For decades, American power served as the organizing principle of the international order — a gravitational center around which alliances, institutions, and economies arranged themselves. Scholar Mark Leonard, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that this era is not declining but has already ended, replaced by a multipolar landscape where influence is distributed, contested, and no longer anchored in Washington. His case rests not on ideology but on the accumulated weight of observable change: the rise of rival economies, the diffusion of technology, the quiet erosion of dollar dominance, and t
Scholar argues American global dominance is waning in new world order
Power is no longer concentrated in one place
Mark
When Leonard says American dominance is fading, does he mean America is becoming weak, or just that it's no longer alone at the top?
Mimi
The second one. America is still powerful—militarily, economically, culturally. But power is no longer concentrated. Other actors have grown strong enough to shape outcomes without American approval.
Mark
Is this something that happened suddenly, or has it been building for a while?
Mimi
It has been building for decades. But the pace has accelerated. You can see it in how China moved economically, how Europe consolidated, how regional powers learned to play multiple sides.
Mark
Does Leonard think this is good or bad?
Mimi
He doesn't moralize about it. He treats it as a structural fact. The question he raises is what comes next—how do institutions and countries adapt when the old rules no longer hold?
Mark
What does a multipolar world actually look like in practice?
Mimi
Messier. More negotiation. Fewer situations where one country can simply impose its will. More room for regional powers to maneuver. But also more potential for miscalculation.
Mark
Are there countries that are better positioned for this shift than others?
Mimi
Countries that have built flexibility into their strategies—that don't depend entirely on one alliance or one market. And countries that understand how to operate in a world where they have to persuade rather than command.
El Pulso
- The shift is structural, not cyclical — Leonard's analysis warns against waiting for American primacy to reassert itself, because the underlying architecture of global power has already been redrawn.
- China's economic ascent, Europe's geopolitical consolidation, and the strategic independence of regional powers in the Middle East and South Asia have collectively hollowed out the leverage that once made American leadership feel inevitable.
- Institutions built for a unipolar moment — the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank — are straining under pressure from actors who no longer accept American primacy as the natural order of things.
- The foreign policy community is fractured over what follows: a Chinese-led system, a genuinely leaderless multipolarity, or a dangerous interregnum where old rules have collapsed and new ones have not yet formed.
- Countries that anchored their security and prosperity to American guarantees are now quietly renegotiating their strategies, alliances, and assumptions about who will be there when it matters.
For decades, American power served as the organizing principle of the international order — a gravitational center around which alliances, institutions, and economies arranged themselves. Scholar Mark Leonard, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that this era is not declining but has already ended, replaced by a multipolar landscape where influence is distributed, contested, and no longer anchored in Washington. His case rests not on ideology but on the accumulated weight of observable change: the rise of rival economies, the diffusion of technology, the quiet erosion of dollar dominance, and the growing confidence of regional powers who no longer seek American permission to act. The question before nations and institutions now is not whether to prepare for a post-American world, but how to navigate one they are already living in.
Mark Leonard, a careful student of how power moves across the globe, has published an argument in Foreign Affairs that deserves attention not because it is novel, but because of how precisely it is made. American dominance — the kind that defined the post-World War II order and persisted through the early twenty-first century — is not in temporary retreat. It is structurally fading, and Leonard insists the evidence is already visible rather than speculative.
The case he builds draws on observable realities: China's expanded economic weight, Europe's emergence as a coherent geopolitical actor, the growing autonomy of regional powers who have learned to maneuver without American authorization, and the slow erosion of the dollar's unquestioned centrality to global finance. Technology, once a reliable American advantage, is now widely distributed. Military strength no longer converts into the kind of diplomatic leverage it once did. These are not forecasts — they are descriptions of a world that has already changed.
What follows from this shift is genuinely uncertain. Foreign policy thinkers disagree sharply: some anticipate a Chinese-led replacement order, others envision a multipolar system without any dominant center, and still others fear a prolonged period of instability as old rules dissolve before new ones can form. International institutions designed around American leadership are being tested by powers that no longer treat that leadership as natural or legitimate.
Leonard's contribution is to name the transition clearly and redirect the central question. The post-American world, he argues, is not a future condition to be debated — it is the present reality to be navigated. For nations, alliances, and institutions alike, the work of adaptation has already begun, whether they have acknowledged it or not.
Mark Leonard, a scholar who studies how power moves across the globe, has written a piece in Foreign Affairs arguing that the United States is losing its grip on world leadership. The argument is not new—plenty of people have made it before—but Leonard's version carries weight because he is careful about what he claims and what he leaves open to question.
The core of his thinking is straightforward: American dominance, the kind that shaped the second half of the twentieth century and the early years of this one, is fading. This is not a temporary dip, not a cycle that will reverse itself in a few years. Leonard sees structural shifts in how power is distributed globally—the rise of other economies, the fragmentation of influence, the way that military might no longer translates into the kind of leverage it once did. The world is becoming multipolar, meaning power is spreading out among several major players rather than concentrating in one.
What makes this argument worth taking seriously is that it rests on observable facts rather than ideology. China's economic weight has grown. Europe has consolidated itself as a geopolitical actor. Regional powers in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere have learned to maneuver in ways that don't require American permission. Technology, which once seemed like an American advantage, is now distributed. The dollar still matters, but it is no longer the unquestioned foundation of global finance. These are not predictions; they are descriptions of what has already happened.
Leonard's piece in Foreign Affairs is part of a broader conversation among foreign policy thinkers about what comes next. If America is no longer the dominant power, what replaces it? Is there a new order at all, or just disorder? Different scholars answer differently. Some see a Chinese-led system emerging. Others argue for a genuinely multipolar world where no single power calls the shots. Still others worry about a period of instability as the old rules break down and new ones have not yet formed.
The implications ripple outward. Countries that have built their strategies around American protection or American markets now have to think differently. Alliances that seemed permanent are being renegotiated. International institutions designed for a world of American leadership—the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank—are being tested by actors who no longer accept American primacy as natural or inevitable.
Leonard's contribution is to name this shift clearly and to suggest that the question is not whether it is happening, but how nations and institutions will adapt to it. The reader of his work comes away understanding that the post-American world is not something that might happen in the future. It is already here, unfolding in real time, and the challenge now is learning to navigate it.
Citas Notables
American dominance is fading as a structural fact of global politics— Mark Leonard's argument in Foreign Affairs
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