I can't not give details to the government, and if their databases are so accessible, that is a worry.
In a historic first for British criminal justice, two men have been convicted at the Old Bailey of spying for China — a verdict that illuminates not merely the reach of Beijing's surveillance apparatus, but the quiet vulnerabilities embedded within the institutions meant to protect those who have sought refuge from it. For exiled Hong Kong activist Nathan Law, the trial confirmed what he had long sensed: that the watchers had found ways inside, and that the distance between London and Beijing may be far shorter than democracy's promise implies.
- For the first time in British history, two men — a Border Force official and a Hong Kong trade office manager — have been convicted of operating as Chinese intelligence assets on UK soil.
- The younger spy's access to sensitive government databases allowed him to search for the personal details of pro-democracy dissidents, exposing a systemic failure to protect people who are known targets of hostile foreign states.
- Hong Kong Aid has documented a relentless campaign of intimidation against the UK diaspora — doxxing, threatening phone calls traced to Hong Kong police, and a protester physically beaten inside the Chinese consulate in Manchester.
- The Hong Kong community in Britain is visibly contracting inward: self-censoring, withdrawing from public life, and abandoning political engagement out of fear that surveillance has made safety impossible.
- Despite the convictions, the structural vulnerabilities remain unaddressed — and with the UK government approving a major new Chinese embassy in London, exiles like Nathan Law see the threat not receding, but deepening.
Nathan Law was not surprised to learn he had been photographed entering the Oxford Union one November evening in 2023. The 32-year-old exiled Hong Kong protest leader, who carries a £100,000 Beijing bounty on his head, had long assumed he was being watched. What unsettled him was how easily the watchers had obtained their information — and from whom.
On Thursday, the Old Bailey delivered a historic verdict: Chi Leung Wai and Chung Biu Yuen were convicted of assisting a foreign intelligence service, the first Chinese spies ever prosecuted in British criminal history. Yuen, 65, had orchestrated surveillance from his position as a senior manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London — an institution ostensibly devoted to trade and culture, but one Law described as having been fully weaponized since the 2019 protests. 'In Hong Kong, national security means you disagree with the government,' he said. That mission had simply followed the diaspora to Britain.
What alarmed Law most was the access held by Wai, 38. As a UK Border Force official and volunteer special constable, Wai had direct entry into government databases containing sensitive personal data. Evidence at trial showed he had used derogatory language about pro-democracy protesters and tracked monthly tallies of what he called 'cockroaches' entering the UK — and that he had searched those same systems for Law's address and personal information. 'I can only do so much to protect myself,' Law said. 'But I can't not give details to the government, and if their databases are so accessible and there are no safeguards, that is a worry.'
The danger was already tangible. Hong Kong Aid, an NGO supporting asylum seekers in Britain, had documented addresses of Hongkongers posted online with encouragement for anti-immigration activists to 'visit' them. Its helpline had received suspicious calls from Hong Kong three times daily since 2022 — traced to Hong Kong police. In 2022, a pro-democracy protester was dragged into the Chinese consulate in Manchester and beaten. The NGO told Parliament that the diaspora had grown 'increasingly fearful,' with many withdrawing from community life and self-censoring entirely.
The convictions clarified the stakes without resolving them. In January, the UK government approved plans for a large new Chinese embassy in London. For Law and those he represents, the message was plain: the threat was not approaching — it was already here, already reshaping how they moved through the world.
Nathan Law was not shocked when he learned that a spy ring had photographed him walking into the Oxford Union one November evening in 2023. The 32-year-old exiled Hong Kong protest leader, who carries a £100,000 bounty on his head from Beijing, had long assumed he was being watched. What did surprise him—what genuinely unsettled him—was how easily the watchers had obtained their information, and from whom.
On Thursday, the Old Bailey delivered a historic verdict: Chi Leung Wai, 38, and Chung Biu Yuen, 65, were convicted of assisting a foreign intelligence service. It was the first time in British criminal history that Chinese spies had been prosecuted and convicted. The nine-week trial confirmed much of what Law already suspected. Yuen, the older defendant, had orchestrated the surveillance from his position as a senior manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in central London—the official overseas representation of the Hong Kong government, ostensibly tasked with promoting trade and cultural ties. But since the pro-democracy protests of 2019, Law explained, every arm of Hong Kong's government had been weaponized to enforce what Beijing calls national security. "In Hong Kong 'national security' means like you disagree with the government," he said. That mission had simply extended to London.
