The manner in which policies are implemented can be profound
In a nation where supreme authority rests with a single religious figure, Iran has chosen Masoud Pezeshkian — a moderate reformist — as its new president, offering the public a face of incremental change without altering the underlying architecture of power. The election is real, but its meaning is bounded: Pezeshkian cannot rewrite policy, yet the humanity with which policy is carried out remains his to shape. His rise follows the death of Mahsa Amini and the protests that shook the Islamic Republic's legitimacy, suggesting the regime is offering measured responsiveness rather than transformation. History will judge whether the space between brutal enforcement and humane implementation is narrow or vast.
- The death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody ignited months of protest that forced the regime to reckon with its own eroding legitimacy — Pezeshkian's candidacy is the regime's answer.
- Of more than eighty presidential hopefuls, only six were approved by the Guardian Council: five hardliners and one moderate, a ratio that was not accidental but engineered.
- Pezeshkian cannot touch nuclear strategy, regional military operations, or the IRGC's foreign activities — all of which answer exclusively to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
- Iran has enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels but has not crossed the weaponization threshold, using the capability itself as a deterrent — and Pezeshkian's role is to be the credible civilian face of that ambiguous posture.
- The new president's most immediate and tangible power may be the simplest: preventing the kind of custodial brutality that killed Amini, even while the mandatory hijab law itself remains unchanged.
Iran has elected Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate reformist, as its new president — defeating hardliner Saeed Jalili in a runoff. But the election, while genuine, illuminates only part of how power actually moves in Iran.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sets domestic and foreign policy. The president executes his will. Scholars of Iranian politics caution against dismissing elections as pure theater, however — the manner in which policies are enforced, the leniency or harshness of their implementation, belongs to the president. That distinction carries real human weight. After Mahsa Amini died in police custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly, protests swept the country and challenged the Islamic Republic's legitimacy at its roots. Under Pezeshkian, such custodial killings are expected to stop, even as the hijab rule itself remains. The rule stays; the brutality recedes.
Pezeshkian's approval by the Guardian Council — a twelve-member body appointed by Khamenei — was itself a signal. In 2021, the same body rejected his candidacy. This time, from more than eighty hopefuls, only six were cleared: five hardliners drawn largely from the IRGC, and one moderate. The balance was deliberate. After the Amini protests, the regime needed to offer a reformist face and a credible promise of incremental social change. Pezeshkian, from the Azeri minority, campaigned on the concerns of women, ethnic minorities, and border communities — a message designed to restore the revolution's fraying legitimacy.
On regional military affairs, his authority is nearly nonexistent. The IRGC and its Quds Force answer to Khamenei, not the presidency. Nuclear negotiations are different. Iran has enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels but has not made the political decision to weaponize — instead holding that capability as a deterrent against American or Israeli military action. For that strategy to function, Iran needs a credible civilian negotiator. Pezeshkian is that face. He will navigate a space defined by Khamenei's directives, seeking diplomatic engagement with the West while holding a threshold he did not draw and cannot move alone.
Iran has elected Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate reformist, as its new president. He defeated hardliner Saeed Jalili in a runoff after emerging as the leading candidate in the first round of voting. But the election, while real, tells only part of the story of power in Iran.
The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, holds the actual authority. He sets domestic and foreign policy. He makes the final decisions on all matters of consequence. The president executes his will. This structural reality raises an obvious question: Are these elections merely theater, a way to manufacture consent for decisions already made? The answer, according to scholars of Iranian politics, is more textured than that.
A president in Iran cannot reshape the broad architecture of policy—that remains Khamenei's domain. But the manner in which policies are implemented, the vigor or leniency with which they are enforced, the tone and humanity of their execution—these fall to the president and his administration. The difference between harsh and humane implementation can be profound. After Mahsa Amini died in police custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly, monthslong protests swept Iran, challenging not just specific rules but the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic itself. Under Pezeshkian, such custodial killings are expected to be prevented, even if the mandatory hijab rule itself remains. The rule stays; the brutality recedes.
