The relationship that had once seemed unshakeable was showing strain.
In early December 2020, India's Army Chief General M M Naravane made history by becoming the first Indian Army chief to visit Saudi Arabia officially, extending his journey to the UAE as well. His arrival was less a single diplomatic event than a quiet acknowledgment of a world rearranging itself — Arab states pivoting toward Israel out of fear of Iran, Pakistan's long-privileged military standing in the Gulf visibly eroding, and India sensing a rare opening in a region where it had long been kept at arm's length. Nations, like tides, shift slowly until they do not, and India was moving to meet the moment before it passed.
- A historic first visit by an Indian Army chief to Saudi Arabia signals that New Delhi is no longer content to watch the Middle East's realignment from the sidelines.
- Pakistan's structural dominance over Arab military partnerships — built across generations of training, manpower, and leadership — is fracturing under the weight of its own diplomatic missteps.
- Arab normalization with Israel, driven by shared anxiety over Iran, has dissolved the old constraint that kept India from building security ties with Gulf states.
- India is moving quickly to fill the vacuum, with BrahMos missile sales and broader defense cooperation on the table as Gulf states accelerate military modernization.
- The window is real but fragile — Pakistan may yet recover its footing, and the Arab-Israel rapprochement is still new enough to be reversed.
General M M Naravane, India's Army Chief, arrived in Saudi Arabia in early December 2020 for a four-day visit that would also take him to the UAE — the first time an Indian Army chief had ever made such a trip officially. The agenda remained confidential, but the timing spoke clearly enough.
The Middle East was undergoing a profound shift. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were normalizing ties with Israel, driven by shared alarm over Iran's growing influence. Pakistan, meanwhile, was losing ground in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi after its foreign minister publicly rebuked Saudi Arabia over Kashmir while praising Turkey — a slight that prompted Saudi Arabia to demand repayment of earlier loans and forced Pakistan's Army Chief to fly to Riyadh for damage control.
For decades, Pakistan had occupied a structurally privileged position in the Arab military world. Pakistani officers had trained Arab armies, Pakistani soldiers had staffed the oil industry, and the first five air chiefs of the UAE had all been Pakistani Air Force officers. Former Army Chief Raheel Sharif even led a 41-nation Islamic military coalition. This was not casual influence — it was generational and institutional.
India, for its part, had long been constrained. Its deepening partnership with Israel had made it difficult to build military relationships with Islamic nations, and the Arab world's traditional alignment with Pakistan left little room to maneuver. But as Arab states moved closer to Israel and cooled toward Pakistan, that constraint dissolved.
Navane's visit was India stepping through the door that had opened. Both Gulf states are among the world's largest arms importers, and reports suggested the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar had all expressed interest in India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. If the visit succeeded, other Indian weapons systems might follow. The geopolitical moment was narrow — but for now, it was India's to use.
General M M Naravane, India's Army Chief, arrived in Saudi Arabia in early December 2020 for a four-day visit that would take him to the UAE as well. The trip carried weight precisely because of what it represented: the first time an Indian Army chief had ever set foot in Saudi Arabia on an official visit. The specifics of what would be discussed remained under wraps, but the timing and the destination told their own story.
The Middle East was in the midst of a profound realignment. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the region's most powerful states, had begun normalizing relations with Israel—a shift that would have seemed unthinkable just years earlier. The two Arab nations were driven by a shared concern: the rising threat posed by Iran. At the same time, the incoming American administration under Joe Biden represented an unknown quantity. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was asserting itself more forcefully in regional affairs. And Pakistan, long the Arab world's closest military partner, was finding its standing in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi noticeably diminished.
For decades, Pakistan had held a privileged position in the Arab military establishment. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had provided crucial economic support during Pakistan's nuclear weapons development. Pakistani officers had trained Arab armies. Pakistani soldiers had staffed the oil industry. The first five air chiefs of the UAE had all been Pakistani Air Force officers. Former Pakistan Army Chief Raheel Sharif led the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, a military alliance spanning 41 Muslim nations from Nigeria to Malaysia. This was not a casual relationship; it was structural, built over generations.
But that architecture was cracking. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi had publicly criticized Saudi Arabia for failing to take India's side on Kashmir, while simultaneously praising Turkey. The rebuke stung. Saudi Arabia responded by demanding that Pakistan repay portions of a loan extended during an earlier economic crisis. Pakistan's Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa had to rush to Riyadh to repair the damage. The relationship that had once seemed unshakeable was showing strain.
Meanwhile, India had faced its own constraint. India's deepening security partnership with Israel—a relationship that had grown steadily stronger—had made it difficult for New Delhi to build military ties with Islamic countries. The Arab world's traditional loyalty to Pakistan, combined with its historical antagonism toward Israel, had left little room for India to maneuver. But that constraint was dissolving. As Arab states moved closer to Israel out of shared concern about Iran, and as their ties with Pakistan cooled, a new opening emerged for India.
General Naravane's visit should be understood as India stepping through that door. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were eager to deepen economic ties with India. More significantly, both were among the world's largest military hardware importers, constantly modernizing their arsenals. India saw an opportunity. Recent reports indicated that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar had all expressed interest in acquiring India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile—a sophisticated weapon system that could find eager buyers as regional tensions intensified and the competition for influence in the Middle East sharpened. If the visit succeeded, other Indian weapons systems might follow.
The geopolitical moment was narrow and unlikely to last forever. The Arab world's pivot toward Israel was still new. Pakistan's decline in regional standing was recent enough that it might yet recover. But for now, India had an opening that had not existed before. Naravane's presence in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was a signal that New Delhi intended to exploit it.
Citações Notáveis
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi criticized Saudi Arabia for not taking India's side on Kashmir and praised Turkey instead— Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that an Army chief visits instead of, say, a diplomat or trade official?
An Army chief carries different weight. It signals that the relationship is fundamentally about security and military capability, not just commerce or cultural exchange. It's a statement about strategic partnership at the highest level.
You mention Pakistan's position eroding. Was this sudden, or has it been happening for a while?
It's been gradual, but it accelerated recently. The loan repayment demand and the public criticism from Pakistan's own foreign minister—those were symptoms of something deeper. Pakistan had assumed its position was permanent. It wasn't.
What does India actually gain from selling missiles to Saudi Arabia and the UAE?
Revenue, certainly. But more than that—it's about becoming a credible defense partner in a region that matters enormously. It's about India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean and beyond. It's about being taken seriously as a power.
Does this mean India is now aligned with Israel?
Not exactly. India is aligned with its own interests. Those interests happen to overlap with Israel's in some ways and with the Arab states' in others. India is threading a needle that Pakistan could never manage.
What happens to Pakistan now?
That's the question everyone in Islamabad is asking. Pakistan can't easily rebuild what it's lost. It's closer to Turkey now, but Turkey isn't Saudi Arabia. The old certainties are gone.