The left's share had contracted everywhere
Una semana antes de la segunda vuelta presidencial en Perú, el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos ofreció algo más que estadísticas: ofreció un espejo. Lo que reflejó fue un país dividido no solo por candidatos, sino por trayectorias de vida distintas —educación, edad, clase económica e ideología— que convergen en un momento decisivo para la dirección de la nación.
- La brecha educativa entre los votantes de Castillo y Fujimori es de ocho puntos porcentuales a nivel universitario, revelando que el acceso al conocimiento formal sigue siendo un eje de fractura política en el Perú.
- El 57% de los votantes de Castillo proviene de los segmentos socioeconómicos más bajos, mientras que Fujimori ha logrado construir una coalición que atraviesa distintos niveles de ingreso, lo que le otorga una base más amplia en términos de clase.
- La grieta ideológica es casi absoluta: tres de cada cuatro votantes de Fujimori se identifican como de derecha, mientras que menos de la mitad de los votantes de Castillo se reconocen como de izquierda, señal de que el fujimorismo tiene una identidad política más cohesionada.
- Más allá del duelo entre candidatos, el IEP detecta una tendencia nacional: la identificación de izquierda retrocede en todas las regiones del país, mientras la derecha avanza incluso en zonas históricamente más equilibradas.
- Lima concentra el giro más pronunciado hacia la derecha, con un 56% de identificación derechista, lo que podría inclinar la balanza en la capital y, con ella, el resultado final de la elección.
Una semana antes del balotaje, el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos publicó una radiografía de los electorados de Pedro Castillo y Keiko Fujimori que reveló algo más profundo que preferencias electorales: reveló dos Perúes distintos.
Entre quienes planeaban votar por Castillo, dos tercios contaban solo con educación básica y casi la mitad tenía más de 50 años. Su base económica era predominantemente popular: el 57% provenía de los segmentos D y E. Fujimori, en cambio, reunía un electorado con mayor nivel universitario —41%— y una distribución más equilibrada entre niveles de ingreso, con presencia significativa tanto en sectores medios como en los extremos de la escala socioeconómica.
Pero fue la dimensión ideológica la que trazó la línea más nítida. El 76% de los votantes de Fujimori se identificaba como de derecha; apenas el 5% como de izquierda. En el campo de Castillo, el 47% se reconocía de izquierda, pero un cuarto de sus propios votantes se ubicaba en la derecha, lo que sugería una coalición ideológicamente menos homogénea.
El estudio también capturó una tendencia más amplia: la identificación con la izquierda se contraía en todas las regiones del país. Lima lideraba el giro derechista con un 56%, y ni siquiera el centro del país —el más equilibrado— escapaba a esta reconfiguración. Perú no solo estaba eligiendo entre dos candidatos; estaba eligiendo entre dos visiones del futuro, en un momento en que el mapa ideológico del país se redibujaba en tiempo real.
One week before Peru's runoff election, the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos released a portrait of the two candidates' supporters that laid bare the country's deepening divides—not just in ideology, but in education, age, and economic standing.
The numbers told a stark story. Among those planning to vote for Pedro Castillo, the leftist candidate from Perú Libre, two-thirds had only basic education. Just a third held university degrees. Keiko Fujimori's voters looked different: 41 percent had completed university, while 59 percent had basic schooling. The education gap was real and measurable—eight percentage points separated the two camps at the university level.
Age painted another picture. Castillo's base skewed older. Nearly half his supporters were over 50, with another third between 25 and 39. Only 18 percent were young voters aged 18 to 24. Fujimori's coalition was slightly younger at the top end—53 percent over 40 rather than 49 percent over 50—but the pattern held. Both candidates drew their strength from voters with decades of life experience behind them.
The economic divide ran deepest. Castillo dominated among Peru's poorest segments: 57 percent of his voters came from the D and E socioeconomic brackets, the country's lowest. Only 17 percent came from the A and B segments—the wealthy. Fujimori's support was more evenly distributed across income levels: 28 percent from the top brackets, 34 percent from the middle, and 39 percent from the bottom. She had built a coalition that reached across class lines in ways Castillo had not.
But ideology was where the chasm became unmistakable. The IEP asked voters how they saw themselves politically. Among Castillo supporters, 47 percent identified as left-wing, 27 percent as centrist, and 26 percent as right-wing. Among Fujimori voters, the numbers inverted almost completely: 76 percent called themselves right-wing, 19 percent centrist, and just 5 percent left-wing. The survey had captured not just a choice between two candidates, but a fundamental disagreement about Peru's political direction.
Looking beyond the two campaigns, the IEP found a broader trend reshaping the country. Right-wing identification was growing. In Lima, the capital and the nation's most influential city, 56 percent of voters identified as right-wing, with only 16 percent claiming the left. In Peru's eastern regions, 47 percent leaned right. Even in the country's center, where ideology was most balanced, the right held a slight edge at 34 percent. The left's share had contracted everywhere. In the north, it claimed just 28 percent. In the south, 33 percent. The survey suggested that Peru was not simply choosing between Castillo and Fujimori—it was choosing which direction to turn.
The IEP had conducted 1,227 telephone interviews on May 27 and 28, reaching voters across 24 departments and 387 districts. The margin of error was 2.8 percentage points. The picture was clear, even if the election's outcome remained uncertain.
Notable Quotes
The survey suggested that Peru was not simply choosing between Castillo and Fujimori—it was choosing which direction to turn.— Analysis from IEP data
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does education level matter so much in this election? Is it just about who understands policy better?
It's deeper than that. Education correlates with exposure to different information sources, different social circles, different ways of thinking about the state's role. Castillo's voters are predominantly rural and working-class; Fujimori's base includes more urban professionals. They're not just disagreeing—they're living in different Peru.
The age gap surprised me less than the income distribution. Why is Fujimori pulling from all economic levels while Castillo is concentrated at the bottom?
Fujimori represents continuity with the 1990s and the market-oriented model. That appeals to people who've benefited from it—but also to working-class voters who fear radical change. Castillo represents a break. That's more polarizing. It attracts the desperate but repels the anxious middle.
The ideological numbers are almost cartoonish—76 percent right versus 47 percent left. Is Peru really that divided?
Not quite. The 76 percent includes people who might call themselves right-wing simply because they're not voting for a socialist. And the 47 percent left includes some who are left-wing more by circumstance than conviction. But yes, the country is genuinely split. The center is shrinking.
Lima is 56 percent right-wing. What does that tell you about where power lies?
That the capital—where media, business, and institutions concentrate—is moving decisively away from the left. If Castillo wins despite that, he'll govern a country where the most influential city distrusts him. If Fujimori wins, she has a mandate from the places that matter most economically.
Is there anything surprising in these numbers?
The evenness of Fujimori's support across income levels. She's not just a rich person's candidate. She's built something broader. That's what makes her dangerous to Castillo and what makes her viable as a president, even if people dislike her.