Pezeshkian's candidacy itself signals something about the regime's calculation. In 2021, the Guardian Council—a twelve-member body appointed by Khamenei and composed of top Islamic jurists—rejected his bid to run. This time, from more than eighty hopefuls, only six were approved. Five were hardliners, mostly from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the military and intelligence apparatus that answers directly to Khamenei. One was Pezeshkian, the moderate. This balance was deliberate. After the Amini protests, the regime needed to demonstrate responsiveness, to offer the public a reformist face and a promise of incremental change in social and cultural matters. Pezeshkian, from the Azeri minority, campaigned on addressing the concerns of women, ethnic minorities, and border regions. His election was meant to restore the revolution's fraying legitimacy.
But legitimacy is not the same as power. On matters of Middle East conflicts and regional operations, Pezeshkian's role will be severely constrained. The IRGC and its foreign operations wing, the Quds Force, drive Iranian activity across the region. These forces answer to Khamenei, not the president. The president cannot manage what he does not control.
Nuclear negotiations present a different calculus. Iran has enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels—it could produce weapons-grade material within weeks or months, and assemble a warhead within months after that. Yet it has not made the political decision to cross that threshold. Instead, Iran appears to be using its nuclear capability as a bargaining chip, a deterrent against military action by the United States or Israel. For this strategy to work, Iran needs a civilian negotiator with credibility and diplomatic skill, someone who can convey both explicit and implicit positions to the West. That is where Pezeshkian comes in. He provides the civilian face for what remains Khamenei's nuclear strategy.
The nuclear threshold itself has become part of Iran's deterrence posture, especially after the Iranian-Israeli exchange of fire in April. Iran does not want full-scale war with the United States, and acquiring nuclear weapons would cross a red line that Washington and Tel Aviv have drawn. So Iran maintains its capability without weaponizing it, using the threat as leverage. Pezeshkian and his negotiators will need to navigate this delicate space with precision, finding ways to engage the West while adhering to Khamenei's strategic directives. The West, too, will need to develop new approaches to Iranian diplomacy. At a moment when conflicts stretch from Europe to the Middle East, Iran's new president inherits the task of executing policy within constraints he did not set and cannot unilaterally change.
Notable Quotes
The Iranian president can channel the aspirations and demands of the people. In the past, reformist and moderate presidents have acted as pressure groups to negotiate with the more conservative establishment.— Deepika Saraswat, Iran scholar at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
The nuclear threshold status is increasingly seen as part of Iran's deterrence strategy. Iran has not made the political decision of acquiring the bomb despite the evident technological capabilities.— Deepika Saraswat
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
So Pezeshkian won the election, but Khamenei still holds all the real power. What's the point of having elections at all?
It's not theater, exactly. The Supreme Leader sets the broad direction—the mandatory hijab stays, the regional strategy stays. But how harshly those policies are enforced, how they're implemented day to day—that matters enormously. After Mahsa Amini was killed by morality police, people were asking whether the system itself was legitimate. Pezeshkian's election is partly an answer to that question.
An answer, or a way to quiet people down?
Both, probably. The regime needed to show it was listening. But Pezeshkian can actually be a vehicle for the aspirations people have—for women's rights, for better treatment of minorities. He can't change the rules, but he can change how they're enforced. That's not nothing.
What about his role in nuclear negotiations? Can he actually negotiate, or is he just reading from Khamenei's script?
He's executing Khamenei's strategy, yes. But here's the thing: Iran needs a civilian face for those talks, someone with credibility and diplomatic skill. Khamenei can't sit at the table himself. So Pezeshkian becomes the instrument through which a very sophisticated strategy gets conveyed—Iran's nuclear capability as deterrent, not as a weapon to be built.
And on the Middle East conflicts?
There his role is even more limited. The IRGC runs those operations. They answer to Khamenei directly. Pezeshkian doesn't control that apparatus, so he can't really manage what happens there. He's constrained in different ways depending on the issue.
So he's powerful in some domains and powerless in others.
Exactly. And the Iranians are sophisticated enough to have designed it that way. He can improve people's lives in certain areas while the Supreme Leader keeps control of the things he considers existential.