For nearly three decades, the Ottawa Treaty stood as one of humanity's rare agreements to place the suffering of civilians above the logic of military advantage — a covenant born from the image of children maimed in fields long after wars had ended. Now, in the shadow of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, five European NATO states and Ukraine itself have withdrawn from that covenant, concluding that a treaty their adversary never signed had become an asymmetric burden they could no longer bear. The decision is legally defensible and strategically comprehensible, yet it marks something harder to rec
Russia-Ukraine war unravels decades of landmine treaty protections
We cannot remain bound when the enemy has no restrictions
Why does it matter that these specific countries withdrew? Couldn't they just use mines without formally leaving the treaty?
They could, but withdrawal signals intent. It's a legal declaration that says: we are choosing to use these weapons again. That matters because it normalizes the choice for others. If Poland and Lithuania can withdraw, why not Georgia? Why not Moldova? The treaty only works if countries believe it's binding.
But Russia never signed the treaty anyway. So Ukraine was already fighting an enemy with no legal restrictions.
Exactly. That's the trap. Ukraine was bound by a rule Russia never accepted. So they faced a choice: stay bound and handicapped, or withdraw and level the playing field. It's rational from their perspective. But it's also how treaties die—not from one dramatic breach, but from a cascade of rational defections.
These new mines have sensors and smart technology. Doesn't that make them safer?
That's what the manufacturers argue. But the research suggests the opposite. Sensors make mines harder to detect and harder to remove. And here's the thing: mines don't stay on battlefields. They migrate into civilian spaces. A field that was a military position in 2024 becomes a farm again in 2026. The people living there pay the price.
How long does it take to clear a country of mines?
Ukraine is looking at ten years and thirty-five billion dollars just to make the country safe again. And that's assuming the war ends soon. Every month of fighting adds more mines, more ordnance, more contamination. It's a debt that will outlive everyone who laid the mines.
Is there any chance the treaty gets rebuilt?
Not soon. The moment has passed. Once you have five NATO countries openly manufacturing mines again, once you've normalized the withdrawal, the treaty becomes a relic. What Wisotzki called the last functioning humanitarian arms control agreement is now just another failed institution.
O Pulso
- Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered the strategic assumptions that had made the Ottawa Treaty viable, leaving signatory nations facing an enemy unconstrained by any mine ban.
- Poland is mass-producing anti-personnel mines for rapid border deployment, Lithuania is resuming both production and procurement, and Finland is laying plans for 'responsible' minefields — European democracies openly reversing a generation of humanitarian commitment.
- A quarter of Ukraine's territory is now contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, over 1,150 Ukrainian civilians have been killed or injured since 2022, and full clearance is estimated to cost nearly 35 billion dollars over a decade.
- Researchers warn that the precedent set by Western democracies withdrawing from the treaty gives cover to any nation in conflict to do the same, threatening a cascade that would hollow out the agreement entirely.
- With the INF Treaty expired, New START lapsed, Open Skies terminated, and the Ottawa Treaty fracturing, the architecture of arms control built over decades is now largely rubble — and no replacement framework is in sight.
For nearly three decades, the Ottawa Treaty stood as one of humanity's rare agreements to place the suffering of civilians above the logic of military advantage — a covenant born from the image of children maimed in fields long after wars had ended. Now, in the shadow of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, five European NATO states and Ukraine itself have withdrawn from that covenant, concluding that a treaty their adversary never signed had become an asymmetric burden they could no longer bear. The decision is legally defensible and strategically comprehensible, yet it marks something harder to recover than territory: the quiet collapse of the last functioning pillar of humanitarian arms control, and the opening of a door through which many others may now follow.
In August 2020, twelve-year-old Raheela Bibi lost both hands to a landmine while playing outside in Pakistan. Her sister's leg was shattered; her brother lost sight in one eye. Years later, she described the difficulty of doing homework without hands — and her refusal to stop trying. Her story is one thread in a much larger unraveling.
Landmines are weapons of deliberate cruelty, designed not to kill soldiers outright but to maim them, on the theory that a wounded combatant drains enemy resources more than a corpse. In peacetime, this logic inverts catastrophically. Mines become indiscriminate killers of civilians, especially children, who wander into contaminated fields long after the soldiers have gone. In 2025 alone, more than five thousand people — the vast majority noncombatants — were killed or injured by mines or unexploded ordnance. In South Sudan, nine in ten victims were children.
The world had tried to solve this through law. The 1997 Ottawa Treaty, signed by more than 120 nations and ratified by 166, banned anti-personnel mines outright. It came into force in 1999, when roughly twenty-five thousand people were being killed or maimed by mines each year. But four major powers never joined: China, India, Russia, and the United States. Russia, crucially, never signed at all.
Then came Russia's full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the treaty's architecture began to crack. By 2025, five European NATO states bordering Russia — Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — had all withdrawn. Ukraine withdrew as well, though the legal effect is suspended until the war ends. These are not peripheral actors. These are Western democracies concluding that humanitarian protections they had upheld for a generation had become asymmetric liabilities against an adversary bound by nothing.
Ukraine's position was stated plainly by Roman Kostenko, secretary of its parliamentary security committee: 'We cannot remain bound under conditions when the enemy has no restrictions.' As of mid-2025, roughly a quarter of Ukraine's territory is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants. More than 1,150 Ukrainian civilians have been killed or injured since the invasion began. Full clearance is estimated to cost nearly 35 billion dollars over the next decade.
