EU proposes enlargement reforms to speed accession while protecting democracy

The European Commission is trying to solve a problem that has festered for decades: how to let new countries into the European Union without breaking the machinery that holds it together, and without repeating the democratic disasters it has already lived through.

On October 6, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos laid out a package of reforms designed to accelerate the accession process for four frontrunner candidates—Albania, Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine—with Montenegro potentially joining as early as 2028. The core tension is simple and brutal: the EU wants to grow, but it is terrified of what growth might cost. A larger union, Kos told journalists in Strasbourg, is a long-term investment in Europe's peace, security, and prosperity. The question is whether the union can actually afford it.

The first obstacle is procedural. Every decision in the accession process—opening negotiation clusters, moving candidates forward—currently requires unanimous approval from all 27 member states. This sounds democratic in theory. In practice, it has meant that individual countries can block progress for reasons that have nothing to do with whether a candidate is ready to join. Hungary blocked Ukraine's negotiation process. Other states have used bilateral grievances as leverage. A Commission official, speaking anonymously, called the system mind-blowing: every cluster requires three separate unanimous decisions. The Commission is now recommending a shift to qualified majority voting, which would allow decisions to pass with support from a weighted majority rather than requiring every single member to agree.

But here is the trap: changing the voting rules would itself require unanimous approval. Member states have rejected similar proposals before. Tinatin Akhvlediani, head of the enlargement program at the Centre for European Policy Studies, told DW she has reservations about whether the member states will actually agree to give up their veto power. The reform that would unblock enlargement requires the very unanimity it is designed to escape.

To make accession more attractive, the Commission is proposing that candidate countries receive some membership benefits before they formally join—but only if they meet EU standards and align strategically with European foreign policy. Montenegro already participates in the Single Euro Payments Area, even as a non-member. The Commission wants to systematize this approach: gradual integration as an accelerator, not a substitute for full membership. Nina Vujanovic, a research fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, sees the logic. Reforms matter, but so does rewarding progress early. The catch is that strategic alignment is now a condition. Countries must orient themselves toward the EU, not toward Russia. This is not abstract language. It means candidates cannot trade gas with Russia and expect to build trust with Brussels. It means the EU is explicitly trying to keep candidate countries out of Moscow's orbit, particularly targeting leaders like Serbia's Aleksandar Vucic, who has promoted Russian interests.

The third pillar of the reform package addresses the EU's deepest fear: that new members will undermine democracy from within. Poland and Hungary have shown what this looks like—the slow dismantling of judicial independence, the capture of media, the erosion of checks on executive power. The Commission proposes a 15-year period after accession during which it would be easier to sanction new members by cutting financial support or restricting voting rights. Kos was blunt in interviews with The Guardian and other European outlets: no more Viktor Orban. The EU needs faster mechanisms than Article 7, the current process for addressing democratic backsliding, which is slow and requires consensus.

But this creates a new problem: inequality. Heather Grabbe, a senior fellow at Bruegel, calls it inherently unfair. Why should Montenegro face different conditions than Slovenia in the 2040s? Why should new members be treated as perpetual suspects? Akhvlediani counters that many candidate countries are fragile democracies with shaky records on democratic norms, so stricter oversight is justified. Grabbe acknowledges the logic but notes the deeper problem: it would be realistic to apply the same rules to all members, but doing so would require unanimous approval—and, as she puts it, it is very hard to get turkeys to vote for Christmas.

The Commission's proposals will be discussed by the European Council, the body made up of the heads of state and government of all 27 member states, at its meeting on October 15–16. What emerges from those talks will determine whether these reforms become reality or remain a blueprint for a union that cannot quite reform itself. The enlargement agenda depends on it.