Our part worked fine—the failure was somewhere else
In the aftermath of Portugal's April 2025 nationwide blackout, a quiet but consequential dispute has emerged over who bears responsibility when a nation's emergency lifeline goes silent. SIRESP, the state entity entrusted with coordinating police, firefighters, and paramedics across Portugal, has sought €343,000 in penalties from its infrastructure providers — with NOS, the company supplying transmission circuits and satellite backup, bearing the largest share of that demand. NOS has firmly rejected the claim, arguing that providing the pipes through which a system flows is not the same as governing how that system is built or run. The disagreement touches something older than any contract: the perennial human difficulty of assigning accountability when complex, interdependent systems fail the people who need them most.
- Portugal's emergency communications network, SIRESP — the sole lifeline for over 40,000 emergency responders — collapsed during the April 28 blackout, leaving coordination dangerously compromised across the country.
- SIRESP has now turned to financial penalties, demanding €343,000 from service providers, with the majority aimed squarely at NOS for failures in its transmission and satellite backup services.
- NOS is pushing back forcefully, insisting it fulfilled every contractual obligation and that responsibility for network design and operations rests entirely with SIRESP itself — not with the companies laying the infrastructure.
- The dispute is further complicated by NOS's claim that no formal penalty notice has even been officially delivered, leaving the boundary between negotiation and enforcement dangerously blurred.
- This is not an isolated stumble — SIRESP has failed during the catastrophic 2017 wildfires, the April 2025 blackout, and the January storm Kristin, each episode deepening doubts about whether Portugal's critical emergency infrastructure can be trusted when lives are on the line.
On Tuesday, NOS rejected what it described as an unfounded penalty demand from SIRESP, the state entity that runs Portugal's exclusive emergency communications network. SIRESP had reportedly sought €343,000 in fines from various service providers over failures during the nationwide blackout of April 28, 2025 — with the largest portion directed at NOS, which supplies ground-based transmission circuits and satellite backup services to the network.
NOS was unequivocal in its response: the company had honored every obligation under its contracts and could not be held responsible for failures it did not cause. Its role, the company argued, is that of an infrastructure provider — it delivers transmission capacity, but does not design the network, determine how it operates, or make strategic decisions about its functioning. Those responsibilities, NOS maintained, belong to SIRESP alone. The company also noted it had not received any formal penalty notice, raising questions about whether the matter had even moved beyond internal deliberation.
The stakes in this dispute extend well beyond a contractual disagreement. SIRESP is not an ordinary utility — it is the backbone through which police, firefighters, paramedics, and emergency coordinators communicate during crises, serving more than 40,000 users and handling over 35 million calls each year. When it fails, the consequences cascade across the entire emergency response system.
The April blackout was not the network's first serious failure. SIRESP has struggled with reliability since its inception, most gravely during the deadly wildfires of 2017, which prompted significant reforms. Yet the system faltered again during the 2025 blackout and once more during storm Kristin in late January — each incident renewing the same troubling question about whether Portugal's emergency infrastructure can be counted on precisely when it is needed most.
NOS says it is prepared to share technical data to help establish what actually went wrong and remains open to contributing to improvements. But it has drawn a firm line against accepting financial liability for failures it considers outside its contractual scope. Whether SIRESP and the Portuguese government will accept that boundary — and what the technical record ultimately reveals — remains an open question.
On Tuesday, the telecommunications company NOS pushed back hard against what it called an unfounded demand for penalties. The state's emergency communications network, SIRESP, had reportedly asked for €343,000 in fines from various service providers over failures that occurred during Portugal's nationwide blackout on April 28, 2025. The bulk of that sum, according to reporting, was directed at NOS—the company responsible for two critical pieces of the system: ground-based transmission circuits and satellite backup transmission services.
But NOS was having none of it. In a statement, the company insisted it had done nothing wrong and therefore could not be held accountable. The firm provides transmission infrastructure to SIRESP under contract, it said, and it fulfilled every obligation those contracts demanded. The company does not design the network, does not decide how it operates, and does not make the strategic calls about how it functions. Those responsibilities, NOS argued, belong entirely to SIRESP itself—the state entity that actually runs the system.
The dispute centers on a fundamental question of responsibility. NOS sees itself as a contractor providing a service—like a delivery company that gets packages to the right address on time. What happens after delivery, the company suggests, is not its concern. SIRESP, by contrast, apparently believes that when the network fails, the companies providing its backbone infrastructure bear some of the cost. The company also noted it has not actually received any formal penalty notice or even an official warning that one was coming, which raises the question of whether this is still a negotiation or a done deal.
What makes this dispute significant is the stakes involved. SIRESP is not a routine utility. It is Portugal's exclusive emergency communications network—the system through which police, firefighters, paramedics, and other emergency services coordinate during crises. More than 40,000 users depend on it, and it handles over 35 million calls annually. When it fails, the consequences ripple across the entire emergency response apparatus.
The April blackout was not the first time the network has stumbled. SIRESP has been dogged by problems since its creation, with the most serious failures occurring during the devastating wildfires of 2017. Those incidents prompted major overhauls. Yet the system failed again during the April 2025 blackout and again in late January when the storm Kristin battered the central region. Each failure raises the same uncomfortable question: Is Portugal's critical emergency infrastructure actually reliable when it matters most?
NOS says it stands ready to provide technical data to support its position and to help clarify what actually went wrong. The company also says it remains willing to work on improvements to the network. But it is drawing a clear line: it will not accept financial responsibility for problems it did not cause. Whether SIRESP and the government agree with that assessment remains to be seen. The dispute is still unfolding, and the technical facts—who failed and why—have not yet been publicly established.
Notable Quotes
NOS provides transmission services under contract and fulfilled every obligation those contracts demanded— NOS statement
Network design, architecture, and operational decisions are the exclusive responsibility of SIRESP S.A.— NOS statement
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would SIRESP demand penalties from NOS if NOS only provides the pipes, not the intelligence?
Because when the pipes fail, the whole system fails. SIRESP is saying: you're responsible for keeping your part working. NOS is saying: our part worked fine—the failure was somewhere else in the network.
But if NOS didn't design the network, how can they be blamed for how it performs?
That's the legal and contractual question at the heart of this. NOS argues it's like blaming a power company for a hospital's poor patient outcomes. But SIRESP might say: you signed up to provide critical infrastructure—you bear some risk if it breaks.
Has NOS actually been penalized yet?
No. They say they haven't even received a formal notice. This might still be SIRESP making a demand that NOS will fight in court or through negotiation.
What worries me is that this network keeps failing. Is the real problem that nobody wants to take responsibility?
That's the pattern. After 2017, they fixed things. Then it broke again in 2025. Now there's finger-pointing instead of answers. The public doesn't care who's at fault—they care that emergency services can't talk to each other when there's a crisis.
What happens next?
NOS will likely refuse to pay and demand proof that their services actually caused the failure. SIRESP will have to decide whether to pursue it legally or negotiate. Meanwhile, the network is still the same one that failed twice in recent years.