Samsung, SK Hynix Test Chinese Chip Tools to Hedge Against US Export Controls

Measures designed to constrain Beijing are creating opportunities for Chinese rivals
U.S. export controls on semiconductor equipment are inadvertently helping Chinese equipment makers gain footholds in foreign-owned Chinese factories.
Mark

Why would Samsung and SK Hynix test Chinese equipment if they're not planning to use it?

Mimi

Because the alternative—being locked out of servicing their own factories—is worse. They're not betting on Chinese tools being better. They're betting on American restrictions getting tighter.

Mark

But Samsung denied testing AMEC equipment. Doesn't that undermine the story?

Mimi

Samsung's public denial and the private reality are both true. Companies don't announce hedging strategies. They deny them until they have to act. The denial itself is part of the story—it shows how sensitive this is.

Mark

What does this mean for American chipmaking equipment companies?

Mimi

It means they're losing leverage. If South Korean companies can maintain their Chinese factories without American tools, Washington's export controls become less effective. And American suppliers lose a massive market.

Mark

Is this actually helping China's semiconductor ambitions?

Mimi

Indirectly, yes. The export controls were meant to slow China down. Instead, they're forcing foreign companies to test Chinese alternatives, which gives Chinese equipment makers the validation they need to improve faster.

Mark

Could this backfire on Samsung and SK Hynix?

Mimi

Potentially. If they deploy Chinese equipment and it fails, or if Washington punishes them for it, they lose. But if they don't prepare and restrictions tighten, they lose anyway. They're choosing the risk they can control.

Mark

What happens next?

Mimi

Watch whether any Korean company actually installs Chinese equipment at scale. That's the moment the market shifts. Right now it's still theoretical. But the tests are real, and the pressure is real.

  • Washington's revocation of Samsung and SK Hynix's special import licenses in 2025 turned a theoretical risk into an urgent operational vulnerability — if American tools can no longer be serviced or replaced, entire Chinese factories could go dark.
  • Samsung publicly denied testing AMEC equipment while three insiders confirmed the evaluations are real and ongoing, revealing the deep tension between corporate diplomacy and quiet contingency planning.
  • Chinese equipment makers like AMEC, already proven in domestic fabs, are now being measured against the world's most exacting chipmakers — a credibility test that could redefine their global standing.
  • Deutsche Bank projects four Chinese equipment firms will each surpass a billion dollars in 2026 revenue, with the group potentially claiming 25 to 40 percent of China's wafer-fabrication market — a structural shift, not a blip.
  • Applied Materials alone drew 8.53 billion dollars from China in fiscal 2025; a sustained pivot toward Chinese alternatives would send tremors through the established order of the entire semiconductor equipment industry.

In the shadow of Washington's tightening grip on semiconductor technology, Samsung and SK Hynix have been quietly testing Chinese-made chipmaking equipment at their Chinese factories — not out of ambition, but out of prudence. The same export controls designed to contain China's technological rise are, paradoxically, handing Chinese equipment makers a rare audition on the world's most demanding stages. What began as a hedge against regulatory uncertainty has become a quiet inflection point in the decades-long dominance of American, Japanese, and European suppliers. The ground beneath global semiconductor supply chains is shifting, one test run at a time.

Two years ago, Samsung and SK Hynix made a quiet decision. As American export controls on semiconductor technology grew more unpredictable, both South Korean memory giants began testing etching machines from Shanghai-based AMEC at their Chinese factories. The move was not about growth — it was insurance.

The stakes are considerable. Samsung runs a major NAND flash facility in Xian; SK Hynix operates NAND plants in Dalian and a DRAM factory in Wuxi. All have long depended on equipment from American suppliers like Applied Materials and Lam Research. In 2023, both companies received special U.S. status allowing them to import controlled equipment without individual licenses. By 2025, Washington revoked it. An annual license for 2026 followed, but the message was unmistakable: the rules could change again. What the companies feared most was not a ban on new equipment, but restrictions on servicing or replacing the American tools already installed — a scenario that could shut their factories down entirely.

Samsung denied to Reuters that any AMEC testing had occurred. SK Hynix declined to comment. Yet three people with direct knowledge confirmed the evaluations were real. The companies, these sources said, were keeping Chinese suppliers in reserve — not to expand, but to sustain what they already had.

For AMEC and China's broader equipment industry, the moment is significant. Chinese makers have spent years narrowing the gap with Western rivals in etching, deposition, and cleaning, often undercutting established suppliers by 20 to 30 percent. AMEC's tools are already running at Yangtze Memory Technologies, giving the Koreans reason to believe they were mature enough to evaluate. An endorsement from either Samsung or SK Hynix would carry enormous weight globally.

