In a Sydney courtroom, a judge has drawn a line that many find either clarifying or alarming: the line between hatred of a people and criticism of a state. Justice Desmond Fagan rejected a terrorism order against Mohammed Farhat, a young man who spray-painted anti-Israel slogans on cars, finding the act to be political speech rather than antisemitism — and in doing so, challenged the institutional authority of the IHRA definition that Australia has formally embraced. Beneath the legal ruling lies a deeper wound: police withheld evidence that Farhat was paid, not ideologically driven, leaving a
NSW weighs appeal of ruling that anti-Israel vandalism wasn't antisemitic
The political nature of the curse was not changed by the circumstances.
Why did the judge focus so heavily on the IHRA definition when the core issue was whether police withheld evidence?
Because the definition shaped everything that came before. If disparaging Israel is automatically antisemitic under IHRA, then Farhat's actions look like ideological hatred. But if it's political speech, the whole case changes. The judge had to untangle that to explain why the miscarriage of justice happened in the first place.
But the Jewish groups say the location matters—a Jewish neighborhood, Jewish-owned cars. Doesn't context make it antisemitic?
That's the real disagreement. Fagan said context doesn't transform political speech into antisemitism. The Jewish Council of Australia agrees with him. But the Executive Council says the community felt attacked regardless of the speaker's motivation. Both things can be true—it can be political speech and still wound people deeply.
So the police withheld evidence that he was paid to do it. How does that change the moral weight of what he did?
Dramatically. If you're ideologically motivated, you're a true believer—a terrorism risk. If you're hired muscle, you're a vandal. The state built its case on the first story without telling the court about the second. That's not just unfair to Farhat. It's unfair to the community too, because it misidentifies the actual threat.
What happens if the government appeals and wins?
Then Farhat could be subjected to the extended supervision order, and the IHRA definition gets reinforced in Australian law. But it also means a court has said police can withhold exculpatory intelligence and still get what they want. That's the real danger.
O Pulso
- A 22-year-old remains imprisoned past his parole date after counter-terrorism police concealed evidence that he was hired to write slogans, not acting on extremist conviction.
- Justice Fagan's rejection of the IHRA antisemitism definition has fractured the Jewish community, with peak bodies calling it dangerous judicial activism while progressive Jewish voices call it a necessary correction.
- The NSW government is urgently seeking appeal advice, and a Greens MP has referred police conduct to the state's law enforcement watchdog over what she calls a systemic miscarriage of justice.
- The ruling forces a public reckoning with whether institutional definitions of antisemitism, adopted in the wake of a deadly Hanukkah attack, are tools of protection or instruments that blur the boundary between bigotry and political dissent.
In a Sydney courtroom, a judge has drawn a line that many find either clarifying or alarming: the line between hatred of a people and criticism of a state. Justice Desmond Fagan rejected a terrorism order against Mohammed Farhat, a young man who spray-painted anti-Israel slogans on cars, finding the act to be political speech rather than antisemitism — and in doing so, challenged the institutional authority of the IHRA definition that Australia has formally embraced. Beneath the legal ruling lies a deeper wound: police withheld evidence that Farhat was paid, not ideologically driven, leaving a man of limited means and intellect to bear the weight of charges shaped by information his own prosecutors never shared.
In late 2024, Mohammed Farhat spray-painted anti-Israel slogans on cars in Woollahra and set one vehicle alight. He pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of property damage. When he was due for release, the state sought to have him declared a terrorism risk under the Terrorism Act. This week, NSW Supreme Court Justice Desmond Fagan rejected that application — and in doing so, exposed both a police failure and a deeper dispute about the meaning of antisemitism in Australia.
The case's most damaging revelation was procedural. Within weeks of Farhat's November 2024 arrest, counter-terrorism police had concluded he was not ideologically motivated — he had been recruited and paid to write the slogans. That intelligence was never passed to prosecutors, never reached the sentencing magistrate, and was absent when the state sought to frame the now 22-year-old as a terrorism threat. Fagan found this a serious miscarriage of justice, and assessed the risk of Farhat committing a terrorism offence as insignificant. He remains in prison nonetheless.
But the ruling's wider impact lies in Fagan's treatment of the speech itself. He found the vandalism to be political comment, not antisemitism, and directly challenged the IHRA definition — formally endorsed by the Australian government following a deadly Hanukkah attack in December — calling it detached from common understanding. He noted that Jewish people have long been among the most prominent critics of Israeli policy toward Palestinians, and that the political character of the slogan was not altered by the demographics of the neighborhood where it appeared.