What truly alarmed Law, however, was the access wielded by Wai, the younger of the two men. As a UK Border Force official and volunteer special constable with the City of London police, Wai had direct entry into British government databases containing sensitive personal information. In court, evidence emerged that he had used derogatory language to describe pro-democracy protesters and boasted of tracking monthly totals of what he called "cockroaches" entering the UK. More troublingly, the trial revealed that he had searched those same systems for addresses and other sensitive data on Law himself. "He had access to the system that contains information on us," Law said. "I think there's a part of the evidence showing that he used those systems to search for addresses or any other sensitive personal information for me."
The implications rippled outward. Law could take precautions—vary his routes, check for followers, guard his digital footprint. But he could not refuse to provide his details to the British government. If those databases were accessible to hostile intelligence operatives with no meaningful safeguards in place, then dissidents like him were fundamentally exposed. "I can only do so much to protect myself," he said. "But I can't not give details to the [British] government, and if their databases are so accessible and there are no safeguards to protect people like us, who are obviously targets of intelligence and secret operations from hostile governments, then that is a worry."
The danger was not theoretical. Hong Kong Aid, an NGO assisting asylum seekers in Britain, had documented the fallout in testimony to Parliament's joint committee on human rights. In 2024, the addresses of Hongkongers living in the UK were posted online, and anti-immigration activists were encouraged to "visit" them. The NGO's helpline received suspicious calls from Hong Kong three times daily since 2022—calls traced to the Hong Kong police. There had been threats made by Beijing's national security police to family members of UK-based democracy advocates. In 2022, a Hong Kong pro-democracy protester had been dragged into the Chinese consulate in Manchester and beaten, a stark demonstration of Beijing's willingness to project violence onto British soil.
The chilling effect was already visible. "The Hong Kong diaspora in the UK has become increasingly fearful," Hong Kong Aid wrote. "Many avoid political engagement, stop attending community events, and self-censor to avoid repercussions." Law himself had become a study in caution. He takes no unnecessary risks, offers the authorities few opportunities, and moves through the world with constant vigilance. The conviction of Wai and Yuen would not change that calculus. If anything, it had made the stakes clearer. In January, the UK government had approved plans for a new, large Chinese embassy in London, ending years of debate over the security risks it would pose. For Law and the diaspora he represented, the risks were already here, already real, and already reshaping how they lived.
Notable Quotes
In Hong Kong 'national security' means like you disagree with the government. And that extends to the role of HKETO; it is also used to punish people who disagree with the government.— Nathan Law
The Hong Kong diaspora in the UK has become increasingly fearful. Many avoid political engagement, stop attending community events, and self-censor to avoid repercussions.— Hong Kong Aid, in testimony to Parliament's joint committee on human rights
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
When you learned that someone with access to British government databases had been searching for your personal information, what went through your mind?
It confirmed what I already knew intellectually but hadn't fully confronted—that my safety depends on systems I have no control over, managed by people I've never met. I can be careful. I can watch for followers. But I can't audit a government database.
The trial revealed that Wai used derogatory language about pro-democracy protesters. Did that suggest this was personal, or was it just the language of the operation?
Both, I think. The language shows how these people view us—not as political opponents but as subhuman. That's the ideology that makes the surveillance feel justified to them. It's not just intelligence work; it's enforcement of a worldview.
You mentioned taking precautions before and after the Oxford Union debate. What does that actually look like?
Different routes, checking who's around, getting picked up rather than using public transport, being aware of patterns. But it's exhausting, and it only works if you're lucky. The real vulnerability isn't in what I do—it's in what I can't control.
Hong Kong Aid reported that addresses of dissidents were posted online and people were encouraged to visit them. How does that change the nature of the threat?
It moves it from surveillance to potential violence. Someone knows where you live. Someone has been told you're a problem. That's not abstract anymore.
What do you think the UK government should do now?
Audit who has access to these databases. Put real safeguards in place. Understand that when you employ someone with dual citizenship and ties to a hostile intelligence service, you're creating a vulnerability. And recognize that dissidents aren't just statistics—we're people whose safety depends on the integrity of your systems.