Any Chinese involvement in projects near India's border would not be welcome.
When Bangladesh's new Prime Minister chose Beijing and Kuala Lumpur over New Delhi for his first foreign visit, he announced — without a word — that a smaller nation had decided to test the limits of its own agency. The decision reflects eighteen months of fractured trust between Dhaka and Delhi, a vacuum that China has moved swiftly to fill with infrastructure promises and river management schemes near one of South Asia's most sensitive strategic corridors. Bangladesh now stands at the intersection of two competing visions for the region's future, seeking investment and dignity from both without being consumed by either.
- China's offer to manage the Teesta River and build an economic corridor has alarmed India, whose strategists see Beijing edging toward the Siliguri Corridor — the narrow strip of land that is India's only land link to its entire northeast.
- India's continued sheltering of deposed PM Sheikh Hasina, convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity, makes any high-profile rapprochement politically toxic for PM Rahman at home.
- Bangladeshi public opinion has hardened sharply against India following allegations that Indian border guards pushed thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims across the frontier without due process, and after Hindu-nationalist politicians made inflammatory remarks during West Bengal elections.
- Quiet signals of repair are nonetheless emerging — bus routes between Kolkata and Dhaka have resumed, India sent emergency fuel through the Friendship Pipeline, and Delhi elevated its new High Commissioner to cabinet rank as a gesture of seriousness.
- Bangladesh owes China over six billion dollars and sources more than seventy percent of its arms from Beijing, meaning the economic and strategic entanglement with China is already deep, whatever diplomatic language surrounds it.
When Prime Minister Tarique Rahman took his first overseas trip as Bangladesh's elected leader, he flew to Malaysia and China — not India. In New Delhi, the omission registered as a statement. It reflected something real: a recalibration of how Dhaka sees itself in the region, and a willingness to court Chinese investment even while attempting to repair a relationship with India that had broken badly over the preceding eighteen months.
The fracture began in August 2024, when mass protests toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to Delhi and has remained there since. The interim government that followed kept India at a distance. Diplomatic visits ceased. Trade restrictions multiplied. When Rahman's Bangladesh Nationalist Party won a landslide in February, both capitals saw an opening. Bus services between Kolkata and Dhaka quietly resumed. India sent emergency fuel through the cross-border Friendship Pipeline when global supplies tightened. Delhi appointed a new High Commissioner to Dhaka and elevated him to cabinet rank — a rare signal of intent.
But the thaw is fragile. Bilateral trade reached roughly thirteen billion pounds last year, yet the political temperature remains volatile. Bangladeshi public opinion has hardened against India — partly over Delhi's long support for Hasina, partly over allegations that Indian border guards pushed thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims across the frontier without proper procedures. When Hindu-nationalist politicians made inflammatory remarks about Bangladesh during West Bengal elections in May, those words traveled fast and landed hard in Dhaka.
China, meanwhile, moved decisively into the space India left open. During Rahman's Beijing visit, the two countries agreed to a joint feasibility study on managing the Teesta River — a waterway whose diminished flow Bangladesh has long sought help restoring. Previous governments had invited India to partner on the project; Delhi moved too slowly. China offered resources and will. It is already Bangladesh's largest arms supplier and holds over six billion dollars of Bangladeshi debt. Beijing also proposed an economic corridor linking Yunnan province through Myanmar to Bangladesh.
For India, the Teesta project is not simply about water. The river sits near the Siliguri Corridor — a twenty-two-kilometre strip of land connecting mainland India to its seven northeastern states. Any Chinese presence in infrastructure near that chokepoint touches a deep nerve, sharpened by decades of border conflict and the memory of a humiliating war in 1962. A former Indian foreign secretary told the BBC plainly: Chinese involvement in projects near India's border would not be welcome.
Rahman's calculation is genuinely difficult. India is too important — economically, strategically, and in terms of regional security — to alienate. But as long as Hasina remains in Delhi, a high-level visit there carries enormous political risk at home. Some analysts believe he will go anyway, because the cost of prolonged estrangement is higher still. What Bangladesh is attempting — accepting what each great power can offer without surrendering to what either demands — is the kind of balance that looks manageable in theory and is nearly impossible to hold in practice.
When Prime Minister Tarique Rahman boarded a plane for his first overseas visit as Bangladesh's elected leader, he chose Malaysia and China—not India. The decision landed like a statement in New Delhi, where officials have long assumed that newly-minted South Asian leaders would naturally turn to India first. Rahman's pivot toward Beijing signals something deeper: a recalibration of how Dhaka sees its place in the region, and a willingness to court Chinese money and expertise even as it tries to mend a relationship with India that fractured badly over the past eighteen months.
The backdrop matters. In August 2024, mass protests toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to Delhi and remains there still. The interim government that followed kept India at arm's length. Diplomatic visits dried up. Trade restrictions flew back and forth. When Rahman's Bangladesh Nationalist Party won a landslide in February, both capitals recognized an opening to reset. Bus services between Kolkata and Dhaka resumed after eighteen months of silence. When the Middle East conflict disrupted global fuel supplies earlier this year, India sent thousands of tonnes of emergency fuel through the cross-border Friendship Pipeline. Last month, India appointed a new High Commissioner to Dhaka and elevated him to cabinet rank—a rare gesture meant to signal seriousness about rebuilding the relationship.
