In South Africa, a court dispute over a compounding pharmacy has drawn quiet attention to a question older than the case itself: how does a society continue to protect people from medicines once those medicines are already in use? As compounded formulations reach growing numbers of patients — driven in part by global shortages of drugs like semaglutide — the absence of the same traceability and monitoring infrastructure that governs registered pharmaceuticals becomes not merely a regulatory gap, but a human one. The story unfolding in Pretoria is, at its deepest level, a reminder that medicine
Beyond the Courtroom: Why Compounded Medicines Need Robust Safety Monitoring
Medicine safety does not end when a medicine is approved or injected.
Why does a court case about one pharmacy suddenly make pharmacovigilance matter to the general public?
Because it exposes a gap that's been quietly widening. For decades, pharmacovigilance worked invisibly—it caught problems before they became crises. But compounded medicines are different. They're prepared outside the factory system, often in larger quantities now, without the same traceability infrastructure. If something goes wrong, we might not know until it's too late.
But compounded medicines have been around for centuries. What's changed?
Scale and demand. A pharmacist preparing a custom liquid for one child is one thing. A pharmacy preparing semaglutide formulations for hundreds of patients is another. The moment you move from individual prescriptions to routine supply, you need the safety systems that come with manufacturing—documentation, batch tracking, adverse event reporting.
Couldn't regulators just require those systems without banning compounding?
Exactly. That's the point. No one is arguing that compounding should disappear. Some patients genuinely have no other option. But if you're going to compound at scale, you need to know who received what, when, and be able to investigate if something goes wrong. That's not burdensome—it's basic public health.
What happens if a compounded medicine causes harm and no one can trace it?
You're left guessing. Was it a contamination problem? A concentration error? A bad batch? Did other patients get the same bad medicine? Without traceability, you can't answer those questions. You can't protect the next patient. That's the real risk.
So the court case is almost beside the point?
Not beside the point—but it's the symptom, not the disease. The courts will decide whether iDexis can legally compound these medicines. But the harder question is what happens after: how do we monitor safety if compounding becomes routine? That's a public health question, not a legal one.
What would a robust system actually look like?
Every compounded medicine would be traceable to the patient, the pharmacist, the ingredients, the batch, the date. Any adverse event would be reported and investigated. Patterns would be monitored. If a problem emerged, regulators would have the information to act quickly. It's not complicated. Pharmaceutical manufacturers do it already. Compounding pharmacies can too.
O Pulso
- Demand for compounded medicines, especially GLP-1 drugs like semaglutide, has surged beyond what registered supply chains can meet, pushing pharmacies into territory that blurs the line between individual preparation and commercial-scale manufacturing.
- Unlike registered pharmaceutical products, compounded medicines often lack the batch validation, stability testing, and formal pharmacovigilance infrastructure needed to catch rare but serious safety failures before they multiply.
- International precedent is sobering: some of the worst medicine safety disasters of recent decades trace back not to faulty active ingredients but to contamination and inconsistency during the compounding process itself, resulting in outbreaks and deaths.
- The iDexis court case has forced South Africa's regulatory conversation into the open, exposing the absence of systematic adverse event reporting and traceability requirements for compounded medicines supplied at scale.
- Regulators, pharmacists, healthcare professionals, and patients are being called toward a shared framework — one that preserves access for vulnerable patients while building the documentation and reporting systems that make safety monitoring possible.
- The trajectory points toward a necessary reckoning: South Africa must develop compounding-specific pharmacovigilance mechanisms, or risk a growing population of patients receiving medicines with no safety net beneath them.
In South Africa, a court dispute over a compounding pharmacy has drawn quiet attention to a question older than the case itself: how does a society continue to protect people from medicines once those medicines are already in use? As compounded formulations reach growing numbers of patients — driven in part by global shortages of drugs like semaglutide — the absence of the same traceability and monitoring infrastructure that governs registered pharmaceuticals becomes not merely a regulatory gap, but a human one. The story unfolding in Pretoria is, at its deepest level, a reminder that medicine safety is not an event but a continuous act of collective vigilance.
A court case involving a Pretoria compounding pharmacy has surfaced a question that rarely enters public debate: how do we know medicines remain safe once large numbers of people are using them? The legal arguments concern intellectual property and regulatory authority over semaglutide-containing products, but beneath them lies something more fundamental — the science of pharmacovigilance.