The response split along familiar lines. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry condemned the ruling as dangerous judicial activism, arguing that vandalism in a Jewish neighborhood is inherently an attack on a community, not protest. The NSW government said the Attorney General was seeking urgent advice on appeal. The progressive Jewish Council of Australia, by contrast, welcomed the judgment, arguing the IHRA definition shields Israel from legitimate scrutiny while distorting the fight against genuine hatred.
A Greens MP has referred the police's handling of the case to the state's law enforcement watchdog, citing grave concern about systemic or deliberate maladministration. Police say the matter is under internal review. What remains unresolved is the larger question Fagan's ruling has forced into the open: whether Australia's courts will treat the IHRA definition as a reliable instrument of justice — or as a contested political document that may do as much harm as good when applied in a courtroom.
In late 2024, a Sydney man named Mohammed Farhat spray-painted "Fuk Israel" on several cars in Woollahra and set another vehicle alight. He pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of property damage. The state sought to have him declared a terror threat, requesting a one-year extended supervision order under the Terrorism Act when he was released from prison. This week, NSW Supreme Court Justice Desmond Fagan rejected that request entirely—and in doing so, opened a fault line in how Australian courts understand the difference between political speech and antisemitism.
Fagan's decision turned on a crucial fact that had been hidden from the courts below. Counter-terrorism police, within three weeks of Farhat's arrest in November 2024, had concluded he was not ideologically motivated at all. Intelligence showed he had been recruited and paid to write the slogans. That information never reached the prosecution. It never reached the magistrate who sentenced him. It was not disclosed before the state attempted to cast the now 22-year-old as a terrorism risk. Fagan found this constituted a serious miscarriage of justice. He determined there was an "insignificant" risk Farhat, whom he described as having limited intellect, would commit a serious terrorism offence. Farhat remains in prison despite having been due for parole release in early December 2025.
But the ruling's most consequential finding concerned the nature of the speech itself. Fagan rejected the state's argument that the vandalism was antisemitic. He found it to be political comment. In doing so, he took direct aim at the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism—a definition that has been formally endorsed by the Australian government and adopted by institutions across the country following the Bondi Beach terror attack in December that killed fifteen people during a Hanukkah festival. Fagan called the IHRA formulation "detached from the reality of the common usage and understanding of antisemitism in this country." He noted that Jewish people have themselves been among the most forceful critics of Israel's conduct toward Palestinians for decades. The political nature of the curse, he wrote, was not changed by the fact that it was spray-painted in a neighborhood with a concentration of Jewish residents.
The response has been swift and divided. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Australia's peak Jewish organization, labeled Fagan's decision dangerous judicial activism that should be reviewed. Co-chair Alex Ryvchin told Sky News the ruling was extraordinary given the current state of antisemitism globally, and that Fagan's focus on the IHRA definition "seems like the work of activism rather than a judicial member." Ryvchin argued the vandalism in a Jewish neighborhood was inherently an attack on the community, not merely political protest, and that Fagan's judgment "totally avoids the facts of the case but also the community impact." He called for an appeal. The NSW government said Thursday that Attorney General Michael Daley was "seeking urgent advice about the prospects of an appeal."
But not all Jewish voices aligned. The progressive Jewish Council of Australia welcomed Fagan's categorical rejection of the IHRA definition. Executive member Bart Shteinman agreed with the judge's finding that Jewish Australians are not a monolith, and argued that the IHRA definition "distorts the fight between real antisemitism while shielding Israel from legitimate scrutiny." He suggested the judgment should give governments and institutions pause before adopting the definition.
Meanwhile, the handling of the case itself has drawn scrutiny. Greens MP Sue Higginson wrote to the NSW police watchdog, the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, requesting an urgent investigation into police conduct. She wrote of being "gravely concerned systemic or deliberate maladministration has resulted in a severe miscarriage of justice." The watchdog said it was considering the request. NSW police responded that the matter was under internal investigation and declined further comment.
The case has become a test of how Australian courts will navigate the contested terrain between protecting religious communities from genuine hatred and preserving space for legitimate political criticism. Fagan's judgment suggests at least one senior judge believes that distinction matters—and that the IHRA definition, for all its institutional backing, may not be the right tool to make it. Whether that view will survive an appeal, and what it means for how antisemitism is understood and prosecuted in Australia going forward, remains to be seen.
Citações Notáveis
It's quite extraordinary that we're still being dragged back into foundational discussions about what is and isn't antisemitism, and the judge's focus seems like the work of activism rather than a judicial member.— Alex Ryvchin, co-chair of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry
The IHRA definition distorts the fight between real antisemitism while shielding Israel from legitimate scrutiny, and this judgment should give governments and institutions pause before adopting it.— Bart Shteinman, executive member of the progressive Jewish Council of Australia