In the quiet corridors of factories in Xian, Dalian, and Wuxi, two of the world's most powerful chipmakers have been conducting an experiment that speaks to the fragility of technological alliances in an age of geopolitical rivalry. Samsung and SK Hynix, long dependent on American equipment to sustain their Chinese operations, have spent two years testing Chinese-made alternatives — not out of preference, but out of prudence. The United States, in its effort to contain China's semiconductor rise, has inadvertently handed Chinese equipment makers their most consequential audition yet, and the o
Samsung, SK Hynix Test Chinese Chip Equipment as US Export Controls Tighten
They are preparing for a future in which they might have to rely on Chinese alternatives
Mark
Why would Samsung and SK Hynix risk testing equipment from a Chinese supplier when they have such strong relationships with Applied Materials and Lam Research?
Mimi
Because the relationships are no longer reliable. The U.S. can revoke export privileges at any time. These companies have billions of dollars invested in Chinese factories. If they suddenly can't service the American equipment in those factories, the investment becomes worthless.
Mark
But Samsung denied testing AMEC equipment. If the tests are real, why deny them?
Mimi
Because admitting it would damage their relationship with American suppliers and invite political pressure from Washington. They need to keep both doors open—maintain the American partnerships while quietly validating Chinese alternatives.
Mark
Is Chinese equipment actually good enough to replace American tools?
Mimi
In some areas, yes. Etching and deposition—the core processes—have narrowed the gap significantly. Chinese equipment won't replace the most advanced lithography systems, but for maintenance and repair of existing lines, it's becoming viable.
Mark
What does this mean for companies like Applied Materials?
Mimi
It means they're losing pricing power and market share in China. If Chinese suppliers can do 70 percent of the job for 30 percent less cost, customers will use them. The export controls were meant to constrain China, but they're actually creating competition for Western suppliers.
Mark
Could Samsung and SK Hynix actually switch to Chinese equipment at their domestic factories?
Mimi
Unlikely. There are security and intellectual-property risks that make that unthinkable. But in China, where they already operate under restrictions, the calculus is different. They're not trying to expand there—they're trying to survive.
O Pulso
- The revocation of Samsung and SK Hynix's 'validated end user' status in 2025 left their Chinese factories exposed to the possibility of being cut off from the American tools they depend on for maintenance and production.
- The deepest fear is not a ban on new equipment but the prospect that future controls could prevent servicing of machines already installed — effectively stranding billions of dollars in factory infrastructure.
- For two years, both companies have been quietly testing AMEC etching equipment in their Chinese plants, a move that, if confirmed, would represent a seismic endorsement of Chinese semiconductor suppliers.
- Chinese equipment makers have closed the technology gap enough to offer viable alternatives at 20 to 30 percent lower cost, and analysts project they could claim up to 40 percent of China's wafer-fab equipment market by 2026.
- Applied Materials, Lam Research, and other Western suppliers now face the real possibility of losing a combined market worth tens of billions of dollars — a consequence born directly from the controls meant to protect Western technological leadership.
In the quiet corridors of factories in Xian, Dalian, and Wuxi, two of the world's most powerful chipmakers have been conducting an experiment that speaks to the fragility of technological alliances in an age of geopolitical rivalry. Samsung and SK Hynix, long dependent on American equipment to sustain their Chinese operations, have spent two years testing Chinese-made alternatives — not out of preference, but out of prudence. The United States, in its effort to contain China's semiconductor rise, has inadvertently handed Chinese equipment makers their most consequential audition yet, and the outcome may redraw the map of global chip manufacturing in ways no policy architect foresaw.
Two years ago, Samsung and SK Hynix began a quiet experiment in their Chinese factories. Without announcement or fanfare, they started testing etching equipment made by AMEC, a Shanghai-based semiconductor tool company. Three people with knowledge of the matter confirmed the tests. The reason was straightforward: the South Korean chipmakers were preparing for a future in which American tools might no longer be reliably available to them in China.
For years, both companies had operated under a special arrangement with the U.S. Commerce Department — a 'validated end user' status that allowed them to import controlled American equipment into China without seeking individual licenses each time. It was a pragmatic accommodation. But in 2025, that status was revoked. A one-year license followed, covering 2026 only. The signal was unmistakable: the rules were temporary, and the next change might be more severe. What haunted the chipmakers most was not restrictions on new purchases, but the possibility that future controls could extend to servicing and maintaining the American machines already running inside their plants — rendering those factories unable to sustain themselves.
