said. When the ceasefire was agreed and Netanyahu interpreted it as excluding Lebanon, Trump initially went along, then reversed course entirely when the agreement seemed to unravel. On April 17, he posted on social media: "Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are PROHIBITED from doing so by the U.S.A. Enough is enough!!!" It was an unprecedented public humiliation of the Israeli prime minister.
Since then, Israeli officials have been telling reporters that the ceasefire is fragile and that renewed fighting is inevitable. There have been reports of intensive U.S.-Israeli military coordination resuming, though the anticipated strikes have not materialized. Trump, according to Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, is already looking past Iran. He has a critical meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping scheduled for May 14, and he wants the Iran war largely resolved before he arrives in Beijing. Walking into that meeting as a supplicant, needing China's help to pressure Iran into concessions, would undermine his negotiating position on the economic issues he wants to address with Xi. Netanyahu, however, has learned from past conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon that Trump's attention is finite. Even if forced to accept a temporary ceasefire that contradicts his own strategic interests, he can wait for Trump's focus to shift elsewhere and then resume operations. "If Trump reaches a deal, the Israelis will have to accept it for the time being, and then perhaps they will revisit it to 'mow the grass', as they say, on the missile programme or on the nuclear programme at some later time," Shapiro said.
Yet both men are trapped. Netanyahu must hold elections by October, and current polling suggests he will lose his office. Trump faces congressional elections that could render him a lame duck in domestic politics. The failed war will damage both of them at the ballot box. And as Pinkas observed, Netanyahu can always generate political waves in the United States—he is one of the few figures who can command as much press attention as Trump himself. The strategic failure of the Iran campaign has also become a kind of adhesive neither can easily dissolve. If Trump publicly turns on Netanyahu, he essentially admits he was led into a war under false pretenses. "The problem Trump has is that if he lashes out at Netanyahu, if he expresses his disillusionment or desperation, he basically admits he was led into this war," Pinkas said. "In other words, they have screwed each other pretty badly."
Notable Quotes
He is doing so much talking about how great the relationship is that it makes me rather concerned about how much tension there is.— Dahlia Scheindlin, American-Israeli political consultant
The problem Trump has is that if he lashes out at Netanyahu, if he expresses his disillusionment or desperation, he basically admits he was led into this war.— Alon Pinkas, former Israeli diplomat
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Netanyahu feel the need to release that video insisting everything was fine with Trump?
Because the silence had become deafening. For weeks, Israeli papers were reporting he'd been cut out of the loop entirely—not consulted on Iran strategy, excluded from the peace talks. When a leader has to publicly assert that his relationship with his most important ally is strong, it usually means it isn't.
But they launched this war together. How do you go from that kind of coordination to barely speaking?
The war itself broke the relationship. Netanyahu sold Trump on a quick victory—three or four days, he said. The Iranian people would rise up, the regime would collapse. None of that happened. Instead, Iran hit back hard, the Strait of Hormuz closed, and the global economy took a hit. By late March, Trump was already disappointed and looking for an exit.
So Trump started negotiating without Netanyahu?
Exactly. When the ceasefire talks began with Iran and Pakistani mediators, Israel wasn't even in the room. Netanyahu had to use his own intelligence to figure out what was being discussed. And the terms that emerged didn't address any of Israel's core concerns—the missiles, the proxy forces.
Trump publicly humiliated him over Lebanon, didn't he?
He did. Posted on social media that Israel was "PROHIBITED" from bombing Lebanon anymore. "Enough is enough!!!" For a sitting U.S. president to publicly forbid an Israeli prime minister from military action—that's extraordinary. It was a very public signal that the partnership had fractured.
Can they actually separate from each other now, or are they stuck together?
They're stuck. Netanyahu can't admit the war was a mistake without destroying his political standing before October elections. Trump can't publicly turn on Netanyahu without admitting he was led into a war under false pretenses. And Netanyahu knows Trump's attention will eventually shift elsewhere—it always does. So they're bound by mutual failure and mutual need to keep up appearances.
What happens next?
Trump wants the Iran situation largely resolved before his May 14 meeting with Xi Jinping. Netanyahu will accept whatever ceasefire Trump negotiates, then wait for Trump's focus to move to China and other priorities. Once Trump's attention is elsewhere, Israel will likely resume operations—what they call "mowing the grass." The relationship survives, but it's transactional now, not strategic.