The Iranian regime has proven that during a shutdown, they can kill.
In the silence imposed by one of the longest national internet shutdowns on record, a quiet resistance has taken shape: ordinary people risking imprisonment to carry small white satellite terminals across Iran's borders, so that those inside may speak and be heard. Since February, when a blackout severed nearly all Iranians from the outside world, underground networks have smuggled Starlink devices that bypass state-controlled infrastructure entirely, connecting citizens to uncensored information and allowing evidence of repression to reach the world. It is an old human story wearing new technology — the insistence that communication, like breath, cannot be indefinitely withheld. As authoritarian blackouts spread globally, reaching 313 incidents across 52 countries in 2025 alone, what happens in Iran has become a measure of how far governments will go, and how far people will go in response.
- Iran has kept nearly all of its citizens cut off from the global internet for over two months, a blackout that began amid airstrikes and follows a January crackdown that killed more than 6,500 protesters and led to 53,000 arrests.
- Only a privileged class of officials and state journalists hold 'white sim cards' granting unrestricted access, while everyone else navigates a country where even owning a Starlink terminal can bring espionage charges and a decade in prison.
- Smugglers like Sahand operate through complex cross-border networks funded by Iranians abroad, moving a dozen or more satellite terminals at a time into the hands of people willing to document and share what the regime wants hidden.
- At least 100 people have been arrested for Starlink possession, and the government's own minister admitted the blackout costs the economy roughly $35 million per day — yet the isolation for ordinary citizens continues.
- Human rights groups warn that 2025 set a record for internet shutdowns worldwide, framing Iran not as an outlier but as the sharpest edge of a global authoritarian trend that systematically silences civilian voices during moments of crisis.
Sahand speaks carefully, seated somewhere outside Iran, visibly aware of what his words could cost others. He is part of an underground network smuggling Starlink satellite terminals across the border into a country where the internet has been dark for more than two months and where possessing such a device can mean prison. "If even one extra person is able to access the internet," he says, "I think it's worth it."
Iran's current blackout began on February 28, following US and Israeli airstrikes, but it was not the first. A shutdown in January accompanied a government crackdown on nationwide protests that, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency, left more than 6,500 people dead and 53,000 arrested. Authorities justify the blackouts as security measures against espionage and cyberattack. In practice, only select officials and state media journalists retain full access through so-called "white sim cards." Everyone else is cut off entirely.
The Starlink terminals Sahand's network moves across the border connect directly to SpaceX satellites, bypassing Iran's controlled domestic infrastructure altogether. He says he has sent roughly a dozen into the country since January. The human rights organization Witness estimates at least 50,000 terminals are already inside Iran, a number activists believe has grown. A volunteer managing a Persian-language Telegram channel told the BBC that around 5,000 units have been sold through it over two and a half years.
The legal stakes are severe. Iranian law now makes using, buying, or selling a Starlink device punishable by up to two years in prison; importing more than ten can bring ten years. At least 100 people have been arrested for possession alone. One American-Iranian woman told the BBC that a male family member was detained and accused of espionage simply for owning a terminal.
Despite the blackout, video evidence of extrajudicial killings and beatings during the January protests reached the outside world — much of it believed to have traveled through Starlink connections. This is precisely what the network exists to enable: not just access to information, but the ability to show the world what is happening on the ground. Sahand's operation is funded by Iranians abroad, not by any government, and now advises users to pair terminals with VPNs to avoid detection — though many cannot afford the added cost during an ongoing economic crisis.
The government has quietly acknowledged the damage. A minister estimated the blackout costs at least 50 trillion rials — around $35 million — per day. A limited scheme called "Internet Pro" has since offered select businesses partial global access, but ordinary citizens remain isolated. Digital rights organization Access Now recorded 313 internet blackouts across 52 countries in 2025, the highest since tracking began, and calls such shutdowns a clear violation of human rights that can never be justified.
For Sahand, the calculus is simple and grave. "The Iranian regime has proven that during a shutdown, they can kill," he says. The smuggling network he is part of understands the risk. But he frames it as something beyond personal choice — a fight, he says, in which intervention feels not optional but necessary.
Sahand sits across from the BBC interviewer in a location outside Iran, visibly tense. He speaks carefully about his work: he is part of an underground network that smuggles Starlink satellite terminals into his country, where the technology is illegal and the internet has been shut down for more than two months. "If even one extra person is able to access the internet, I think it's successful and it's worth it," he says. The anxiety is real. If the Iranian regime identifies him, he fears the people he knows inside the country will pay the price.
