Swiss watchmakers face existential challenge as Gen Z shuns luxury status symbols

The Swiss watch industry arrived at Geneva Watch Days in early September 2026 with a paradox written into its attendance sheets. Seventy-one brands had booked hotel rooms, boutiques, and exhibition spaces—a record turnout that should have signaled confidence. Instead, the executives moving between these displays carried a different story: the business model that had sustained Swiss watchmaking for decades was fracturing under the weight of younger consumers who did not want what the industry was selling.

For years, the formula had been straightforward. As sales volumes declined, Swiss manufacturers simply raised prices. Fewer watches, each one more expensive, each one more exclusive. It worked for the giants—Rolex, Patek Philippe, Cartier—whose names alone could sustain waiting lists and cult followings. But the strategy left everyone else exposed. Mid-market players and their suppliers were being squeezed from both sides: unable to command the premiums of the ultra-luxury tier, yet priced too high to compete with what was coming next.

The numbers told the story plainly. Switzerland exported 25.4 million watches in 2016. By 2025, that figure had collapsed to 14.6 million. The Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry had no choice but to acknowledge what was happening: the industry's core market was shrinking, and the old remedies were no longer working. Jean-Christophe Babin, president of Geneva Watch Days and chairman of Bulgari, called it the main challenge facing the entire sector. Not geopolitical tensions, not tariffs, not dampened demand from China. The real threat was structural and generational.

Gen Z and young millennials, Babin observed, did not think about watches the way their parents had. They were not chasing status or collecting brand loyalty like a badge. They wanted excitement, emotion, discovery—the feeling of finding something unexpected rather than the security of owning something recognized. And they were increasingly comfortable buying second-hand. Online resale markets offered them discontinued models, avoided waiting lists, and delivered immediate gratification instead of months or years of anticipation. The secondary market was booming precisely because it offered what the primary market would not: access without gatekeeping, choice without scarcity theater.

The industry's response, Babin argued, had been too cautious. Watchmakers had focused on technical refinement—better movements, more complications, incremental improvements to established designs. What they had not done was take real risks. The exception proved the rule: Audemars Piguet and Swatch had collaborated on the Royal Pop collection earlier in 2026, reimagining the iconic Royal Oak in accessible, colorful formats aimed partly at younger buyers. It was the kind of disruption that could attract new customers without alienating existing ones. Yet such bold departures remained rare. "If we don't do that, it will be very difficult to recover volumes," Babin said.

Meanwhile, the competitive landscape was shifting in ways the Swiss industry had not fully reckoned with. Chinese watchmakers had closed the quality gap. Their mechanical movements now matched what ETA SA or Sellita could produce for standard complications. Laopu, a Chinese luxury jeweler that had become one of the country's most viral consumer brands, demonstrated that Western incumbents could be displaced rapidly. Chinese manufacturers were also bypassing traditional retail networks entirely, selling mechanical watches globally through online channels and adding pressure on Swiss products, especially in the mid-priced segment.

Japanese brands—Seiko, Citizen, Casio—were gaining ground for a different reason. They did not try to trade up the way Swiss manufacturers did. They built quality at accessible price points and held that line. Oliver Muller, founder of LuxeConsult, an industry advisory firm, noted that Gen Z placed less weight on the Swiss-made hallmark than previous generations. Each Japanese or Chinese brand might be marginal on its own, but aggregated, they were taking volume away from institutional Swiss names in the mid-priced segment where the real market existed.

Breitling's CEO, Georges Kern, had warned investors that what they were witnessing might be the "new normal" for the sector. The luxury watch industry had spent years perfecting how to make more money from fewer sales. The challenge now was entirely different: how to persuade a new generation to buy watches at all. The answer would require not just bolder innovation, but a fundamental reckoning with what younger consumers actually valued—and a willingness to let go of the scarcity and exclusivity that had defined Swiss watchmaking for so long.