Coal demand has never been higher, yet growth has stalled
En un momento en que el mundo proclama su transición hacia las energías limpias, el carbón consumió casi 8.800 millones de toneladas en 2024 y 2025, marcando niveles récord que desafían la narrativa del declive. Tres perturbaciones convergentes —el conflicto en Irán, el fenómeno de El Niño y una tragedia minera en China que cobró más de 90 vidas— amenazan ahora con revertir la modesta caída del 5% en el comercio marítimo del mineral registrada el año pasado. La historia del carbón no es la de un combustible que muere, sino la de uno que se resiste, moldeado por la geopolítica, el clima y el peso de las economías que aún no pueden prescindir de él.
- El comercio marítimo de carbón cayó un 5% el año pasado, pero en abril de 2026 repuntó un 4% interanual, señal de que las fuerzas disruptivas ya están actuando sobre el mercado.
- El cierre del Estrecho de Ormuz ha encarecido el petróleo y el gas, empujando a varios gobiernos a regresar al carbón como alternativa más barata y predecible.
- Un El Niño intenso amenaza la generación hidroeléctrica en India y en provincias chinas como Sichuan, mientras el calor extremo dispara la demanda de electricidad para refrigeración.
- El accidente minero del 22 de mayo en Shanxi —con más de 90 muertos— forzó el cierre de instalaciones y una ola de inspecciones que podría reducir la producción doméstica china y obligar a aumentar las importaciones marítimas.
- Si los tres factores persisten, los graneleros sólidos de clase Panamax serían los grandes beneficiados de un repunte sostenido en los volúmenes de carga de carbón durante 2026.
El mundo quemó casi 8.800 millones de toneladas de carbón en 2024 y 2025, niveles récord que coexisten con una transición energética que avanza pero no termina de imponerse. China ilustra mejor que nadie esta paradoja: por primera vez, su capacidad renovable instalada superó a la de generación carbonífera, y la producción eléctrica basada en carbón cayó un 1,5%, el primer descenso desde 2015. Sin embargo, Pekín amplió simultáneamente su minería doméstica y sus compras terrestres a Mongolia para reducir su dependencia de las importaciones marítimas. El resultado es visible en los datos: el comercio marítimo global de carbón bajó un 5% el año pasado y continúa descendiendo en 2026.
Tres perturbaciones amenazan con invertir esa tendencia. La primera es geopolítica: el conflicto en Irán y el cierre del Estrecho de Ormuz —por donde transita cerca de una quinta parte del petróleo y gas mundial— han encarecido esos combustibles y llevado a algunos gobiernos a refugiarse en el carbón. En abril, el comercio marítimo del mineral ya repuntó un 4% interanual, aunque los analistas advierten que el impacto total del conflicto aún no se refleja plenamente en las cifras.
La segunda perturbación es climática. La Organización Meteorológica Mundial prevé un El Niño intenso en 2026 que traerá sequía a regiones hidroeléctricas clave de India y China, como Sichuan y Yunnan. Menos lluvia implica menos generación hidráulica; más calor implica mayor demanda de refrigeración. El carbón sería llamado a cubrir ambos déficits.
La tercera es una tragedia industrial. El 22 de mayo, un accidente en una mina de la provincia de Shanxi mató a más de 90 trabajadores, forzó el cierre de instalaciones del grupo Shanxi Tongzhou Coal Coking y desencadenó inspecciones masivas en la región. La producción doméstica china podría resentirse, obligando al país a incrementar sus importaciones por vía marítima.
Si los tres factores se consolidan y persisten, el mercado de graneleros sólidos —especialmente los Panamax— podría experimentar un repunte significativo en la demanda de fletes. El carbón, una vez más, demuestra que su historia está lejos de haber concluido.
The world burned through nearly 8.8 billion tons of coal in 2024 and 2025, hitting record consumption levels even as governments and energy companies worldwide pushed hard toward renewable power. The paradox is real: coal demand has never been higher, yet the growth has stalled. The International Energy Agency's numbers tell the story of an energy system in transition, one where the old fuel refuses to disappear even as the new one arrives.
