Japan's Takaichi signals cautious reset with China while maintaining Taiwan stance

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stood before parliament on Monday with a delicate task: acknowledge Beijing without backing down. In a wide-ranging policy speech laying out her government's agenda for a 69-day parliamentary session, she chose her words about China with visible care. The country was an "important neighbour," she said, one with which Japan would work to build a "constructive and stable relationship" through dialogue and communication on shared challenges. But in the same breath, she drew a firm line, listing concerns about disputes in the East and South China Sea, Chinese military activity near Japanese territory, coercive measures, and human rights. The balance was deliberate—and it mattered because nearly a year of diplomatic friction had preceded this moment.

That friction began last November when Takaichi, then foreign minister, suggested that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan could threaten Japan's survival and potentially trigger a Japanese military response. Beijing reacted with fury, demanding she retract the comments. She refused. The rupture spread beyond official channels into trade, tourism, and the broader texture of bilateral relations. Now, as prime minister, Takaichi was attempting something more nuanced: to signal openness to stabilizing ties without surrendering the position that had caused the original breach.

What struck observers most was what Takaichi did not say. Taiwan went unmentioned in her speech—a notable absence that analysts interpreted not as a policy shift but as a deliberate choice to avoid further inflaming Beijing while also signaling that her November remarks did not represent a fundamental change in Japan's stance. Shin Kawashima, a professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, noted that Japanese prime ministers rarely invoke Taiwan in inaugural or policy addresses, given that Japan maintains no formal diplomatic relations with the island. Her silence, he suggested, was meant to convey that her administration's position on Taiwan remained unchanged, even as she attempted to reset the tone with China.

The timing of Takaichi's speech aligned with other tentative moves toward re-engagement. In late September, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice-Premier He Lifeng had received Takeshi Iwaya, a former Japanese foreign minister, in Beijing—the highest-level reception of a visiting Japanese politician in nearly a year. Iwaya led a 50-member business delegation, a signal that economic actors on both sides were seeking to restore stability. Wang had also said that ties with Tokyo were "waiting to be normalised again." Takaichi's language about China as an "important neighbour" appeared to reciprocate that opening, though experts cautioned that both sides remained far from a genuine thaw.

The core problem persisted unresolved. Beijing wanted Takaichi to retract her November statement about Taiwan and a potential Japanese military response. She could not do so without suffering serious political damage at home, where her position on Taiwan enjoyed broad support. Chinese state media responded to her October speech with skepticism bordering on contempt. The state broadcaster CGTN accused her of "diplomatic hypocrisy," arguing that her conciliatory language masked Tokyo's hardening security posture and its stance on Taiwan. A columnist for the outlet wrote that the fundamental issue was not a shortage of diplomatic vocabulary but a widening contradiction between what Takaichi's government said about China and what it actually did. Analysts from Chinese institutions suggested her remarks were merely tactical—an attempt to ease domestic pressure and reassure Japan's business community—rather than evidence of genuine policy recalibration.

Beijing had also taken concrete steps to signal its displeasure. It had warned its citizens against travel to Japan, tightened export controls on dual-use goods including rare earths, and maintained economic restrictions on bilateral trade. As of early October, there were no signs that China was quietly unwinding these measures. Kawashima noted that restrictions on people-to-people exchange and economic sanctions remained in place, though he pointed to recent visits by Japanese lawmakers and business groups as attempts to improve relations.

Experts described the current moment as both sides testing the water while maintaining their original positions. A genuine thaw seemed unlikely as long as Japan's stance on Taiwan remained unchanged and Takaichi refused to retract her November comments. The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Shenzhen in November would serve as a barometer—whether Takaichi and Xi Jinping met, whether ministerial-level talks occurred, and what tone those encounters carried would signal whether the cautious re-engagement could deepen into something more substantial. For now, engagement was happening through business and parliamentary channels rather than at the highest diplomatic levels, a sign that both capitals were moving carefully, testing whether words could begin to repair what November had broken.