Israel demands accountability three years after October 7 security failure

The October 7, 2023 attack killed approximately 1,200 people across southern Israel and resulted in 251 hostages taken to Gaza; Kfar Aza alone lost 64 residents including half its civil defence squad.
I need my country to take responsibility
A woman whose brother and niece were killed in the October 7 attack speaks to the absence of accountability three years later.
Mark

Why hasn't there been an official inquiry into what happened? It seems like the most basic thing a government would do after a catastrophe like that.

Mimi

Netanyahu has blocked it at every turn. He rejected an independent state inquiry led by the Supreme Court, arguing the judiciary would be biased against him. His government proposed an alternative where political parties would appoint the commission members, but then said they ran out of time to pass the legislation before parliament ended in July.

Luke

That's a convenient timeline. But I want to be careful here—did Netanyahu explicitly say he ran out of time, or is that the government's explanation? And how much of this is about him personally versus the broader political coalition he leads?

Mimi

The government said it ran out of time. As for Netanyahu personally, he has consistently refused the state inquiry and argued against the Supreme Court's involvement. His allies defend him by saying the attack was so secret that even he couldn't have known.

Mark

But there were warnings, right? I read that soldiers warned about preparations for an attack.

Mimi

Yes. Female soldiers posted at bases along the Gaza border warned their superiors for months. His own security chief warned him. According to reporting, the UAE leader allegedly called him ten days before to warn of Hamas plans. Netanyahu denies knowing anything.

Luke

Hold on—the UAE call is from one source, the Haaretz newspaper, and Netanyahu's office called it "an absolute lie." We should be clear that's disputed. The soldier warnings are documented, but what exactly did they say, and how far up the chain did they go? Those are different things.

Mimi

Fair point. The soldiers warned about suspicious activity and possible preparations. Whether that reached Netanyahu directly or what form those warnings took—that's part of what an inquiry would answer.

Mark

So the military has accepted responsibility, but the political leadership hasn't?

Mimi

Exactly. The IDF chief of staff apologized and resigned. Military commanders were fired. The domestic intelligence chief left. But Netanyahu has rejected any personal responsibility. Even the IDF's spokesman at the time resigned six months later because of the political refusal to accept accountability.

Luke

That's a real split. But I want to know: when Netanyahu says his security chiefs deliberately didn't wake him, is there any evidence for that, or is that his explanation?

Mimi

That's his claim. He told Channel 14 that they feared he would order a massive military deployment. But Yaakov Katz, who has written extensively about the defense failures, documented what military leaders actually knew that morning—they expected a small, limited incursion, not what actually happened. So waking Netanyahu wouldn't have changed the outcome.

Mark

Then what's the real failure? Is it the intelligence failure, or the policy?

Mimi

Both, according to critics. The intelligence failure is obvious. But Katz argues Netanyahu set a policy of containment rather than confrontation with Hamas, and that doctrine trickled down to every soldier on the border. He allowed Qatar to funnel hundreds of millions in aid to Gaza while keeping Hamas in power.

Luke

That's a bigger political argument, though. Netanyahu says the money was to avoid a civilian catastrophe. Whether that policy was wise or foolish is something voters will decide. The accountability question is narrower: what did he know about the specific attack, and when?

Mimi

Right. And that's exactly what an independent inquiry would answer. Which is why families like Inbar Goldstein's, who lost her brother and niece, keep demanding one.

Mark

Is there any chance it happens before the election?

Mimi

No. Netanyahu has blocked it, and he's running for re-election this month. If he wins, it's unlikely to happen. If he loses, his successor might establish one. But for now, three years later, there's still no official investigation into how the worst security failure in Israel's history was allowed to happen.