Compounding has always served a legitimate purpose. Children who cannot swallow tablets, patients allergic to registered formulations, individuals requiring doses not commercially available — all depend on pharmacists who can prepare medicines tailored to their needs. But as global shortages of drugs like semaglutide have grown, some pharmacies have begun compounding these formulations at scale, raising questions that the existing regulatory framework was not fully designed to answer.
Medicines do not stop being monitored once they are approved. Clinical trials, however rigorous, involve selected participants in controlled conditions and cannot capture rare adverse reactions — those occurring in perhaps one in 50,000 patients — or the full complexity of real-world populations. Pharmacovigilance is the ongoing process of watching medicines in use: collecting reports from healthcare professionals and patients, identifying unexpected patterns, and acting when risks emerge. It is a shared responsibility across the entire health system.
Registered pharmaceutical products carry with them extensive manufacturing validation, batch traceability, and formal safety reporting obligations. Compounded medicines, by their nature, often lack this infrastructure — not because pharmacists are incapable of quality work, but because the evidence base is thinner and the systems less formalised. International experience shows that when compounded medicines cause harm, the problem is rarely the active ingredient itself; it is variability in concentration, contamination during sterile preparation, or inconsistencies between batches. Some of the gravest medicine safety incidents in recent decades have involved contaminated compounded sterile products, with consequences measured in outbreaks and lives lost.
Traceability sits at the heart of any solution. When an adverse reaction is reported, investigators need to know the formulation, batch number, preparation date, and the pharmacy responsible. Without that chain of information, it is impossible to determine whether a single patient is affected or whether an entire batch poses wider risk. As compounded medicines reach more patients, the same principles of documentation that protect users of registered products must extend to those who depend on compounding.
The debate should not collapse into a binary between regulation and access. Overly restrictive rules could deny vulnerable patients treatments they genuinely need. But patients should not be asked to accept a lower standard of safety simply because their medicine was compounded rather than manufactured. What is needed — and what the iDexis case has made harder to ignore — is a proportionate framework: robust record-keeping, adverse event reporting mechanisms, and systematic monitoring wherever compounded medicines are supplied to substantial numbers of people. Medicine safety does not end at the pharmacy counter. It continues, quietly and necessarily, for as long as the medicine is in use.
A court case in South Africa involving a Pretoria-based compounding pharmacy has forced a reckoning with a question that rarely surfaces in public debate: how do we know that medicines are safe once thousands of people are using them? The legal arguments—about intellectual property, regulatory authority, and access to semaglutide-containing products—will be resolved in the courts. But beneath those disputes lies something more fundamental, and more urgent.
Pharmacies have compounded medicines for centuries. A child who cannot swallow tablets needs a liquid. A patient allergic to an ingredient in a registered product needs an alternative. A person requiring a dose not commercially available needs a custom formulation. These are legitimate clinical needs, and compounding remains an essential part of modern pharmacy. But in recent years, the line between preparing medicines for individual patients and manufacturing them on a commercial scale has blurred. Demand for certain medicines—particularly glucagon-like peptide-1 receptor agonists like semaglutide, used for diabetes and obesity—has outpaced supply in many countries. Some pharmacies have begun compounding these formulations in larger quantities to meet patient demand. This raises a question that most South Africans have never heard of, despite benefiting from the answer every time they visit a doctor or clinic: pharmacovigilance.
The term sounds technical, but the principle is straightforward. Medicines do not stop being monitored once they are approved for use. Before the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority registers a medicine, it undergoes years of laboratory research and clinical trials. But those trials involve carefully selected participants in controlled environments. They cannot capture the full complexity of real-world healthcare. Rare adverse reactions—those occurring in one out of every 20,000 to 50,000 patients—may never appear in trials involving only a few hundred or a few thousand people. Once a medicine enters the market, it reaches populations underrepresented in trials: older adults, pregnant women, people with multiple chronic illnesses. Age, underlying conditions, living environments, and interactions with other medicines all influence whether and how severely adverse events occur. This is why evaluating medicine safety is an ongoing process, not a one-time event.
Pharmacovigilance means continuously asking whether a medicine is performing as expected in the real world, identifying unexpected safety concerns as early as possible, and taking action when necessary. A healthcare professional reports an unexpected side effect. A patient submits an account of an adverse reaction. A pharmaceutical company notices an unusual pattern emerging across several countries. Regulators analyse these signals, compare information from multiple sources, and determine whether further investigation is required. Sometimes the outcome is reassuring. Occasionally it leads to updated prescribing information, additional warnings, restricted use, or withdrawal from the market. Importantly, pharmacovigilance is not simply about counting side effects. It is about understanding why they occur, identifying who is at greater risk, determining whether the medicine itself is responsible, and ensuring that benefits continue to outweigh risks. It is a shared responsibility involving healthcare professionals, pharmacists, nurses, patients, pharmaceutical companies, regulators, and public health authorities.
