China escalates island-seizure drills as US backs Philippines security pact

The island seizure ability reflected that the PLA has already conducted enough exercises to gain superiority
A military analyst describes what China's drills reveal about its readiness to seize disputed territory in the South China Sea.

In the contested waters of the South China Sea, two visions of regional order are being performed simultaneously — one through the language of force, the other through the renewal of alliance. China's accelerating island-seizure drills and America's reaffirmation of its security pact with the Philippines are not merely military maneuvers; they are declarations of intent, each side inscribing its claims on a body of water that has become the defining theater of great-power competition in our time.

  • China doubled its island-capture naval exercises in just the first half of 2021, broadcasting footage of amphibious landings and air-cushioned landing craft as a deliberate signal of readiness to retake disputed territory by force.
  • The USS Benfold's passage near Mischief Reef and Beijing's new vessel-notification regulation have sharpened the friction, turning routine navigation into acts of political confrontation.
  • Washington responded not with warships alone but with ceremony — Secretary Blinken's face-to-face meeting with Manila marked the 70th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty and publicly celebrated the Philippines' restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement.
  • Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana pressed for updated treaty language with clearer American commitments, explicitly anchored to the 2016 Hague ruling that invalidated most of China's territorial claims.
  • The competing exercises and diplomatic gestures are converging into a sustained standoff, with each side calibrating its signals to project resolve without crossing the threshold into open conflict.

China sealed off waters near the Leizhou Peninsula this past week to conduct live-fire exercises designed to sharpen its capacity to seize an island by force. The drills were not isolated — earlier that same week, the Southern Theatre Command had already staged an amphibious landing in the South China Sea, with state television broadcasting footage of the Wuzhishan transport dock, helicopters, tanks, and landing craft delivering soldiers to an unnamed island. Military analysts read the message plainly: the PLA was demonstrating readiness to retake lost territory. The pace of such exercises had nearly doubled compared to 2020.

The timing was deliberate. As China's drills unfolded, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in Washington meeting Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. — their first in-person encounter — to mark the 70th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty and celebrate the Philippines' restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement. For Locsin, the renewed pact represented a recalibration of the regional balance of power. For Blinken, it was an opportunity to reaffirm American security commitments and call on China to respect international law and the 2016 arbitration ruling that had invalidated most of its territorial claims.

Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana added a sharper edge, arguing that the Mutual Defense Treaty needed updated language to clarify the precise scope of American obligations — and to align those obligations with the Hague ruling. Meanwhile, the USS Benfold had already sailed near Mischief Reef, prompting Beijing to introduce regulations requiring foreign vessels to announce their presence in waters China considers its own.

What has emerged is a theater of competing declarations — military exercises and diplomatic ceremonies staged in full view of the other side, each one a sentence in an argument about who holds authority over the South China Sea and on what terms the region's order will be written.

China sealed off a stretch of ocean near its southern coast this past week to conduct live-fire exercises—drills designed to sharpen its capacity to seize and hold an island by force. The exercises, scheduled for Thursday and Friday, took place in waters west of the Leizhou Peninsula, just above the island of Hainan, according to notices issued by China's Maritime Administration. They arrived at a moment of deliberate strategic messaging: the United States, through Secretary of State Antony Blinken, was publicly celebrating the Philippines' decision to restore a decades-old military alliance that had been allowed to lapse.

The timing was not coincidental. Earlier that same week, China's Southern Theatre Command had already conducted an amphibious landing exercise in the South China Sea. State television footage showed the operation in detail: the Wuzhishan, a Type 071 amphibious transport dock, moving through the water alongside two helicopters, at least one tank, and three air-cushioned landing craft. Soldiers were ferried to an unnamed island by both helicopter and ship. The exercise was methodical, practiced, and clearly meant to be seen. Military analysts noted the signal it sent. Song Zhongping, a former People's Liberation Army instructor and military commentator based in Hong Kong, interpreted the drills as a statement of intent: China was demonstrating its readiness to retake islands it had lost. "The island seizure ability shown in the video reflected that the PLA has already conducted enough exercises to gain superiority in the air and at sea," he said. The frequency of such exercises had accelerated sharply. In the first half of 2021 alone, China conducted twenty naval drills involving elements of island capture—nearly double the thirteen exercises it had carried out during all of 2020.