  • Families who lost children, siblings, and neighbors on October 7 are demanding a formal state inquiry — and finding the door to accountability held shut by the very man they hold responsible.
  • Evidence of prior warnings — from border soldiers, intelligence chiefs, and regional allies including reportedly the UAE's leader — has accumulated for three years without a definitive official response, deepening public distrust.
  • The military has moved to accept its failures, with the IDF chief of staff resigning and commanders dismissed, while the political echelon has offered only deflection and counter-accusations.
  • Netanyahu's proposed alternative inquiry — with members appointed by political parties rather than the judiciary — collapsed before it could be legislated, leaving the question unresolved as elections arrive.
  • The accountability debate has now fused with the election itself, with opponents releasing satirical attacks and grieving families confronting Netanyahu at public ceremonies, as polls show a nation closely and painfully divided.

Three years after the deadliest day in Israel's history, the communities that bore the weight of Hamas's October 7 attack still wait for an accounting that has not come. Warnings were given, doctrines were set, and lives were lost — yet the political leader who held ultimate responsibility continues to seek re-election while blocking the independent inquiry that might illuminate how it happened. In the long human story of power and accountability, Israel now faces the question that follows every catastrophe: whether the reckoning must come before the next disaster, or only after it.

Three years after Hamas gunmen broke through Israel's border fence and killed more than 1,200 people across the southern communities, the question of responsibility for the security failure remains officially unanswered. At Kfar Aza, a kibbutz near Gaza, sixty-four residents died and nineteen were taken hostage. Inbar Goldstein lost her brother, niece, and four other relatives to the assault. "I need my country to take responsibility," she said.

The attack was not without warning. Young female soldiers stationed along the Gaza border had flagged signs of preparation for months. One of them, Roni Eshel, was killed when gunmen overran her base. Her uncle, Elad Levy, has spent three years asking what intelligence reached political leaders — including whether warnings from Egypt, the UAE, and Netanyahu's own security chief were acted upon. Netanyahu's office denied a report that the UAE leader called him ten days before the attack, calling it "an absolute lie."

Rather than accept responsibility, Netanyahu has blamed his security chiefs for not waking him in the hours before the assault, claiming he could have prevented it. Journalist Yaakov Katz, who documented what military leaders actually knew that morning, disputes this — arguing the real failure was Netanyahu's own doctrine of containing rather than confronting Hamas, which allowed Qatar to funnel hundreds of millions into Gaza while keeping Hamas in power. "You set the policy," Katz said. "You created a doctrine that trickled down to the last soldier manning the watchtower."

The military has moved toward accountability in ways the political leadership has not. The IDF chief of staff apologized and resigned. Commanders were dismissed. The IDF's international spokesman on October 7, Col. Richard Hecht, also resigned, citing the refusal of political leaders to follow suit. "It's a disgrace," he told the BBC.

Netanyahu has blocked an independent state inquiry, and a proposed political alternative collapsed before parliament could legislate it. Campaigners have asked Israel's highest court to compel a proper commission. As elections approach, the debate has become central to the campaign — with opponents releasing a satirical video game mocking Netanyahu's evasions, and a grieving father confronting him at a memorial ceremony before being led away by security. For many Israeli voters, the question of whether the worst security failure in the nation's history should disqualify its architect has become inseparable from the question of whether he remains the best person to prevent the next one.

Three years have passed since the morning when Hamas gunmen broke through Israel's border fence and killed more than 1,200 people across the southern communities. The attack remains the deadliest day in Israel's history since its founding in 1948. Yet as the country approaches elections this month, the question of who bears responsibility for the security failure that allowed it to happen remains unanswered—and the man who was prime minister when it occurred refuses to accept any blame.

At Kfar Aza, a kibbutz near the Gaza border, the wound is still visible. On the morning of October 7, 2023, shortly after 7 a.m., Hamas attackers killed seven members of the community's fourteen-person civil defence squad. Sixty-four residents died that day. Nineteen were taken hostage. Inbar Goldstein lost her brother and niece in the assault, and four other relatives were kidnapped. "I need my country to take responsibility," she said. The attack was not sudden or unpredictable. For months beforehand, young female soldiers stationed along the Gaza border had warned their superiors about signs of preparation for a major operation. One of them, Roni Eshel, was killed with fourteen others when gunmen overran her base at Nahal Oz. Her uncle, Elad Levy, has spent three years asking questions that remain unanswered: Were the Egyptians warning the prime minister? The Emiratis? What did Netanyahu know, and when did he know it? "The truth should be clear," Levy said. "If we don't inquire into this, it will happen again and again."

