NATO commander to warn Russia of alliance's defensive readiness

In Warsaw on Monday, NATO's top military commander will stand before a security conference and lay out, in deliberate terms, what the alliance believes it can do if Russia attacks. General Alexus Grynkewich, who holds the title of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is expected to articulate what his office calls a "theory of victory"—a framework for how NATO intends to maintain its military edge and, if necessary, prevail in armed conflict with Moscow.

The timing of this address reflects a hardening reality in European security. Western officials have grown increasingly alarmed by what they describe as a campaign of hybrid attacks emanating from the Kremlin: sabotage, interference, and other operations that fall short of declared war but carry real consequences. In recent months, these incidents have become more frequent and more brazen. A drone laden with explosives was discovered at a German airport. Other acts of suspected Russian interference have rattled NATO capitals. The pattern suggests that as Russian forces have stalled in their war against Ukraine, Moscow has shifted energy toward destabilizing the alliance itself and the countries that support Kyiv.

Grynkewich's statement, when it comes, will serve two audiences at once. To Russia, it is meant as a clear message: NATO has war-gamed this scenario, has prepared for it, and possesses the capability to defend itself and its members. To NATO's own members—particularly those on the eastern edge of the alliance, closest to Russian territory—it is meant as reassurance. Colonel Martin O'Donnell, speaking for the general last week, described the theory in measured language: maintain NATO's advantage through deterrence and defense planning, set conditions now to prevent aggression, and if attacked, be ready to win. The alliance has no intention of attacking Russia, NATO officials emphasize. This is a defensive posture, they say, grounded in the alliance's founding purpose.

Yet NATO faces a genuine puzzle. The alliance was built to deter and, if necessary, defeat a conventional military invasion. It has less clarity about how to respond to the gray zone—the space between peace and war where Russian operations increasingly occur. A drone at an airport, a sabotaged undersea cable, interference in elections, cyberattacks on infrastructure: these are serious threats that can cause significant harm and loss of life, but they do not fit neatly into NATO's traditional defense framework. The alliance has struggled to develop a coherent strategy for this middle ground.

Complicated matters further is a looming uncertainty about American commitment. The Pentagon is conducting a comprehensive review of its military deployments across Europe, with results expected by year's end. There is real concern, particularly among European allies, that the review could lead to reductions in U.S. forces on the continent. This anxiety has only intensified under the Trump administration, where questions about the reliability of American security guarantees have become routine. In response, European countries are moving rapidly to strengthen their own militaries, accelerating defense spending and procurement in ways not seen in decades. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has urged allies to remain steady—to support Ukraine, to avoid naiveté about Russian intentions, but also to remember that the alliance remains stronger than any single adversary.

What Grynkewich will say in Warsaw, then, arrives in a moment of genuine tension: Russia is testing NATO's resolve through hybrid means; the alliance is uncertain how to respond to threats that do not fit its traditional playbook; and the bedrock of European security—the American military presence and commitment—is under review. The general's theory of victory, whatever its specifics, will be heard against this backdrop of shifting ground.