When medicines are registered, regulators have already evaluated extensive evidence about quality, safety, and efficacy. Manufacturers must comply with internationally recognised standards of Good Manufacturing Practice, ensuring consistency from batch to batch. They validate manufacturing processes, monitor product stability, investigate deviations, maintain comprehensive records, and operate formal pharmacovigilance systems throughout the product's lifecycle. Every batch can be traced. Every adverse event contributes to a growing body of evidence. Compounded medicines exist in a different environment. By their nature, they are often prepared in smaller quantities for individual patients, meaning they are generally not supported by the same volume of clinical evidence or the same extensive manufacturing validation. This does not mean they are inherently unsafe, nor does it imply that pharmacists cannot prepare high-quality medicines. Rather, it means the evidence base is often more limited, making robust quality assurance and careful post-dispensing monitoring all the more important. International experience shows that when problems do occur with compounded medicines, they are frequently related not to the active ingredient itself but to the compounding process: variability in concentration, contamination during sterile preparation, reduced stability, inappropriate storage, or inconsistencies between batches. Some of the most serious medicine safety incidents over the past two decades have involved compounded sterile products that became contaminated during preparation, leading to outbreaks of severe infection and, in some cases, loss of life.
One concept becomes especially important: traceability. Whenever an adverse drug reaction is reported, investigators need to know exactly which product was used—the formulation, strength, batch number, date of preparation, expiry date, and details of the pharmacy that prepared it. Without this information, it is extremely difficult to determine whether an adverse event represents an isolated incident or whether other patients may have received medicines from the same batch and could also be at risk. Traceability has become one of the cornerstones of modern pharmacovigilance. It allows regulators to identify safety signals, investigate problems, and initiate recalls before larger numbers of patients are affected. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have well-established systems to support this process. As compounded medicines are prepared and supplied more widely, similar principles of documentation and traceability become increasingly important if patients are to receive the same level of protection.
The iDexis court case raises questions that extend well beyond this particular legal dispute. If compounded medicines are increasingly being prepared and supplied to larger numbers of patients, what systems should be in place to ensure their safety continues to be monitored after they leave the pharmacy? The answer is not that compounded medicines should be treated identically to registered pharmaceutical products. Compounding fulfils an essential role and remains indispensable for many patients whose clinical needs cannot be met by commercially available medicines. Overly restrictive regulation could unintentionally reduce access to important treatments for vulnerable patients. Equally, however, patients should not be expected to accept a lower standard of safety simply because a medicine has been compounded rather than manufactured. For pharmacies undertaking compounding, particularly where medicines are prepared repeatedly or supplied to substantial numbers of patients, robust record keeping becomes essential. Every preparation should be traceable to the patient who received it, the ingredients used, the suppliers of those ingredients, the batch numbers, the date of preparation, the pharmacist responsible, and the quality assurance processes that were followed. Mechanisms should exist to capture reports of suspected adverse drug reactions associated with compounded medicines. Healthcare professionals and patients should know how and where to report concerns. Reports should be investigated systematically, trends monitored over time, and information shared with the regulatory authority to support broader national pharmacovigilance activities. If a pattern of unexpected adverse events emerges, there should be sufficient information to determine whether the problem relates to a specific batch, a particular preparation process, an individual ingredient, or another contributing factor. These are not novel expectations. They reflect internationally accepted principles of medicine safety that have evolved over decades of experience. The discussion surrounding compounded medicines should not become polarised into a debate about regulation versus access, or innovation versus enforcement. A well-functioning health system should be capable of supporting innovation while maintaining rigorous standards for patient safety. It should enable pharmacists to use their professional expertise to meet individual patient needs while ensuring that appropriate safeguards exist whenever medicines are supplied more broadly. Medicine safety does not end when a medicine is approved, dispensed, or injected. Every medicine continues its safety journey long after it reaches the patient. Pharmacovigilance is often described as the science of watching medicines. In reality, it is much more than that. It is the science of protecting people.
Citações Notáveis
Patients should not be expected to accept a lower standard of safety simply because a medicine has been compounded rather than manufactured.— Professor Renier Coetzee and Lara van Niekerk
Pharmacovigilance is often described as the science of watching medicines. In reality, it is much more than that. It is the science of protecting people.— Professor Renier Coetzee and Lara van Niekerk