NZ Leverages Great Power Rivalry to Deepen Southeast Asia Ties

New Zealand is becoming a useful friend at a moment when Southeast Asian nations are learning to live between superpowers. This week, Thailand's prime minister arrived in Wellington to mark seven decades of diplomatic relations and formalize a strategic partnership. Last week, Vietnam's most powerful leader in recent memory, Tô Lâm, was here discussing trade and deeper ties. The Philippines relationship was upgraded last month. Indonesia and Malaysia are next on the conversation list. The timing is not coincidental.

Across the region, a quiet but urgent recalibration is underway. As China and the United States compete for influence and leverage, countries from Bangkok to Hanoi are pursuing what analysts call "multi-alignment"—a deliberate strategy to build robust networks of trade, security, and cultural ties with as many partners as possible, rather than betting everything on one great power. It is mass hedging. Southeast Asian nations are increasing trade with each other, reaching toward Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. The goal is simple: if something fractures with Washington or Beijing, there are other routes, other relationships, other sources of supply and security.

New Zealand fits into this picture because it is small enough to be unthreatening and capable enough to be useful. Thailand buys $1.6 billion of New Zealand products annually and ranks among our top ten trading partners—though that figure pales beside the $20 billion we export to China. Vietnam is growing at eight percent a year and has ambitions far larger than its current economy. The Philippines and Indonesia are among the world's most populous nations. These are not marginal markets. They are also not aligned with either superpower in any binding way, which is precisely the point.

Tô Lâm, who consolidated power in April by holding both top positions in Vietnam's political system for the first time in four decades, is moving with particular urgency. He has set Vietnam on a course toward ten percent annual growth over the next five years and aims to reach high-income status by 2045. He is, as one observer put it, a leader in a hurry. His model is South Korea—rapid industrialization through backing large conglomerates, the kind of transformation that takes discipline and speed. For that, he needs partners. New Zealand offers expertise in agritech, geothermal energy, satellite technology, and Antarctic knowledge. These are not glamorous exports, but they are precisely what a nation trying to modernize at pace requires.

Suzannah Jessep, chief executive of the Asia New Zealand Foundation, describes what is happening as a new era of regional diplomacy. Some of it is ceremonial—marking milestone anniversaries like Vietnam's fifty years of formal relations with New Zealand. But much of it reflects what she calls "considerable pressure" in the region. Rules are being tested. Countries are grappling with shocks from Iran and Ukraine. Economic challenges like American tariffs are reshaping calculations. In this environment, relationships that extend beyond trade—cultural ties, educational exchanges, scientific collaboration, sports partnerships—become stabilizing forces. Soft power matters when politics shift or diverge.

What makes this moment distinctive is that New Zealand is not being chosen because it is powerful or ideologically aligned with one camp or another. It is being chosen because it is present, capable, and genuinely interested in relationships that do not come with strings attached to a larger geopolitical agenda. That is a form of advantage. It is also a form of responsibility. These partnerships will only deepen if New Zealand treats them as genuine relationships rather than transactional opportunities. The region is watching to see whether we understand the difference.