Yet the thaw is uneven and incomplete. Bilateral trade last year reached roughly thirteen billion pounds, mostly flowing India's way, but the political temperature remains volatile. Bangladeshi public opinion has hardened against India, partly because Delhi backed Hasina during her rule, partly because of a more recent and rawer grievance: Indian border guards, according to Bangladeshi officials, have pushed thousands of people—mostly Bengali-speaking Muslims—across the frontier without following proper repatriation procedures. When Hindu-nationalist politicians in India made inflammatory comments about Bangladesh during West Bengal state elections in May, the remarks circulated widely in Dhaka and deepened the sense that India's signals were mixed.
Meanwhile, China has moved decisively into the space that India left open. During Rahman's Beijing visit, the two countries agreed to conduct a joint technical feasibility study on managing the Teesta River, a waterway shared by India and Bangladesh whose flow has diminished for years. The river needs dredging, desilting, restoration—work that requires money and expertise. Bangladesh says previous governments invited India to partner on such a project, but Delhi moved too slowly. China, by contrast, has the resources and the will to act. It is already Bangladesh's largest defence supplier, accounting for more than seventy percent of arms imports, and Dhaka owes Beijing more than six billion dollars. During the same visit, China dangled another prize: development of an economic corridor linking Yunnan province to Bangladesh and Myanmar.
For India, the Teesta project is not merely a water-management question. The river sits near the Siliguri Corridor—a twenty-two-kilometre strip of land, sometimes called the Chicken's Neck, that connects mainland India to its seven north-eastern states. Any significant Chinese presence in projects along that corridor touches a nerve. India and China have fought over their border for decades. A war in 1962 ended in humiliation for India. More recent clashes have killed soldiers on both sides. The prospect of Beijing gaining a foothold in Bangladesh's water infrastructure, close to that strategic chokepoint, alarms New Delhi. Shyam Saran, a former Indian foreign secretary, told the BBC plainly: any Chinese involvement in projects near India's border would not be welcome.
China has tried to ease those fears. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson said during Rahman's visit that China-Bangladesh cooperation does not target any third party and should remain free from third-party influence. The words were diplomatic, but they acknowledged the tension. India has long viewed South Asia as its sphere of influence. China has spent years methodically expanding its footprint across the region—in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives—and the competition is now visible and sharp.
Rahman faces a delicate calculation. India remains too important—economically and strategically—for Dhaka to ignore. India's north-east is home to ethnic separatist groups whose activities affect Bangladesh's security. But India's continued harboring of Sheikh Hasina, whom Bangladeshi courts have convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death, makes a high-level visit to Delhi politically fraught for Rahman. As long as Hasina sits in Delhi, the optics of Rahman traveling there are difficult. Yet some analysts believe he will go anyway, because the cost of estrangement is too high.
What unfolds now is a test of how much space exists between two regional powers for a smaller nation to maneuver. Bangladesh needs investment and infrastructure. China is offering both. India is offering stability and historical ties. Rahman must find a way to accept what each can give without surrendering what either demands. It is the kind of balance that looks simple on paper and nearly impossible in practice.
Citações Notáveis
There is no doubt there has been a relative relaxation of tensions between the two countries. The cross-border economic activities are gradually returning to normal and India is also issuing tourist visas to Bangladeshis.— Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary
China-Bangladesh cooperation does not target any third party and should be free from third party influence.— Guo Jiakun, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did Rahman's choice of China for his first visit matter so much to India?
Because it broke a pattern. New South Asian leaders traditionally visit India first—it signals deference to the regional power. Rahman went to China instead, which told Delhi that Dhaka was shopping elsewhere for what it needed.
What does Bangladesh actually need from China that India can't provide?
Money and speed. The Teesta River project is a good example. Bangladesh has been asking India to help manage it for years. China came in and said yes, we'll do a feasibility study. That matters when your economy is struggling.
But why is India so worried about the Teesta project specifically?
Geography and history. The river runs near the Siliguri Corridor—a narrow strip that connects India's mainland to its entire north-east. If China gets involved in infrastructure there, it's not just about water management. It's about having a foothold near India's most vulnerable strategic point.
Is there any way India and Bangladesh can move past the Hasina problem?
Probably not quickly. She's in Delhi, convicted of crimes against humanity back home, and Rahman can't afford to look weak by visiting her. But both countries know they need each other too much to let it fester forever.
So what's Rahman actually trying to do here?
He's trying to get both powers to bid for Bangladesh's loyalty. He needs Chinese investment and infrastructure. He needs Indian stability and trade. The trick is taking from both without committing fully to either.
Can he pull that off?
That's the question everyone's watching. It's a balance that works only if both India and China believe they still have a chance. The moment one of them feels shut out, the pressure on Rahman becomes impossible.