In Geneva this week, representatives of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo gather once more beneath the architecture of a peace they have not yet chosen to inhabit. The Washington Accords, signed in the hopeful aftermath of M23's 2025 offensive, promised a mutual unwinding of threat — Congo neutralizing the FDLR militia, Rwanda withdrawing its border forces — yet each side waits for the other to move first, and the eastern provinces bleed in the interval. What convenes on September 16 and 17 is not quite diplomacy and not quite failure, but something more familiar in the long stor
Rwanda-DRC peace talks test fragile 2025 accord amid continued fighting
Decades of conflict in eastern DRC involving armed groups, repeated fighting, and territorial displacement; M23 captured major cities including Goma and Bukavu in 2025.
Neither country trusts the other to move first.
Mark
So these talks in Geneva—are they a sign that the peace process is working, or that it's failing?
Mimi
Both, actually. The fact that they keep meeting suggests commitment. But the fact that they're still arguing about the same two things—FDLR neutralization and Rwanda's border forces—after more than a year suggests the core problems haven't moved.
Luke
Wait. The Washington Accords were signed in June 2025, and we're now in September 2026. That's fifteen months. How much time do they get before we say this isn't working?
Mimi
That's the right question. But the fighting has continued the whole time. M23 still holds Goma and Bukavu. The FDLR is still in the eastern DRC. Nothing has actually changed on the ground.
Mark
Why is the FDLR so important? It's one armed group among many.
Mimi
Because Rwanda sees it as an existential threat. The group's roots go back to the 1994 genocide. Some of its members were part of the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militia. For Rwanda, the FDLR isn't just another armed group—it's a direct threat from the past.
Luke
But here's the thing: Congo says it got a faction of the FDLR to agree to disarm in July. Rwanda rejected that. So Congo is actually trying to do something, and Rwanda won't accept it.
Mimi
Rwanda's argument is that the agreement requires neutralization, not negotiation. They see Congo's willingness to negotiate as evidence that Kinshasa isn't serious about eliminating the group.
Mark
And Congo's side?
Mimi
Congo accuses Rwanda of supporting M23. If Rwanda is arming M23, then Rwanda isn't actually committed to peace either. It's a mirror accusation.
Luke
But M23 isn't even a party to the Washington Accords. So how does that fit into the framework?
Mimi
It doesn't, really. That's why there's a separate Qatar-led dialogue. But the US-backed process requires Rwanda and Congo to support those talks. So you have two parallel agreements, each dependent on the other, and neither one is moving.
Mark
So what happens if the September talks fail?
Mimi
The fighting continues. The armed groups stay in place. The territorial gains M23 made in 2025 don't get reversed. And the cycle repeats.
Luke
And if they succeed?
Mimi
That's the question nobody can answer yet.
The Pulse
- Fighting has never stopped in North and South Kivu — M23 still holds Goma and Bukavu, cities it seized in 2025, and the Congolese army has not reclaimed them.
- Rwanda and Congo are trapped in a mirror standoff: Kigali will not withdraw border forces until the FDLR is neutralized, and Kinshasa will not aggressively dismantle the FDLR until Rwanda pulls back.
- Congo's July announcement that an FDLR faction had agreed to disarm was rejected by Rwanda as a deliberate evasion — the accords demand neutralization, not negotiation, Kigali insists.
- The August coordination meeting produced procedural steps — monitoring initiatives, a demobilization plan, an October conference — but no movement on the core deadlock.
- The Geneva session is now the test of whether the Washington process can generate real momentum, or whether it joins the long list of agreements that exist on paper while eastern Congo burns.
In Geneva this week, representatives of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo gather once more beneath the architecture of a peace they have not yet chosen to inhabit. The Washington Accords, signed in the hopeful aftermath of M23's 2025 offensive, promised a mutual unwinding of threat — Congo neutralizing the FDLR militia, Rwanda withdrawing its border forces — yet each side waits for the other to move first, and the eastern provinces bleed in the interval. What convenes on September 16 and 17 is not quite diplomacy and not quite failure, but something more familiar in the long story of this region: the difficult, necessary work of keeping a fragile process alive long enough for trust to become possible.
In three days, officials from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will sit down in Geneva to confront a peace agreement that is already unraveling. The Joint Security Coordination Mechanism — created to oversee the Washington Accords signed in June 2025 — will convene September 16 and 17, with mediators from the United States, Qatar, Togo, and the African Union. On paper, it exists to ensure compliance. In practice, it is a forum for two governments to trade accusations they cannot resolve.
The fighting has not stopped. In eastern Congo's North and South Kivu provinces, clashes between Congolese forces and M23 continue. The armed group still controls Goma and Bukavu — major cities it seized during its 2025 offensive. The broader conflict has drawn in neighboring states for decades, with armed groups exploiting porous borders and weak governance. The Washington Accords were meant to break this cycle. Instead, the two central obligations underpinning the entire agreement remain unfulfilled.