AMEC's equipment was not a perfect substitute for what Applied Materials or Lam Research could offer, but it was capable enough, and it was already proven in Chinese production environments through its use at Yangtze Memory Technologies. It was also 20 to 30 percent cheaper. For Chinese equipment makers, a credible endorsement from Samsung or SK Hynix would be transformative.
The broader irony is difficult to ignore. U.S. export controls were designed to slow China's semiconductor ambitions. Instead, they have created a captive market for Chinese suppliers and given foreign companies operating in China a compelling reason to diversify away from American tools. Applied Materials earned $8.53 billion from China in fiscal 2025 — nearly a third of its total revenue. That position is now vulnerable. Deutsche Bank projects that four leading Chinese equipment makers will each surpass $1 billion in revenue in 2026, collectively positioned to claim 25 to 40 percent of China's vast wafer-fabrication equipment market.
Samsung publicly denied the AMEC tests. SK Hynix declined to comment. The episode remains officially unacknowledged — real enough to be described by multiple sources, deniable enough to preserve existing supplier relationships. But the fact that the tests occurred at all reveals something important: the world's largest memory chipmakers are no longer certain that American tools will always be there when they need them. They are quietly building an alternative, and in doing so, they may be accelerating a shift in the global semiconductor equipment landscape that Washington never intended to set in motion.
Two years ago, Samsung and SK Hynix began a quiet experiment. In their Chinese factories—one in Xian, another in Dalian, a third in Wuxi—they started testing etching equipment made by a Shanghai company called Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, or AMEC. The tests were not announced. The companies did not advertise them. But three people with knowledge of the matter say the tests happened, and they happened for a reason: the South Korean chipmakers were hedging their bets against a future in which the United States might cut them off from American tools.
For years, Samsung and SK Hynix had relied almost entirely on equipment from U.S. suppliers like Applied Materials and Lam Research. These tools were essential—etching machines that carved patterns into silicon wafers, deposition systems that layered materials atom by atom. In 2023, the U.S. Commerce Department had granted both companies special status as "validated end users," which meant they could import certain controlled equipment into China without applying for individual licenses each time. It was a privilege born of necessity: the companies needed to keep their Chinese factories running, and Washington wanted to allow that, at least for a while.
But the privilege was fragile. In 2025, the U.S. revoked the validated-user status. Later that year, it issued an annual license allowing the companies to bring in equipment for 2026—but only for that year. The message was clear: the rules could change again, and probably would. What worried Samsung and SK Hynix most was not the immediate restrictions on new equipment, but the possibility that future controls might extend to servicing and maintaining the American tools already installed in their Chinese plants. If that happened, their factories could become stranded, unable to repair or upgrade the machines that kept them running.
So they began testing Chinese alternatives. AMEC's etching equipment was not as advanced as what Applied Materials or Lam Research could offer, but it was close enough—and it was 20 to 30 percent cheaper. More importantly, AMEC equipment was already being used by Chinese chipmakers like Yangtze Memory Technologies, which meant it had been tested in real production environments. If Samsung and SK Hynix were willing to test it too, that would amount to a powerful endorsement. For Chinese equipment makers, it would be a breakthrough.
The broader picture is one of unintended consequences. The U.S. export controls were designed to slow China's semiconductor ambitions, to keep advanced chipmaking tools out of Chinese hands. But they have created a different dynamic: they have given Chinese equipment makers a reason to exist, and they have given foreign companies operating in China a reason to buy from them. Applied Materials reported $8.53 billion in China revenue in fiscal 2025—30 percent of its total sales. That market is now at risk. Deutsche Bank estimates that four major Chinese equipment makers—Naura Technology, AMEC, Piotech, and ACM Research—will each generate more than $1 billion in revenue in 2026. Together, they could capture 25 to 30 percent of China's projected $28 billion wafer-fabrication equipment market. Excluding lithography and metrology, where Chinese suppliers still lag, their share could approach 40 percent.
Samsung and SK Hynix have not yet committed to deploying Chinese equipment widely. Samsung even denied to Reuters that it had tested AMEC equipment at all. SK Hynix declined to comment. AMEC did not respond to requests for comment. The tests remain in a gray zone—real enough that three sources felt compelled to describe them, but deniable enough that the companies can maintain their relationships with American suppliers. Still, the fact that the tests happened at all signals something: the world's largest memory chipmakers are no longer confident that American tools will always be available to them in China. They are preparing for a future in which they might have to rely on Chinese alternatives, at least for maintenance and repair. If that future arrives, it will reshape the global semiconductor equipment market in ways that Washington did not intend.
Citações Notáveis
Samsung said it has not tested AMEC equipment for use at its China factory and had not considered doing so— Samsung statement to Reuters
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