In the long history of trade routes shaped by conflict, Chinese supertankers are now tracing a new arc around the African continent — a detour born not of exploration but of necessity. Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have severed one of the world's most vital energy corridors, forcing Chinese state shippers to add nearly 10,000 nautical miles and a full month to each Saudi crude delivery. The improvised workaround, threading through Egyptian pipelines and crowded anchorages, holds for now — but it exposes how thinly the architecture of modern energy security is stretched when a sing
Chinese Supertankers Reroute Around Africa to Dodge Red Sea Houthi Attacks
The market is highly anxious, with few effective short-term responses available
Mark
Why would China accept such a costly detour when the direct route exists?
Mimi
Because the Houthis have made the direct route genuinely dangerous. It's not a theoretical risk—they've sunk ships. Chinese state companies got explicit government guidance to avoid the area, so they had to find another way or stop buying Saudi crude altogether.
Mark
But couldn't they just wait for the blockade to end?
Mimi
They can't afford to wait. China's crude inventories are already dropping fast. They're at 25 million metric tons and falling. If they stop buying now, they risk a real energy shortage. So they're paying the price of the detour instead of paying the price of scarcity.
Mark
What's the actual cost of adding a month and 10,000 miles?
Mimi
It's substantial—extra fuel, extra crew time, extra insurance. But the real cost is structural. The Egyptian pipeline and Suez Canal can only handle so much traffic. Before the blockade, Saudi Arabia was shipping 4.9 million barrels a day from Yanbu. This new route probably can't match that volume, which means China gets less crude overall, not just slower.
Mark
So this isn't a solution, it's a Band-Aid?
Mimi
Exactly. It's a Band-Aid that's already showing strain. Sidi Kerir port went from having one or two ships waiting to seven in a single day. The system is improvised and fragile. If anything else breaks—if the Suez Canal has an incident, if the pipeline has maintenance—the whole thing could collapse.
Mark
What does China actually want to happen?
Mimi
They're calling for dialogue and respect for regional sovereignty, which is diplomatic language for "please stop attacking ships." But they're also quietly accepting that this might be the new normal for a while. They're deploying their own ships, chartering Korean vessels, doing whatever it takes to keep crude flowing. It's a holding pattern, not a strategy.
The Pulse
- Houthi attacks have effectively shut down the Red Sea for Chinese tankers, with traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait collapsing 38% and hitting its lowest daily volume of 2025 on August 3.
- Insurance premiums have nearly doubled and Chinese state shippers COSCO and China Merchants Group have pulled vessels from the region entirely, forcing an improvised rerouting through Egypt that adds a month to every delivery.
- Egypt's Sidi Kerir port reached near-full capacity on August 5 with seven tankers at anchor — a system designed for normal times now groaning under the weight of an emergency supply chain.
- China's commercial crude inventories have fallen to 25 million metric tons, with storage tanks barely half full, leaving analysts describing the market as 'highly anxious' with no quick fix in sight.
- The SUMED pipeline and Suez Canal cannot match pre-blockade Saudi export volumes of 4.9 million barrels per day, meaning the workaround may not hold — and Beijing's energy security remains hostage to a conflict it cannot resolve.
In the long history of trade routes shaped by conflict, Chinese supertankers are now tracing a new arc around the African continent — a detour born not of exploration but of necessity. Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have severed one of the world's most vital energy corridors, forcing Chinese state shippers to add nearly 10,000 nautical miles and a full month to each Saudi crude delivery. The improvised workaround, threading through Egyptian pipelines and crowded anchorages, holds for now — but it exposes how thinly the architecture of modern energy security is stretched when a single chokepoint closes.
The supertankers that once carried Saudi crude straight through the Red Sea are now sailing around the entire African continent. Chinese VLCCs — vessels capable of holding millions of barrels — are adding nearly 10,000 nautical miles and roughly a month to each journey, rerouting to avoid Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It is a workaround born of necessity, and it is already showing its limits.
With Chinese state shippers like COSCO and China Merchants Group ordered to avoid high-risk zones, the crude still has to move. The solution runs through Egypt: Saudi tankers carry oil from Yanbu to the Egyptian coast, where it flows through the SUMED pipeline to the port of Sidi Kerir. There, Chinese vessels either take on full loads or complete partial ones begun at Yanbu. The Yuan Xi Hu arrived empty at Sidi Kerir in early August to load entirely there; the Olympic Luck and DHT Gazelle split their loads between the two ports. It is a system assembled from available pieces, not designed for scale.
