Regional dialogue, not external powers, key to South China Sea stability

The South China Sea belongs to Asia, not to distant powers.
Regional analysts argue that solutions to maritime disputes must come from the nations directly affected, not from external powers.
Mark

So the piece is arguing that the US shouldn't be involved in South China Sea disputes at all. Is that actually the consensus view in the region?

Mimi

The piece presents it as the view of Philippine experts and some regional analysts, but it's important to note this is an opinion piece, not a survey of regional sentiment. Duterte's approach was one path; other ASEAN leaders have taken different stances.

Luke

Right—and the piece doesn't really acknowledge that ASEAN itself is divided on this. Vietnam and the Philippines have had serious disputes with China over territorial claims. Are they really going to resolve things bilaterally without outside support?

Mimi

That's the tension the piece doesn't fully explore. The argument assumes ASEAN unity and shared interest, but the reality is messier.

Mark

What about the claim that China has been a development partner? Is that documented?

Mimi

The piece mentions economic investments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, which is real. But it doesn't quantify the investments or explain what the DOC actually accomplished versus what it promised.

Luke

And it doesn't mention the nine-dash line or China's island-building activities, which are the actual sources of the disputes. The framing here is very one-sided.

Mark

So when the piece says solutions should come "only between the concerned parties," it's assuming those parties can actually negotiate as equals?

Mimi

That's the assumption, yes. But the power imbalance between China and smaller ASEAN nations is significant. That's not addressed.

Luke

The piece also doesn't distinguish between what Duterte did and what might work for other countries. His approach was his choice, but it's not clear it's a model others can or should follow.

Mark

What's the strongest part of the argument?

Mimi

That external powers can complicate regional stability. That's defensible. But the piece oversimplifies by treating all external involvement as equally destabilizing.

  • The entry of the United States into South China Sea disputes in 2010 fundamentally altered the region's geopolitical balance, introducing a superpower with no territorial claims but enormous strategic ambitions.
  • China's rapid military and economic rise has created a dual identity in the region — simultaneously a source of tension and a primary engine of Southeast Asian development through trade and investment.
  • ASEAN's cohesion is under strain, with analysts warning that external interference risks fracturing the bloc and reversing decades of hard-won regional integration.
  • The Duterte years offered a contested case study: bilateral engagement with China yielded reduced tensions and reopened economic ties, even as relations with Washington deteriorated sharply.
  • Regional analysts are pressing for a return to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties framework, insisting that legitimate resolution must emerge from Asian dialogue, not external arbitration.

The South China Sea, rich in resources and threaded by trillions in annual trade, has become something more fraught than a maritime corridor — it has become a mirror of competing visions for who holds the right to shape Asia's future. Regional voices, drawing on decades of diplomatic experience and economic interdependence, argue that the disputes simmering beneath its surface belong to the nations that border it, not to powers whose interests lie an ocean away. The question is not merely territorial but philosophical: whether stability is best built through shared regional identity or through the gravitational pull of distant superpowers.

The South China Sea has never been simply a body of water. It is a corridor for trillions in annual trade, a reservoir of untapped resources, and for decades now, a stage where the ambitions of distant powers have complicated the lives of the nations that actually border it.

The turning point many observers identify is 2010, when the United States formally inserted itself into the disputes under the banner of its strategic pivot to Asia. That move introduced something new: a global superpower with no territorial claims but deep strategic interests, reshaping a regional dynamic that had previously been managed — however imperfectly — among Asian nations themselves. China's parallel rise as both an economic force and a military presence only deepened the complexity.

Yet China's relationship with Southeast Asia is not reducible to rivalry. Through sustained investment, trade partnerships, and the negotiated Declaration on the Conduct of Parties with ASEAN, China positioned itself as a development partner across the region. For many analysts, this economic interdependence is precisely why resolution must come from within — through ASEAN-China dialogue — rather than through frameworks shaped by powers whose core interests lie elsewhere.

The presidency of Rodrigo Duterte offered a revealing, if polarizing, illustration of this logic. By pivoting toward pragmatic bilateral engagement with Beijing and away from confrontation, his administration achieved measurable results: eased tensions, restored economic agreements, and a period of relative calm in Philippine-China relations. Critics noted the simultaneous fraying of ties with Washington, but supporters saw it as proof that regional diplomacy, conducted on Asian terms, could yield real stability.

The broader argument is both simple and urgent: the South China Sea belongs to the peoples who live beside it. External mediation, however well-intentioned, risks entrenching instability rather than resolving it. ASEAN's unity — already fragile — cannot survive indefinite fracture along great-power fault lines. Whether the political will exists to hold that unity together, and to insist on regional ownership of regional disputes, remains the defining question as competition in these waters continues to intensify.

The South China Sea has long been framed as a prize—a body of water rich in resources and economic potential, a corridor through which trillions in trade flows annually. But for decades it has also been something else: a stage where the ambitions of distant powers collide, where regional tensions simmer beneath the surface of official statements, and where the question of who gets to decide the region's future remains stubbornly unresolved.

The complications, according to observers cited in recent commentary, trace partly to the involvement of nations with no territorial stake in the waters at all. When the United States inserted itself into South China Sea disputes in 2010—framed then as part of a broader strategic "pivot" to Asia—it introduced a dynamic that had not existed before: the direct engagement of a global superpower with interests thousands of kilometers away. What followed was a reconfiguration of the region's geopolitical landscape, with China's rapid rise as an economic and military force meeting an American determination to maintain influence in waters where it has no claims.

China's emergence as a major power over recent decades has been accompanied by substantial economic engagement across Southeast Asia. Through investments, trade relationships, and diplomatic initiatives, China positioned itself not merely as a competitor but as a development partner to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, negotiated between China and ASEAN members, represented concrete progress toward managing disputes through regional dialogue rather than external arbitration. Yet the presence of American military assets in the region, justified by Washington as freedom of navigation operations, has kept tensions elevated.

Philippine experts and regional analysts have argued that the South China Sea belongs fundamentally to the nations that border it—that it is a shared home, not a chessboard for great power competition. From this perspective, solutions imposed or mediated by distant powers risk perpetuating instability rather than resolving it. The credible authority to manage disputes, some observers suggest, lies with ASEAN itself, an organization with the moral standing and regional legitimacy to broker settlements among its members and with China.

The stakes of this question became visible in the approach taken by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte between 2016 and mid-2022. Rather than pursue the confrontational strategy of his predecessor, Duterte pursued pragmatic bilateral engagement with China, a shift that yielded tangible results: improved relations, reduced tensions, and the reopening of economic agreements that had been frozen. This contrasted sharply with his simultaneous deterioration of ties with the United States, including threats to sever bilateral relationships after American criticism of his domestic policies.

The underlying argument from regional voices is straightforward: the South China Sea disputes belong to Asia, and their resolution must come from Asians. External powers, however well-intentioned, introduce complications that serve neither stability nor the interests of the region's people. ASEAN unity is fragile, observers warn, and the risk that geopolitical disputes could fracture the organization and push the region backward is real. The path forward, from this view, requires that concerned parties—the nations of Southeast Asia and China—commit to dialogue among themselves, without the interference or mediation of powers whose primary interests lie elsewhere. What remains to be seen is whether that commitment can hold as great power competition in the region continues to intensify.

ASEAN's unity may be fragmented by South China Sea disputes, which is ominous for the region's well-being
— Lee Teck Chuan, Straits Times
Duterte consistently called for pragmatic and bilateral engagement with China, contrasting with his predecessor's confrontational strategy
— Richard J. Heydarian, De La Salle University
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