China, which consumes more coal than any other nation, offers the clearest picture of this shift. Last year, the country's installed renewable energy capacity surpassed its coal-fired generation capacity for the first time. Coal-based electricity production fell 1.5 percent—the first decline since 2015. Yet China has simultaneously ramped up domestic coal mining and increased overland purchases from Mongolia, a deliberate strategy to reduce dependence on maritime imports and secure its own energy independence. The result shows in the shipping data: global maritime coal trade dropped 5 percent last year, and through the first half of 2026 it has fallen another 0.5 percent.
But three emerging disruptions could reverse this downward trajectory entirely. The first is geopolitical. Conflict in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil and natural gas flows—have driven up prices for both fuels. Facing higher costs and supply uncertainty, some governments have turned back to coal as a cheaper, more reliable alternative. In April, global maritime coal trade jumped 4 percent year-over-year, a signal that the shift is already beginning. Energy markets move slowly, though, and analysts believe the full impact of the Iran situation may not yet be visible in the demand figures.
The second factor is weather. The World Meteorological Organization expects a strong El Niño pattern to develop in 2026. In India and in Chinese provinces like Sichuan and Yunnan—regions heavily dependent on hydroelectric power—El Niño typically brings drier conditions and reduced rainfall. Less water means less hydroelectric generation. At the same time, higher temperatures across Asia would drive up electricity demand for air conditioning and cooling systems. The result would be a sharp increase in coal consumption to fill the gap left by missing hydropower and to meet the surge in cooling demand.
The third factor is industrial tragedy. On May 22, a mining accident in Shanxi province killed more than 90 workers. The disaster prompted the closure of facilities operated by Shanxi Tongzhou Coal Coking Group and triggered a wave of safety inspections across the region. Several mines have suspended operations temporarily, and analysts expect domestic coal production to suffer. To maintain energy supplies, China would likely need to increase its maritime coal imports to compensate for the lost domestic output.
If all three factors materialize and persist through 2026, the combined effect could be substantial. Global coal consumption would rise, maritime shipping volumes would climb, and the solid bulk carrier market—particularly vessels in the Panamax class—would see increased demand for cargo movement. But the outcome depends entirely on how long each disruption lasts and how severely it affects supply and demand. The coal market, it seems, is not finished with the world yet.
Notable Quotes
Some governments have turned to coal as an alternative energy source in response to higher oil and gas costs and supply risks— Veson Nautical analysis
In India and Chinese provinces with high hydroelectric generation, reduced rainfall from El Niño could significantly affect power production— Maritime analysis cited in report
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would governments turn back to coal now, when they've spent years trying to move away from it?
Because energy security matters more than long-term strategy when prices spike and supplies tighten. The Iran conflict made oil and gas suddenly expensive and risky. Coal is still there, still available, and still cheaper in the short term—so countries that can burn it do.
But China is building renewables faster than anyone. Why would they need more coal?
China is doing both. Renewables are growing, yes, but they're not reliable enough yet to replace coal entirely. And right now, China faces a supply problem: a mining disaster has shut down production in Shanxi, one of their biggest coal regions. They need to import to fill the gap.
What about El Niño? How does weather change coal demand?
Hydroelectric dams depend on rainfall. If El Niño brings drought to Sichuan and Yunnan, those dams produce less power. Meanwhile, the heat drives up demand for air conditioning. Coal plants have to make up the difference.
So this is temporary, then? Once the Iran situation settles, once El Niño passes, coal demand drops again?
Probably. But that's the point—these disruptions could give coal a reprieve in 2026. The shipping market would benefit. But it's not a reversal of the long-term trend. It's a pause.
What happens to the workers in those closed mines?
The source doesn't say. The accident killed over 90 people. The mines are shut down for inspections. Whether they reopen, whether workers get their jobs back—that's not addressed in the analysis.