Kabila Forms New Group as Congo Faces M23 Insurgency Challenge

Ongoing M23 insurgency has displaced hundreds of thousands and caused significant civilian casualties in eastern Congo.
A former head of state mobilizing his own armed force
Kabila's decision to organize a new military faction signals how fragmented Congo's security response has become.
Mark

Why would a former president, someone who already held power, need to form his own armed group now?

Mimi

Kabila spent eighteen years running the country, which means he built relationships with military officers, regional commanders, and armed factions. When he left office, those networks didn't disappear. He's essentially activating them because the current government can't contain M23.

Luke

But we should be careful here—the reporting says he's "forming" a group, but we don't actually know its size, its command structure, or whether it's truly independent or coordinating with elements of the national military. Those details matter.

Mark

So this could be less about Kabila acting alone and more about him mobilizing existing networks that were already there?

Mimi

Exactly. Congo's security landscape has always been fragmented. What's new is that a former president is doing this openly, which signals how broken the state's monopoly on force has become.

Luke

The reporting also notes that M23 has displaced hundreds of thousands and caused significant casualties. That's the real story—not just the political maneuvering, but the fact that civilians are suffering because no one can actually defeat this insurgency.

Mark

Does forming this new group make that situation better or worse?

Mimi

Almost certainly worse. More armed factions means more opportunities for miscalculation, more groups competing for territory and resources, and more civilians caught in the crossfire.

Luke

And we don't know if international mediators even know about this yet, or what their response will be. That's a gap in the reporting.

Mark

So this is really about state collapse, isn't it? When the government can't provide security, former leaders step in.

Mimi

That's the pattern in Congo. And each time it happens, the state gets weaker, not stronger.

  • The M23 insurgency has held territory in North Kivu and South Kivu for years, displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians and resisting every effort by the Congolese military to dislodge it.
  • Into this security vacuum, former president Kabila — out of office since 2019 but still commanding deep networks of military officers and regional strongmen — is now mobilizing his own armed force.
  • The move signals a dangerous fragmentation: rather than a unified national response, Congo's political establishment is splintering into competing armed factions, each pursuing its own strategic interests.
  • International mediation efforts have yielded little, and the current government's inability to contain the insurgency is creating conditions where former leaders feel both justified and empowered to act outside state channels.
  • Critical questions remain unanswered — who will command Kabila's faction, whether it will coordinate with or rival the national military, and how foreign governments will respond to yet another armed group entering an already crowded conflict landscape.

In the shadow of a prolonged insurgency that has displaced hundreds of thousands across eastern Congo, former president Joseph Kabila — who governed the Democratic Republic of Congo for nearly two decades — has begun assembling a new armed faction outside the formal structures of the state. His move reflects a broader fracturing of Congo's political and military order, where the persistence of the M23 rebellion has exposed the limits of both national institutions and international mediation. History reminds us that when states cannot provide security, power does not disappear — it disperses, often into the hands of those who once held it formally.

Joseph Kabila, who led the Democratic Republic of Congo for eighteen years before stepping down in 2019, has begun organizing a new armed faction — a decision that marks a striking departure from conventional post-presidential politics and signals how severely the M23 insurgency has strained Congo's security order. The M23, active in cycles since 2012, continues to control significant territory in North Kivu and South Kivu, provinces that border Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The insurgency has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and left a documented trail of casualties, while the Congolese military has struggled to mount a coherent counter-offensive against an enemy that exploits porous borders and difficult terrain.

Kabila's decision to form this group reflects the deeply fractured nature of Congo's political and military landscape. Though no longer in formal power, he retains influence over networks built during his long presidency — military officers, regional strongmen, and armed factions that operated under his watch. By organizing a new force, he is positioning himself as an alternative power center, stepping into a vacuum that the current government and international mediators have failed to fill.

What this faction will look like in practice — its commanders, its relationship to the national army, its rules of engagement — remains unclear. What is clear is that its emergence adds yet another armed actor to an already overcrowded conflict, raising fears among foreign governments and multilateral organizations that have long warned against the proliferation of non-state military forces in the region. Whether Kabila's intervention strengthens or further complicates Congo's capacity to counter the M23 is an open question, but the very fact that a former head of state feels compelled to raise his own army speaks plainly to how far eastern Congo remains from anything resembling stability.

Joseph Kabila, who spent eighteen years as the Democratic Republic of Congo's president before stepping down in 2019, has begun assembling a new armed faction. The move comes as the M23 insurgency continues to hold territory across eastern Congo, a region that has endured decades of overlapping conflicts, warlord activity, and militia violence. Kabila's decision to organize this group signals a significant shift in how Congo's political establishment is responding to the security crisis—rather than relying solely on the national military or international intervention, a former head of state is mobilizing his own armed force.

The M23 insurgency, which has cycled through periods of dormancy and resurgence since its founding in 2012, has proven remarkably difficult to contain. The group controls swaths of territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, areas that sit at the crossroads of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The insurgency's persistence has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and left a trail of documented civilian casualties. For years, the Congolese military has struggled to mount an effective counter-offensive, hampered by logistical constraints, corruption, and the sheer complexity of fighting an enemy that operates across porous borders and difficult terrain.

Kabila's formation of this new group reflects the fractured nature of Congo's security landscape. Rather than a unified national response, the country's political and military establishment has fragmented into competing factions, each with its own armed capacity and strategic interests. Kabila, though no longer in formal power, retains significant influence over networks of military officers, regional strongmen, and armed groups that operated during his presidency. By organizing a new faction, he is positioning himself as an alternative power center capable of addressing threats that the current government appears unable to contain.

The timing of this move underscores the deepening tensions within Congo's political sphere. The country's current leadership has struggled to manage both the M23 threat and the broader instability that characterizes the eastern provinces. International mediation efforts, including those led by regional organizations and foreign governments, have produced limited results. The insurgency remains entrenched, and the humanitarian toll continues to mount. Into this vacuum of effective state response, figures like Kabila are stepping, mobilizing armed capacity outside formal state structures.

What remains unclear is how this new group will operate in practice, who its commanders will be, and whether it will coordinate with or operate independently of the national military. The move also raises questions about the international response. Foreign governments and multilateral organizations have long expressed concern about the proliferation of armed groups in Congo, yet the state's inability to provide security has created conditions where former leaders feel compelled to organize their own forces. This dynamic threatens to further complicate an already fractured security environment.

The emergence of Kabila's faction adds another layer to an already complex conflict. The M23 insurgency will now face not just the Congolese military but also armed groups organized by political figures outside the formal state apparatus. Whether this fragmentation of armed response will strengthen or weaken Congo's overall capacity to counter the insurgency remains to be seen. What is certain is that the security crisis in eastern Congo continues to deepen, and the political establishment's response—fractured, personalistic, and organized outside formal state channels—suggests that the path toward stability remains distant.

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