The strain is visible everywhere. Sidi Kerir reached near-full capacity on August 5 with seven vessels waiting at anchor, against a normal count of one or two. Saudi Arabia has deployed at least four of its own supertankers to run the shuttle between Yanbu and Egypt's Ain Sukhna terminal, supplemented by chartered South Korean vessels. Meanwhile, Red Sea traffic has fallen 38% from pre-blockade levels, and insurance premiums have nearly doubled as underwriters price in the real risk of attack — a risk the Houthis have underscored by sinking an Indian cargo ship and warning that Chinese vessels serving Saudi ports are not exempt.
For China, the pressure is acute. Commercial crude inventories fell below 25 million metric tons by the end of July, down from roughly 30 million at the start of the year, with storage tanks only half full. Analysts describe the market as highly anxious. The SUMED pipeline and Suez Canal cannot replicate the 4.9 million barrels per day Saudi Arabia was exporting from Yanbu before the blockade, and Beijing's public calls for dialogue have yet to change conditions on the water. Whether this improvised supply chain can hold — or whether it quietly forces a structural decline in Saudi crude flows to China — remains the question no one can yet answer.
The ships that once carried Saudi crude straight through the Red Sea now take a path that would have seemed unthinkable just months ago. Chinese supertankers—massive Very Large Crude Carriers capable of holding millions of barrels—are sailing around the entire African continent to avoid Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The detour adds nearly 10,000 nautical miles to each journey and stretches delivery times by roughly a month. What was once a direct route has become a costly, complicated workaround that reveals how fragile global energy supply chains have become.
The blockade forced Chinese state-owned shippers like COSCO and China Merchants Group to pause their usual Saudi loadings after government warnings to steer clear of high-risk zones. But the crude still needs to move. The solution relies on Egypt as a middleman. Saudi tankers ferry oil from the port of Yanbu to Egypt's coast, where it flows through the SUMED pipeline to the port of Sidi Kerir. There, Chinese-operated vessels either load the full cargo or complete partial loads they began at Yanbu before transiting the Suez Canal. The Yuan Xi Hu, operated by COSCO, arrived empty at Sidi Kerir in early August to take on a complete load. The Olympic Luck and DHT Gazelle followed a different model, partially loading at Yanbu and finishing at Sidi Kerir. It is a system born of necessity, not efficiency.
The human cost of the blockade is visible in the numbers. Traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has collapsed by 38 percent compared to pre-blockade levels, hitting its lowest daily volume of 2025 on August 3. Insurance premiums in the Red Sea have nearly doubled as underwriters price in the genuine risk of attack. The Houthis have already sunk an Indian cargo ship, and they have made clear they will not exempt Chinese vessels operating from Saudi ports. Companies have responded by pulling their ships out of the Red Sea entirely.
The new route has created its own bottlenecks. Sidi Kerir, Egypt's crude-loading port, reached near-full capacity on August 5 with seven vessels waiting at anchor—a stark contrast to the usual one or two. To keep the shuttle service running between Yanbu and Egypt's Ain Sukhna terminal, Saudi Arabia has deployed at least four of its own supertankers and chartered additional vessels from South Korea's Sinokor Merchant Marine. The infrastructure that seemed adequate for normal times is straining under the weight of this improvised supply chain.
For China, the pressure is acute. Commercial crude inventories had fallen below 25 million metric tons by the end of July, down from roughly 30 million at the start of the year. Storage tanks were only 51.64 percent full in late July, compared to 58.1 percent in March. The market, according to analysts, is "highly anxious." There are few quick fixes. The SUMED pipeline and Suez Canal have capacity limits that make it nearly impossible to match the 4.9 million barrels per day that Saudi Arabia was exporting from Yanbu before the blockade began. Beijing has called publicly for dialogue to ease Red Sea tensions and respect regional sovereignty, but the costly logistics continue to unfold with no clear end in sight.
What remains uncertain is whether this workaround can hold. The new route concentrates shipping in geopolitically exposed waterways and may ultimately limit the tankers available for this trade. Analysts warn that capacity constraints could force a prolonged structural decline in Saudi crude exports to China, leaving Beijing's energy security vulnerable to forces it cannot easily control.
Notable Quotes
The market is described as highly anxious, with few effective short-term responses available to secure supply— Market analysts
Beijing has called for dialogue to ease Red Sea tensions and respect regional sovereignty— Chinese government position
Want the full story?
Read the original at Caixin Global ↗
War & Conflict