The paradox is hard to miss. Policies designed to contain China's semiconductor ambitions are inadvertently opening doors for Chinese equipment makers inside foreign-owned factories on Chinese soil. Deutsche Bank estimates that Naura, AMEC, Piotech, and ACM Research will each exceed a billion dollars in 2026 revenue, collectively targeting 25 to 40 percent of China's wafer-fabrication equipment market. Applied Materials alone reported 8.53 billion dollars in China revenue in fiscal 2025 — a figure that would shrink considerably if the shift accelerates.

Significant obstacles remain: lengthy qualification cycles, limited service networks, intellectual-property concerns, and the possibility of political pressure from Washington. Neither company has committed to large-scale deployment, and neither is likely to risk installing Chinese equipment at their domestic Korean facilities. For now, the tests continue quietly, no major decisions made. But the door has opened, and those on the other side are watching carefully.

Two years ago, when the future of American chipmaking equipment in China grew suddenly uncertain, Samsung and SK Hynix made a quiet decision. They began testing etching machines built by Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, a Shanghai-based company, at their factories across China. The move was not about expansion or innovation. It was insurance.

The two South Korean memory chipmakers operate some of the world's most sophisticated semiconductor plants on Chinese soil—Samsung's NAND flash facility in Xian, SK Hynix's NAND plants in Dalian and its DRAM factory in Wuxi. These operations have long depended on equipment from American giants like Applied Materials and Lam Research. But Washington's appetite for controlling what technology flows into China has been growing, and the companies wanted to know: if the rules tightened further, could they keep their Chinese factories running with Chinese-made tools instead?

The timing of those tests was not accidental. In 2023, the U.S. Commerce Department had granted Samsung and SK Hynix special status as "validated end users," allowing them to import certain controlled equipment without individual licenses. That permission lasted two years. In 2025, Washington revoked it entirely. The companies were later granted an annual license for 2026, but the message was clear: the ground beneath them was shifting. What worried them most was not the ban on new equipment, but the possibility that future restrictions might extend to servicing, repairing, or replacing the American tools already installed in their Chinese plants. If that happened, their factories could grind to a halt.

Samsung and SK Hynix have not publicly committed to deploying Chinese equipment at scale. Samsung explicitly denied to Reuters that it had tested AMEC machines at all. SK Hynix declined to comment. But three people with direct knowledge of the matter confirmed the evaluations were real and ongoing. The companies, these sources said, were keeping Chinese suppliers in reserve—not to expand production in China, but to maintain and upgrade the lines they already had.

For AMEC and China's emerging semiconductor equipment industry, this moment represents something rare: a chance to prove themselves to the world's best chipmakers. Chinese equipment makers have spent years closing the gap with Western rivals in areas like etching, deposition, cleaning, and planarization. They often undercut established suppliers by 20 to 30 percent. AMEC's machines are already in use at leading Chinese chipmakers like Yangtze Memory Technologies, which gave Samsung and SK Hynix reason to believe the equipment was mature enough to test. A breakthrough endorsement from either company would carry enormous weight in the global market.

What is unfolding is a paradox embedded in American export controls themselves. Measures designed to constrain China's semiconductor ambitions are inadvertently creating openings for Chinese rivals to gain footholds inside foreign-owned factories operating in China. Deutsche Bank estimates that four Chinese equipment makers—Naura Technology, AMEC, Piotech, and ACM Research—will each generate more than a billion dollars in revenue in 2026. Together, they could capture 25 to 30 percent of China's projected 28 billion dollar wafer-fabrication equipment market. Excluding lithography and metrology, where Chinese companies still lag significantly, their share could approach 40 percent.

The established suppliers—Applied Materials, Lam Research, KLA, and their Japanese and European counterparts—have dominated wafer fabrication for decades. Applied Materials alone reported 8.53 billion dollars in China revenue in fiscal 2025, representing 30 percent of its total sales. A sustained shift toward Chinese equipment would reshape that landscape. Yet significant hurdles remain. Chinese tools still require lengthy qualification processes, have smaller service networks, face intellectual-property concerns, and could draw political pressure from Washington. It is also unclear whether Korean chipmakers would risk installing Chinese equipment at their domestic factories, where security and intellectual-property protection are paramount.

For now, Samsung and SK Hynix are hedging. They are not abandoning American suppliers. They are simply preparing for a world in which they might have to. The tests continue quietly. No major deployment decisions have been made. But the door has opened, and Chinese equipment makers are watching closely to see if it stays open.

Samsung said it has not tested AMEC equipment for use at its China factory and had not considered doing so
— Samsung statement to Reuters
Chinese equipment makers have narrowed the gap in areas such as etching, deposition, cleaning and planarisation, often at significantly lower cost—20 to 30 percent less than comparable foreign equipment
— Dan Hutcheson, TechInsights
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