On the American side, the response was diplomatic affirmation. Blinken met face-to-face with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. in Washington, marking their first in-person encounter. The occasion was weighted with symbolism: the meeting coincided with the seventieth anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two nations and seventy-five years of diplomatic relations. Blinken expressed satisfaction that the Philippines had reinstated the Visiting Forces Agreement, a security pact that had been suspended but was now restored after President Rodrigo Duterte conducted what he called a thorough assessment based on national interest. For Locsin, the reinstatement represented a recalibration of the regional balance of power. "The move puts the relationship between the US and the Philippines back on track and restores the security balance in the Asia Pacific region," he said.

Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana was more specific about what needed to change. Speaking at a forum organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, he argued that key areas of the Mutual Defense Treaty required updating to reflect current security realities. He wanted clearer language about the precise scope of American commitments to Manila, and he wanted those commitments aligned with the 2016 arbitration ruling issued by an international tribunal at The Hague. That ruling had determined that most of China's territorial claims in the South China Sea had no legal basis under international law.

Blinken echoed that point. He underscored the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and called on China to respect international law and abide by the 2016 arbitration award. The message was clear: the United States was reaffirming its security obligations to the Philippines at the precise moment China was demonstrating its military capacity to project power across the region.

The backdrop to these exercises and diplomatic moves was a series of recent confrontations. A guided-missile destroyer, the USS Benfold, had sailed near Mischief Reef, a disputed feature that China claims as its own but which the Philippines and Vietnam also claim. In response, Beijing had introduced a regulation requiring foreign vessels to provide notice before entering what China considers its territorial waters. China had also launched a series of naval exercises in late August, timed to precede a high-profile joint drill involving the United States and members of the Quad alliance off the coast of Guam. Each side was signaling resolve, each was demonstrating capability, and each was watching the other closely. The South China Sea had become a stage for competing visions of regional order, played out through military exercises and diplomatic affirmations of alliance.

The island seizure ability shown in the video reflected that the PLA has already conducted enough exercises to gain superiority in the air and at sea, and this marine combat ability will certainly be used to regain control of some islands
— Song Zhongping, military analyst and former PLA instructor
We are very gratified to have the recent renewal of the Visiting Forces Agreement
— US Secretary of State Antony Blinken
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Inventor

Why does China need to practice island seizure so many times? Isn't the capability already understood?

Model

The exercises aren't really about learning how to do it—they're about proving you can do it, and doing it publicly. When state television releases footage, when you double your drills year over year, you're sending a message to your rivals and your own population. It's demonstration of will.

Inventor

And the Philippines bringing back the American security pact—that's a direct response to these drills?

Model

It's a response to the broader pattern. The Philippines has territorial claims in these waters too, and they're watching China's military grow and its exercises multiply. The VFA gives them a legal framework to ask for American help if things escalate.

Inventor

But Duterte had suspended the agreement in the first place. What changed his mind?

Model

He called it a reassessment based on national interest. The security environment shifted. China's activities intensified. The calculus changed. Sometimes leaders have to recalibrate when circumstances demand it.

Inventor

Is the 2016 arbitration ruling actually binding on China?

Model

Legally, yes—it was issued under international law. Practically, China doesn't recognize it. That's why both Blinken and the Philippine defense secretary kept mentioning it. They're trying to establish that there's a legal standard China should follow, even if Beijing refuses to acknowledge it.

Inventor

So what happens next? Do these exercises keep escalating?

Model

That's the question everyone's asking. You have China demonstrating capability, the US and Philippines reinforcing their alliance, and no clear off-ramp. Each side sees the other's moves as provocative. Each responds with its own show of strength. It's a cycle that can continue indefinitely, or it can break into something worse.

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