Over the past three years, reports have accumulated of warnings that reached Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before the attack. His own security chief warned him. Regional neighbors—including, according to reporting by Israel's Haaretz newspaper last month, the leader of the United Arab Emirates, who allegedly called Netanyahu ten days before the assault—tried to alert him to Hamas plans for a major operation. Netanyahu's office dismissed the report as "an absolute lie" and announced plans to sue the newspaper. His allies have argued that the attack's secrecy was so complete that even Netanyahu could not have known. Amir Ohana, a member of Netanyahu's Likud party, said it was "preposterous and absurd" to suggest the prime minister could have known when Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had told only a handful of people.

Instead of accepting responsibility, Netanyahu has blamed his own security chiefs, claiming they deliberately chose not to wake him in the hours before the attack for fear he would order a massive military deployment and escalate the situation. "What would have happened if they had woken me? This would not have happened," he told Israel's right-wing Channel 14 television network. But Yaakov Katz, a journalist and author of books on Israel's defence, has documented what military and intelligence leaders actually knew in those early hours: calls between senior figures, the sudden recall of commanders from leave, the dispatch of elite units to the border. Their expectation was a small, limited incursion—not the catastrophe that unfolded. Waking Netanyahu would not have changed the outcome, Katz argues. What matters more is the policy Netanyahu set: a doctrine of containment rather than confrontation with Hamas, one that allowed Qatar to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Gaza while keeping Hamas in power. "You were the prime minister, you set the policy," Katz said. "You created a doctrine that trickled down to the last soldier manning the watchtower."

The military has moved toward accountability in ways the political leadership has not. The IDF's then-chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, publicly apologized for the failure to defend civilians and resigned. Military commanders were fired. Israel's domestic intelligence chief left his position. Col. Richard Hecht, the IDF's international spokesman on October 7, resigned six months later, citing the refusal of political leaders—including Netanyahu—to accept responsibility. "It's a disgrace," he told the BBC. "Within the IDF I don't think there's a problem. And that's the pain. That's one of the main causes of bad blood between the political echelon and the military."

Netanyahu has consistently refused to establish an independent state inquiry into the attacks. Before calling elections, his government proposed an alternative "national commission of inquiry" whose members would be appointed by political parties rather than the judiciary. But the government said it ran out of time to pass legislation for even that limited inquiry before parliament ended its session in July. Campaigners have asked Israel's highest court to force the government to establish a proper state commission. Yizhar Shai, a former minister whose youngest son, a soldier, was killed on October 7, is part of that effort. "We are going into these elections almost blindfolded as it relates to October 7th," he said. "Our prime minister has never given a detailed, thorough explanation under oath."

At a memorial ceremony in Jerusalem on Monday, the father of one of those killed stood up to confront Netanyahu directly. "You didn't protect my son, you didn't protect all those who were murdered," he said, before security guards led him away. "Shame! Disgrace!" The accountability debate has become central to this election. Netanyahu's main opponent, Gadi Eisenkot, released a video game called Sleepy Bibi that asks players to help the prime minister dodge warnings and "make it to bed safely." Yet Netanyahu continues to run on the same platform that defined his career: as Israel's "Mr Security." Over the past three years, he has waged wars against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. His supporters argue he has re-engineered the Middle East and made Israel safer. Critics say his political survival puts the country at risk. Polls suggest a close race. For many Israeli voters, the question of whether the worst security failure in the nation's history should disqualify the man responsible for it has become inseparable from the question of whether he remains the best choice to prevent the next one.

I need my country to take responsibility
— Inbar Goldstein, whose brother and niece were killed in the attack
The truth should be clear. If we don't inquire into this, it will happen again and again.
— Elad Levy, uncle of Roni Eshel, a soldier killed at Nahal Oz
It's a disgrace. Within the IDF I don't think there's a problem. And that's the pain. That's one of the main causes of bad blood between the political echelon and the military.
— Col. Richard Hecht, IDF international spokesman on October 7, who resigned six months later
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