Someone with access to his thinking would have an enormous advantage
En los márgenes de la diplomacia y los mercados de predicción, ocho cuentas anónimas apostaron con una precisión inquietante sobre el destino de las negociaciones entre Estados Unidos e Irán. Lo que The Guardian ha descubierto no es solo una posible irregularidad financiera, sino una pregunta más profunda sobre quién controla el conocimiento del futuro y qué hacen con él quienes tienen acceso a los corredores del poder.
- Ocho cuentas recién creadas en Polymarket colocaron apuestas coordinadas por 70.000 dólares justo antes de que Trump anunciara un retraso en su ultimátum a Irán, una coincidencia demasiado exacta para ser casual.
- La fragmentación deliberada de las posiciones en múltiples carteras digitales sugiere un esfuerzo consciente por ocultar la identidad del apostador o apostadores detrás de la operación.
- Una de las cuentas ya había acertado en febrero al predecir ataques estadounidenses contra Irán, lo que eleva la sospecha de que alguien con acceso a información clasificada está convirtiendo secretos de Estado en ganancias privadas.
- Polymarket opera en una zona gris regulatoria: sin requisitos estrictos de identificación y con transacciones seudónimas, ofrece un refugio casi ideal para quien quiera actuar sobre información privilegiada sin dejar rastro evidente.
- Las apuestas siguen abiertas mientras analistas y posiblemente autoridades observan, a la espera de que el 31 de marzo revele si esta precisión fue suerte o algo mucho más deliberado.
The Guardian ha destapado lo que podría ser un caso de uso de información privilegiada en Polymarket, el mercado de predicción basado en criptomonedas. Ocho cuentas, creadas poco antes de que Donald Trump anunciara el aplazamiento de su ultimátum para atacar instalaciones energéticas iraníes, apostaron de forma coordinada unos 70.000 dólares a que Estados Unidos e Irán alcanzarían un alto el fuego antes del 31 de marzo. Si esa paz se materializa, los titulares de esas cuentas podrían embolsarse cerca de 820.000 dólares.
Lo que convierte este patrón en algo más que una coincidencia es la mecánica detrás de las apuestas. En lugar de concentrar las posiciones en una sola cuenta, los operadores las distribuyeron entre múltiples carteras digitales, una técnica clásica para dificultar la trazabilidad del dinero. Más revelador aún: una de esas ocho cuentas ya había acertado en febrero al predecir correctamente que Washington lanzaría ataques contra Irán. Esa precisión acumulada, combinada con la aparición repentina y sincronizada de las nuevas cuentas, apunta a alguien con acceso a información no pública sobre las intenciones militares y diplomáticas de Estados Unidos.
Los expertos consultados por The Guardian señalan que el momento de las apuestas coincide con los mensajes contradictorios que el propio Trump enviaba sobre la posibilidad de una desescalada. Alguien con acceso directo a su pensamiento o a canales diplomáticos clasificados tendría una ventaja decisiva para anticipar el rumbo real de los acontecimientos.
Polymarket opera en un vacío regulatorio que lo hace especialmente vulnerable a este tipo de abuso: sus requisitos de identificación son mínimos, las transacciones son seudónimas y la plataforma no está sujeta a la misma supervisión que los mercados financieros tradicionales. Por ahora, no hay cargos formales ni confirmación de que los apostadores sean funcionarios gubernamentales, pero la investigación ha encendido las alarmas entre analistas y, presumiblemente, entre las autoridades encargadas de vigilar los delitos financieros. Las ocho cuentas permanecen activas, sus apuestas abiertas, mientras el calendario avanza hacia una fecha que podría responder la pregunta más incómoda de todas.
The Guardian has uncovered evidence of what appears to be insider trading on Polymarket, the cryptocurrency-based prediction market, centered on whether the United States and Iran will reach a ceasefire before March 31. Eight accounts, all created shortly before Donald Trump announced he was delaying an ultimatum to strike Iranian energy facilities, placed coordinated bets totaling roughly $70,000 that peace would be achieved by that deadline. If those bets win, the accounts stand to collect approximately $820,000 in profit.
What makes the pattern suspicious is not just the money or the timing, but the mechanics. The accounts appear designed to obscure their true ownership—a hallmark of insider trading across markets, digital or otherwise. Rather than consolidating their bets into a single account, the traders fragmented their positions across multiple wallets, a technique that makes it harder to trace the money back to its source and to identify whether a single actor or coordinated group is behind the positions.
One detail stands out with particular force: one of these eight accounts had already made a successful prediction in February, betting correctly that the United States would launch strikes against Iran. That accuracy, combined with the sudden appearance of these new accounts and their immediate, coordinated movement into ceasefire bets, suggests someone with access to non-public information about American military and diplomatic intentions. The timing is too clean. The pattern too deliberate.
Experts consulted by The Guardian point to the coincidence between when these bets were placed and the contradictory signals Trump himself was sending about de-escalation. The president's public messaging on Iran has been volatile and inconsistent—one moment threatening, the next suggesting openness to talks. Someone with direct access to his thinking, or to classified diplomatic channels, would have an enormous advantage in predicting which direction events would actually move.
Polymarket operates in a regulatory gray zone. It is a prediction market, not a stock exchange or futures platform, which means it has attracted less scrutiny from financial regulators than traditional markets. Bettors can remain pseudonymous, transactions are recorded on the blockchain but not easily traced to real identities, and the platform has minimal know-your-customer requirements compared to conventional financial institutions. For someone with sensitive information looking for a place to profit from it without detection, Polymarket presents an obvious opportunity.
The investigation raises uncomfortable questions about information flow within the highest levels of government. Prediction markets are supposed to aggregate the wisdom of many independent forecasters. When insiders trade on non-public information, they corrupt that signal. They also raise the possibility that classified information is leaking to people with financial incentives to act on it—a national security concern that goes well beyond market manipulation.
As of now, there is no confirmation that these bets were placed by government officials or their associates, nor is there evidence of criminal charges. But The Guardian's reporting has triggered scrutiny from market analysts and, presumably, from law enforcement agencies tasked with monitoring financial crime. The eight accounts remain active on Polymarket, their bets still open, waiting for March 31 to arrive and reveal whether their predictive advantage was luck or something far more deliberate.
Citas Notables
Experts point to indicators typical of insider trading operations, including use of multiple wallets to divide bets and conceal investor identity, as well as timing alignment with Trump's contradictory messages about possible conflict de-escalation— The Guardian's analysis of expert commentary
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would someone use eight separate accounts instead of just one?
Because one large bet draws attention. Eight smaller ones spread across different wallets look like independent traders making their own calls. It's the difference between a spotlight and a crowd.
But these are on a blockchain. Isn't everything traceable?
Traceable in theory, yes. But tracing requires knowing where to look and having the legal authority to demand answers. Polymarket doesn't require you to prove who you are. You can be a wallet address, nothing more.
What makes the February bet so damning?
It shows the account holder predicted something that hadn't been announced yet. They were right about strikes that most of the market didn't see coming. That's not luck twice. That's access.
Could Trump himself be behind this?
Unlikely. But someone close to him, someone in the room when decisions are made—that's plausible. Or someone who has sources inside the administration.
What happens if the ceasefire doesn't happen by March 31?
The bets lose. Eight hundred thousand dollars evaporates. But the person behind them still made a calculated bet based on information others didn't have. That's the crime, regardless of outcome.
Why does this matter beyond the money?
Because it shows how easily classified information can leak into financial markets. And because it suggests someone with access to America's most sensitive decisions is willing to profit from them.