They can stop building their stockpiles.
As global food and fertiliser markets strain under the weight of a closed Strait of Hormuz and a fractured spring planting season, former World Bank president David Malpass has called on China to release its vast stockpiles — framing the choice not as charity, but as a matter of shared consequence. His appeal arrives at a moment when the distance between policy and hunger has rarely felt shorter, and when the question of who bears responsibility for global stability is being asked with new urgency. At its heart, the dispute touches something older than trade law: whether the world's most powerful actors will choose interdependence over insulation.
- Global fertiliser markets are in crisis — the Strait of Hormuz closure has severed key supply routes just as farmers worldwide race to plant spring crops.
- China, holding the world's largest food and fertiliser stockpiles, has quietly restricted exports since March, a policy tightening years in the making but devastating in its current timing.
- Malpass is challenging not just China's export policy but its identity — arguing that a nation with the world's second-largest economy can no longer credibly claim developing-nation protections at the WTO.
- Beijing has pushed back firmly, defending both its export restrictions and its developing-country status as legitimate, while deflecting blame for supply disruptions onto other actors.
- Malpass argues China's own economic interests — its shipping lines, container operations, and trade dependency — make resolving the Hormuz crisis as urgent for Beijing as for anyone.
- The near-term outlook blends resilience and pain: inflation is expected to rise on many goods, even as a strong jobs market suggests the broader economy has not yet buckled.
David Malpass, who led the World Bank until 2023, used a BBC interview to deliver a pointed message to Beijing: China is holding the world's largest reserves of food and fertiliser while a genuine global crisis unfolds, and it has both the capacity and the responsibility to act.
The backdrop was stark. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz had thrown agricultural supply chains into disarray, with nations competing fiercely for fertiliser ahead of spring planting. Into this scramble, China had halted exports of several fertiliser types beginning in March — restrictions that had been tightening since 2021, but whose consequences were now acute. China produces roughly a quarter of the world's fertiliser and exported over $13 billion worth last year alone. Malpass was unsparing: the restrictions reflected policy, not scarcity.
He also challenged China's claim to developing-nation status at the WTO and World Bank — a designation that carries meaningful protections and exemptions. For a country that is the world's second-largest economy, he argued, the claim had become indefensible. Beijing responded swiftly, with its Washington embassy insisting China remained committed to market stability and defending its developing-country status as a legitimate right.
Malpass also made an economic self-interest argument for Chinese cooperation on the Hormuz crisis. China owns shipping infrastructure and depends on open global trade — a world in which Iran controlled that chokepoint would cost Beijing dearly. The appeal was pragmatic: help restore free passage, and China helps itself.
On the wider economic outlook, Malpass acknowledged that inflation would likely rise on many goods in the months ahead, while noting that a resilient jobs market offered some cushion. It was a careful reading — honest about the pain, but resistant to panic, even as the world waited to see whether Beijing would move.
David Malpass, who spent four years running the World Bank before stepping down in 2023, sat down with the BBC just as tensions were mounting over one of the world's most fragile supply chains. His message was direct: China is sitting on enormous reserves of food and fertiliser while the rest of the planet scrambles to feed itself, and Beijing needs to open those stockpiles.
The timing of his comments was pointed. They came as the Trump administration prepared for a summit in Beijing, and as a genuine crisis was unfolding across global agriculture. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint through which much of the world's oil and fertiliser shipments pass—had thrown supply chains into chaos. Nations were competing desperately for fertiliser ahead of spring planting season, the moment when farmers worldwide need to get nutrients into the soil. Into this scramble, China had quietly halted exports of several fertiliser types starting in March, citing domestic needs. The restrictions were not new; they had been tightening since 2021. But the timing made them consequential. Last year alone, China produced roughly a quarter of the world's fertiliser and exported more than $13 billion worth of it.
Malpass, who also served as Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs under Donald Trump from 2017 to 2019, framed the issue in terms of capacity and choice. "They have the biggest world stockpile of food stuffs and of fertiliser," he said. "They can stop building their stockpiles." The implication was clear: China's export restrictions were not born of scarcity but of policy.
He went further, challenging something more fundamental about how China presents itself to the world. Beijing claims developing-nation status at the World Trade Organization and the World Bank—a designation that comes with certain protections and exemptions. Malpass argued this claim had become indefensible. "They present themselves as a developing country when they're the second biggest economy in the world and in many ways rich," he said. He suggested China could simply suspend that designation if it chose to.
The Chinese embassy in Washington responded swiftly. A spokesperson rejected the characterization, insisting that China remained committed to global market stability and that the real culprits behind supply disruptions were elsewhere. On the question of developing-nation status, the embassy doubled down: China was "universally recognized as the largest developing country," and maintaining that designation was a "legitimate right."
Malpass also saw an opening for Chinese cooperation on the broader geopolitical crisis. The Strait of Hormuz remained blocked, a situation Trump had described as being on "massive life support." Malpass argued that China had every reason to help resolve the deadlock. Beijing owns shipping lines, controls container operations, and profits enormously from global trade. A world in which Iran could choke off the strait would be a world in which China lost. "They would be a big loser if Iran in some way had control of the Strait of Hormuz," he said. The logic was economic self-interest dressed as diplomacy: help us restore free passage, and you help yourselves.
On the broader economic picture, Malpass offered a mixed assessment. Inflation was likely to tick upward in the months ahead—prices on many products would climb. But the jobs market remained robust, suggesting the American economy had some resilience left. It was a reading designed to acknowledge pain without conceding panic, even as the world waited to see whether Beijing would loosen its grip on the supplies that farmers and nations desperately needed.
Citações Notáveis
They have the biggest world stockpile of food stuffs and of fertiliser. They can stop building their stockpiles.— David Malpass, former World Bank president
China is committed to maintaining the stability of global food and fertilizer markets. The root causes behind the current disruptions in global food and fertilizer supply chains are crystal clear; this blame cannot be shifted onto China.— Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington DC
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter what Malpass thinks? He's not in government anymore.
He's not, but he spent four years at the helm of the World Bank and served in Treasury under Trump. He has credibility with the current administration, and his comments are clearly aimed at the Beijing summit happening right now. He's not just observing—he's trying to shape the conversation.
So China is hoarding fertiliser. Why would they do that if it costs them economically?
That's the puzzle. They're restricting exports to secure domestic supplies—partly genuine concern about feeding their own population, partly insurance against future disruptions. But Malpass is saying they have enough. The question is whether they believe him, or whether they're hedging against a world that feels increasingly unstable.
The developing-nation thing seems like a separate argument. Why bring it up now?
Because it's leverage. If China admits it's a wealthy, developed economy, it loses certain protections and exemptions in trade rules. Malpass is saying: you can't have it both ways. You can't act like a superpower and claim the benefits of being a developing nation.
Would China actually help with the Strait of Hormuz?
Malpass thinks they will, because it's in their interest. But that assumes Beijing sees its interests the way Washington does. They might calculate differently—that some disruption is worth the leverage it gives them.
What happens if China doesn't budge on either front?
Then fertiliser stays scarce, prices stay high, and farmers in poorer countries struggle most. The global food system gets more fragile. And the Strait stays closed, which hurts everyone but especially China's trading partners.