Poland has contracted its state defense firm Belma to manufacture mines at scale for rapid eastern border deployment. Lithuania is resuming both production and purchase. Finland insists any mines it lays will be mapped carefully and demined after conflict — a posture researcher Simone Wisotzki of the Leibniz Peace Research Institute finds only partially reassuring. Even smart mines with integrated sensors, she notes, are harder to remove and destroy, and mines are always laid where civilians live.
Wisotzki sees the deeper danger clearly. European democracies have now set a precedent that any nation in an extreme situation can follow. Other Ottawa Treaty parties facing conflict may draw the same conclusion, triggering further withdrawals and eroding the treaty's legitimacy entirely. This is not an isolated rupture. The INF Treaty has expired, New START has lapsed, the Open Skies Treaty is gone, and Russia withdrew from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreement. The Ottawa Treaty was, in Wisotzki's words, 'the only area that could still be said to be working.' That is no longer the case.
In August 2020, a twelve-year-old girl named Raheela Bibi was playing outside with her siblings in Pakistan when a landmine detonated beneath her. Both her hands were amputated in the blast. Her sister's leg was shattered. Her brother lost sight in one eye. Three years later, when Raheela spoke to journalists about her life, she described the grinding difficulty of doing homework without hands—and her refusal to stop trying. Her story is one thread in a much larger unraveling.
Landmines are engineered weapons of a particular cruelty. They are designed not to kill soldiers outright but to maim them, reasoning that an injured combatant drains an enemy's resources far more than a corpse does. In peacetime, however, this calculus inverts entirely. Mines become indiscriminate killers of civilians, especially children, who stumble into fields long after the soldiers have gone home. In 2025 alone, more than five thousand people—the vast majority of them noncombatants—were killed or injured by landmines or unexploded ordnance. In South Sudan, nine out of every ten victims were children.
For nearly three decades, the world had tried to solve this problem through law. In 1997, representatives from more than 120 countries gathered and signed the Ottawa Treaty, a sweeping agreement to ban anti-personnel mines altogether. The treaty took legal force in 1999, by which time roughly twenty-five thousand people were dying or being maimed by mines each year. One hundred sixty-six nations eventually ratified it. But four major powers did not: China, India, Russia, and the United States. Russia, crucially, never signed at all.
Then came February 2022, and Russia's full invasion of Ukraine. What followed was a cascade of withdrawals that has shattered the treaty's architecture. Five European NATO countries that border Russia—Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—all withdrew from the Ottawa Treaty in 2025. Ukraine, though not a NATO member, also withdrew, though the legal effect of that withdrawal is suspended until the war ends. The precedent is stark and alarming. These are not distant nations in conflict over resources or ideology. These are European democracies, members of the Western alliance, deciding that the humanitarian protections they had embraced for a generation were now liabilities.
Ukraine's justification was blunt: Russia has never ratified the treaty and has deployed mines across Ukrainian territory with no legal constraint. "We cannot remain bound under conditions when the enemy has no restrictions," said Roman Kostenko, secretary of Ukraine's parliamentary committee on national security. Ukraine itself has begun laying mines, though on a far smaller scale than Russia's deployment. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service, as of mid-2025, approximately one quarter of Ukraine's entire territory was contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance. This includes both Ukrainian-controlled areas and Russian-occupied zones in the east and southeast. Since the invasion began in February 2022, more than eleven hundred fifty Ukrainian civilians have been killed or injured by mines and explosive remnants of war. The estimated cost of fully clearing the country of mines over the next decade: just under thirty-five billion dollars.
Poland has been particularly explicit about its intentions. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stated repeatedly that his country must be able to rapidly mine its eastern border with Russia if conflict erupts. The state-owned defense company Belma has been contracted to manufacture anti-personnel mines in large quantities. Lithuania has announced it will resume both the production and purchase of landmines. Finland's military has taken a slightly different tack, insisting that if mines must be laid, they should be deployed "responsibly"—with accurate maps of their positions and clear demining plans. But Simone Wisotzki, a researcher at the Leibniz Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, points out that even these newer mines, equipped with integrated sensors and smart technologies, present their own problems. They are harder to remove and destroy. And in practice, mines are always laid in areas civilians inhabit. They remain there long after the war ends, injuring civilians disproportionately.
Wisotzki sees this moment as a dangerous inflection point. "This is a precedent that European states, of all countries, have set," she told Deutsche Welle. "Other parties to the Ottawa Treaty facing equally extreme situations in times of conflict could take the same step. We would then have to deal with more withdrawals, which would undermine the legitimacy of the entire treaty." Her concern is not abstract. The broader landscape of arms control has already collapsed. In recent years, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty expired. The New Start nuclear reduction agreement lapsed. The Treaty on Open Skies was terminated. Russia withdrew from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty. What remains of humanitarian arms control—the agreements meant to protect civilians from the worst weapons—is now fragmenting too. The Ottawa Treaty was, in Wisotzki's words, "the only area that could still be said to be working." And that is no longer the case.
Citações Notáveis
This is a dangerous precedent that European states, of all countries, have set. Other parties to the Ottawa Treaty facing equally extreme situations could take the same step, undermining the legitimacy of the entire treaty.— Simone Wisotzki, Leibniz Peace Research Institute
Humanitarian arms control was in effect the only area that could still be said to be working. And that is no longer the case.— Simone Wisotzki, Leibniz Peace Research Institute