Iran's digital blackout began on February 28, when the United States and Israel launched airstrikes. Before that, the country had experienced a previous shutdown in January, imposed during a government crackdown on nationwide protests that killed more than 6,500 people and resulted in 53,000 arrests, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency. The government claims the shutdowns are necessary for security—to prevent surveillance, espionage, and cyber-attacks. But the effect is total: only select officials and state media journalists have unrestricted internet access through what authorities call "white sim cards." Everyone else is cut off.
The white, flat Starlink terminals that Sahand and others send across the border work by connecting to satellites owned by SpaceX, completely bypassing Iran's heavily controlled domestic network. Multiple people can use a single terminal at once. Sahand says he has sent about a dozen into Iran since January and is actively searching for ways to smuggle in more. According to the human rights organization Witness, at least 50,000 Starlink terminals are already in the country, though activists believe the number has grown. SpaceX did not respond to the BBC's request for comment.
The legal consequences are severe. Last year, Iran passed legislation making the use, purchase, or sale of Starlink devices punishable by up to two years in prison. Distributing or importing more than ten devices can result in a ten-year sentence. State media has reported multiple arrests, including four people—two of them foreign nationals—detained last month for importing satellite internet equipment. Some arrests include accusations of possessing illegal weapons and sending information to the enemy. Yet a market persists. A volunteer managing a public Persian-language Telegram channel called NasNet told the BBC that approximately 5,000 Starlink terminals have been sold through it over two and a half years.
During the January protests, even with the internet shut down, reports and video evidence of extrajudicial killings, arrests, and beatings reached the outside world. Much of this information is believed to have come from people using Starlink to access social media. This matters because Iran has long controlled information flow—promoting state narratives while suppressing reporting on regime repression. A digital rights group estimates that at least 100 people have been arrested for Starlink possession. Yasmin, an American-Iranian whose name the BBC changed, says a male family member was arrested and accused of espionage simply for owning a terminal.
Sahand and others in the network buy the devices and move them across borders through what he describes as a "very complex operation," though he will not elaborate on methods. The operation is funded by Iranians abroad and others who want to help, he says—not by any state. The terminals go to individuals believed to be willing to share information internationally. Now, with authorities hunting for the devices, the network advises users to pair Starlink with VPNs to stay hidden. But many Iranians cannot afford that additional cost, particularly during an economic crisis.
The government has acknowledged the shutdown's damage. A minister said in January that each day of blackout costs the economy at least 50 trillion rials—roughly $35 million. Recently, authorities launched a scheme called "Internet Pro" to give certain businesses limited global internet access. But for ordinary citizens, the isolation continues. Marwa Fatafta, regional policy and advocacy director at Access Now, a digital rights organization, calls communications blackouts "a clear violation of human rights" that can never be justified. According to her group, there were 313 internet blackouts across 52 countries in 2025, the highest number since tracking began in 2016.
For Sahand, the stakes are existential. "The Iranian regime has proven that during a shutdown, they can kill," he says. "It is super crucial for Iranians to be able to portray the real picture of the situation on the ground." Those who volunteer to help with smuggling, he notes, understand the risk. But he frames it as something larger than individual choice: "It's a fight, and we feel somehow we have to intervene and help."
Notable Quotes
If even one extra person is able to access the internet, I think it's successful and it's worth it.— Sahand, smuggling network operative
Communications blackouts are a clear violation of human rights and they can never be justified.— Marwa Fatafta, Access Now
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Sahand think one extra person with internet access makes the whole operation worth the risk?
Because during a blackout, silence becomes a weapon. When the regime controls all information, it can say protesters are violent or foreign agents while victims disappear. One person with a terminal can send out a video, a photo, a witness account—something true that contradicts the official story.
But Starlink is expensive, and he's smuggling devices into a country where people are being arrested for owning them. Who actually gets these terminals?
People Sahand believes will use them to share information internationally. Activists, journalists, people documenting what's happening. But he's honest about the limits—many Iranians can't afford the additional VPN layer needed to stay hidden, so the technology reaches those with some resources, not everyone equally.
The government says shutdowns are for security. Is there any legitimate reason to cut off the internet?
The regime frames it that way. But when you look at what actually happens during blackouts—the arrests, the killings, the information vacuum—it becomes clear the shutdown isn't about preventing espionage. It's about preventing witnesses. It's about controlling the narrative.
What's the personal cost for someone like Sahand?
He lives in fear. Not for himself primarily, but for the people he knows inside Iran. If he's identified, the regime might punish them. He's chosen to accept that risk because he believes the alternative—letting the blackout stand unopposed—is worse.
Is this just Iran, or is this becoming a global pattern?
It's becoming the new normal. 313 blackouts in 52 countries last year alone. Governments are learning that shutting down the internet is an effective tool for controlling dissent. Sahand's network is one small resistance to something much larger.