Bangladesh's Reform Momentum Fades as Political Divisions Deepen

Two years ago, a student-led uprising swept Sheikh Hasina from power after nearly sixteen years of rule. The movement had begun in 2018 over a quota system for government jobs, but by 2024 it had become something larger—a demand for systemic change. When the government tried to reinstate parts of that quota system, the streets filled again. More than a thousand people died in the unrest before Hasina fled to India in August 2024, leaving behind a country exhausted and hungry for transformation.

What followed was a period of genuine institutional reckoning. An interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, backed by the military and key figures from the uprising, drafted an ambitious reform roadmap called the July Charter. It promised term limits for prime ministers, a new upper house of parliament, stronger presidential powers, and real judicial independence. In February 2026, roughly seventy percent of voters approved it. The same election delivered a decisive majority to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the BNP, which had pledged to carry the reforms forward.

But something has shifted. The BNP, now in government, has rejected twenty of the 133 ordinances the interim administration had introduced as part of its reform agenda. These were not minor technical measures. They concerned the National Human Rights Commission, anti-corruption mechanisms, the criminalization of enforced disappearances, and the conduct of referendums. Ali Riaz, who led the interim government's Constitution Reform Commission, described the failure to meet promised timelines as "deeply regrettable." The BNP argues that constitutional changes should move through Parliament by proper legislative procedure, not executive order. But critics hear something else: a government retreating from commitments made when the uprising's momentum was still fresh.

The most troubling reversal concerns enforced disappearances—the practice of state agents abducting people without record or acknowledgment. Under Hasina, this was systematic. An interim commission verified 1,569 cases of enforced disappearance out of 1,913 complaints received. In response, Bangladesh signed the UN Convention against Enforced Disappearances in August 2024 and introduced an ordinance to criminalize the practice. The interim government wanted to embed this protection in the constitution itself, making it permanent and difficult to undo. Instead, the BNP published a new draft bill in July 2026 that shifted investigations of alleged disappearances from the independent National Human Rights Commission to the police—the very institution most likely to be implicated in such abductions. Human Rights Watch warned that this change would undermine accountability and eliminate the deterrent effect the law was meant to create. In April 2026, a man named Miraj Sheikh was allegedly abducted by people posing as Coast Guard personnel. More than three months later, no one knows where he is. It was the first reported disappearance since the uprising.

Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, a professor of international relations at Dhaka University, put the broader disillusionment plainly: "We did not see the elimination of discrimination, the creation of an inclusive society, or the new political order that was promised." Asif Mahmud, a student leader who served as an adviser in the interim government before resigning before the election, accused the BNP of betraying the public and taking the country backward. He suggested that political parties had been eager to secure power through early elections, forcing student leaders to make compromises on core reform demands. Khan, however, noted that the opposition bears responsibility too. "There is no sign of the opposition breaking free from this tendency," he said, observing that politicization has returned to major institutions, including universities.

Overhanging all of this is the figure of Sheikh Hasina herself. She remains in exile in India, sentenced to death by Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity during the 2024 uprising. Yet in a recent interview, she announced plans to return in December and surrender to authorities, claiming she wants to prove the court proceedings are farcical. Her Awami League party remains banned under executive order and was excluded from the February elections. But her looming return has already begun to reshape the political landscape. Some analysts worry it could destabilize the country as her followers attempt to exploit the trial for political gain. Others, like Khan, see a different possibility: that the tensions surrounding her return might actually forge broader political unity in a deeply fractured nation. What seems certain is that Bangladesh's moment of reform, however genuine it appeared two years ago, is now in question.