Can Middle Powers Unite Against Great-Power Pressure?

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, according to reports that have begun circulating. Whether he will actually receive it remains uncertain, but the nomination itself signals something larger: the emergence of a political figure willing to articulate what smaller nations have long felt but rarely said aloud.

Carney's moment came at Davos earlier this year, where he spoke about solidarity among middle powers in the face of American tariffs and territorial pressure. He called for a rules-based international order grounded in multilateralism—the kind of language that typically draws polite nods. Instead, he received thunderous applause. He then moved beyond words. He imposed retaliatory tariffs against the United States and deepened diplomatic ties with the European Union and other nations. Within weeks, he had become a figure of international consequence, the kind of leader smaller countries watch when they need to know if resistance is possible.

The symbolic weight of a Carney Nobel Prize would be substantial. Donald Trump has long sought the award while simultaneously pressuring neighboring countries to bend to his will. He accepted what amounted to a hastily constructed FIFA Peace Prize as a consolation. If Carney were to win the actual Nobel, it would represent a public rebuke—not just to Trump personally, but to the entire logic of great-power coercion. The reaction in smaller nations that have endured such pressure for decades would likely be sharp and celebratory.

But the Norwegian Nobel Committee does not award prizes for symbolism alone. It demands demonstrable, sustained results. Carney has been in office for just over eighteen months. His track record, while notable, remains limited. That said, precedent exists: Barack Obama received the prize early in his presidency, and the European Union won it during a period of profound crisis. The committee considers not only what a recipient has accomplished but what they might accomplish—whether the award itself could strengthen their hand in future efforts.

The real question is whether Carney's vision of a middle-power coalition can actually hold. He has called for an alliance of "like-minded countries"—liberal democracies with market economies committed to multilateralism. South Korea, Japan, Germany, Australia, and the Nordic nations fit this description. Most are American security partners, yet all have experienced Trump's unilateral pressure: threatening tariffs, demands for increased defense spending, territorial ambitions. South Korea was told to fund a fifty-billion-dollar Alaska liquefied natural gas project without prior agreement. Japan was humiliated when Trump invoked its wartime history during talks with China. Denmark faced pressure to surrender Greenland. These countries are "like-minded" not only in their political systems but in their shared experience of being treated as subordinates by a great power.

Carney's warning at Davos was sharp: if these nations cannot secure a seat at the table where decisions are made, they will end up on the menu. The metaphor captured something real. Yet forming a lasting coalition against the United States faces structural obstacles that no amount of rhetorical skill can dissolve. Most of these countries depend on American security guarantees. They maintain complex economic relationships with China. South Korea and Japan harbor their own historical tensions. Their interests overlap but do not align perfectly. A comprehensive organization modeled on the European Union would be unrealistic.

What remains possible is narrower and more pragmatic: issue-specific multilateral networks organized around technology, critical minerals, maritime security, supply-chain resilience, and support for international institutions. Cooperation could extend to nontraditional security challenges—refugee flows, climate change, disease, poverty. These are areas where middle powers have genuine leverage and shared stakes. The United States and other great powers would almost certainly view such efforts as challenges to their dominance and attempt to obstruct them. Yet the incentives for cooperation are real: it could help preserve a multilateral order, diversify supply chains, and reduce dependence on great-power pressure. The European Union began narrowly and modestly before expanding into something far larger. There is no reason middle powers cannot follow a similar path, building cooperation incrementally rather than attempting to construct a rival superstructure overnight.