Rwanda must withdraw its border forces. Congo must neutralize the FDLR — a militia rooted in génocidaires who fled Rwanda in 1994 and have operated from Congolese territory for thirty years. Kigali accuses Kinshasa of arming the group rather than eliminating it. Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of backing M23. Neither will move until the other does first.
The FDLR question has become the fulcrum of the entire process. When Congo announced in July that an FDLR faction had agreed to disarm and enter cantonment, Rwanda rejected it outright — the accords require neutralization, not negotiation. Rwanda read the move as evidence that Kinshasa was not serious, perhaps even complicit in protecting the group.
The August coordination meeting produced some procedural progress: monitoring initiatives, a demobilization plan, an agreement to hold a trilateral conference in October. But these are process steps, not breakthroughs. The Washington framework is itself nested inside a broader diplomatic architecture — including the Qatar-led Doha Framework involving M23 — where each agreement depends on the others, and each is stalled by the same fundamental mistrust.
What is at stake in Geneva is whether two countries locked in decades of conflict can move from accusation toward actual disarmament. The FDLR still operates. Rwanda still holds its border posture. M23's territorial gains remain unreversed. The September talks will determine whether the Washington process can break the deadlock — or become another agreement that lives on paper while the conflict grinds on in the provinces where it actually matters.
In three days, officials from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will sit down in Geneva to confront a peace agreement that is already coming apart. The Joint Security Coordination Mechanism—the body created to oversee the implementation of the Washington Accords signed in June 2025—will convene on September 16 and 17 with mediators from the United States, Qatar, Togo, and the African Union Commission. On paper, the mechanism exists to ensure both countries follow through on their security commitments. In practice, it is a forum for two governments to air accusations they cannot resolve.
The fighting has not stopped. In the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, clashes between the Congolese Armed Forces and the M23 armed group have continued unabated. M23 controls territory it seized in 2025, including the cities of Goma and Bukavu—major population centers that fell to the group's offensive. The broader conflict in eastern Congo has drawn in neighboring countries for decades, with Rwanda and Uganda repeatedly intervening, and armed groups using the region's porous borders and weak state authority to establish bases and wage campaigns. The Washington Accords were meant to break this cycle. Instead, the two central obligations that underpin the entire agreement remain unfulfilled.
Rwanda is obligated to withdraw its forces from the border and lift the defensive measures it has maintained along the frontier with Congo. The Congolese government is obligated to neutralize the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda—the FDLR, a militia rooted in forces that fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Rwanda argues that the FDLR, which has operated from Congolese territory for three decades, poses an existential security threat. Kigali has repeatedly accused Kinshasa of arming and working alongside the group rather than eliminating it. Congo, for its part, has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, allegations Kigali denies. The two countries are locked in a dispute where neither will move until the other does first.
The FDLR dispute has become the fulcrum on which the entire peace process now balances. In July, the Congolese government announced that a faction of the FDLR had signed a protocol agreeing to disarm, demobilize, and enter cantonment—a process of gathering armed fighters in designated areas. Kinshasa presented this as progress toward meeting its obligations under the Washington agreement. Rwanda rejected it outright. The accord requires neutralization, Kigali insisted, not negotiation. Rwanda saw Congo's move as evidence that Kinshasa was not serious about eliminating the group, and that the government in Kinshasa might even be complicit in protecting it.
This deadlock matters because Rwanda's own withdrawal of forces depends on it. Under the Washington framework, Rwanda will only disengage and lift its border measures once Congo has neutralized the FDLR. Congo will only pursue aggressive neutralization once Rwanda withdraws. Neither country trusts the other to move first. At the August meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, the two sides did make some progress: they agreed to advance monitoring and verification initiatives, and Congo presented a disarmament and demobilization plan for the FDLR. They also agreed to hold a trilateral planning conference in October. But these are procedural steps, not breakthroughs. The fundamental disagreement remains.
The Washington Accords themselves are not new. The initial agreement was signed in Washington on June 27, 2025. A reaffirmation, called the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, was signed on December 4 of that year. Both documents are part of a larger diplomatic architecture that includes a separate Qatar-led dialogue between Congo and M23, which produced the Doha Framework for Peace in November 2025. M23 is not a party to the Washington agreement, but the US-backed process requires Rwanda and Congo to support the Doha talks. The result is a nested set of agreements, each dependent on the others, each stalled by the same fundamental mistrust.
What is at stake in Geneva is whether two countries locked in decades of conflict can move beyond accusation and toward actual disarmament. The fighting in the east continues. The armed groups remain. The territorial gains M23 made in 2025 have not been reversed. The FDLR still operates from Congolese soil. Rwanda still maintains its border posture. The September talks will test whether the Washington process can generate enough momentum to break the deadlock, or whether it will become another agreement that exists on paper while the conflict grinds on in the provinces where it actually matters.
Notable Quotes
The Washington Accords reaffirm the parties' commitment to implement the Peace Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, agreed to in Washington, June 2025, and achieve the vision of the Regional Economic Integration Framework, to create a bold roadmap for peace, security, and unprecedented economic growth.— US Department of State spokesperson
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