Across a continent of 54 nations, five years of deliberate investment in health security have yielded measurable progress — yet the Africa Health Security Index, released against the backdrop of an active Ebola outbreak in Central Africa, reveals that progress and preparedness are not the same thing. An average score of 41.5 out of 100, with biosecurity and biosafety registering in the teens, reminds us that the architecture of protection is only as strong as its weakest chamber. Africa has built momentum; it has not yet built safety.
Africa Health Security Index Shows Progress But Critical Gaps Remain
Lab capacity is growing faster than the ability to keep what's inside those labs from escaping.
The index shows 30 percent improvement over five years, but the average score is still only 41.5 out of 100. That sounds like a lot of progress that doesn't actually add up to safety.
Exactly. You can improve significantly and still be unprepared. It's like saying a building's fire safety improved 30 percent—that's real progress, but if it still fails inspection, people are still at risk. The improvement is genuine. Fifty-two countries got better. But the baseline was so low that even substantial gains leave critical vulnerabilities.
The biosecurity and biosafety scores are shockingly low—14.9 and 18.2 out of 100. Why is that the case when lab infrastructure is supposedly expanding?
Because building a lab is faster and cheaper than building the systems to keep it safe. You can construct a facility in a few years. Creating the regulatory frameworks, training the personnel, establishing the oversight mechanisms—that takes longer and requires sustained investment. Africa is expanding capacity, but the safety architecture hasn't kept pace. It's like having more cars on the road without enough traffic laws.
Only 22 percent of countries have plans to deploy medical countermeasures during emergencies. That seems like a basic thing that should exist everywhere.
It should. But there's a difference between having the capacity to develop a vaccine and having the infrastructure to manufacture it at scale, distribute it across a country, and get it into people's arms during a crisis. That requires supply chains, cold storage, trained personnel, communication systems. Many countries can do the first part. The second part requires resources and coordination that most don't have in place.
Financing commitments are actually declining. How does that change the picture?
It changes everything. The improvements of the past five years came partly because of international investment after COVID-19. That money is drying up. African governments will need to fund this themselves, but they're facing budget pressures everywhere. The risk is that the momentum stops. You can't maintain a surveillance system or train epidemiologists without sustained funding.
The index was designed specifically for African priorities rather than imposed from outside. Does that distinction matter?
It matters enormously. An assessment designed by Africans for African contexts measures what actually matters here—the specific risks, the governance structures, the resources available. It's not a one-size-fits-all scorecard. It gives governments evidence they can actually use to make decisions, rather than a report that tells them they're failing by someone else's standards.
Il Polso
- An active Ebola outbreak in Central Africa gives urgent, human weight to what might otherwise read as an abstract scorecard of benchmarks and percentages.
- Laboratory infrastructure is expanding rapidly across the continent, but biosecurity and biosafety protocols are dangerously lagging behind — new facilities are outpacing the safeguards meant to govern them.
- The gap between developing medical countermeasures and actually deploying them is stark: countries score 56.5 on development capacity but only 20.7 on emergency deployment, meaning vaccines and treatments may exist without any plan to reach the people who need them.
- Declining international development assistance is eroding the financial foundation that made recent gains possible, with 18 countries showing no evidence of sustained health security funding.
- African research coalitions designed this index around African priorities — not external standards — giving governments a precise, locally grounded map of where their systems hold and where they fracture.
Across a continent of 54 nations, five years of deliberate investment in health security have yielded measurable progress — yet the Africa Health Security Index, released against the backdrop of an active Ebola outbreak in Central Africa, reveals that progress and preparedness are not the same thing. An average score of 41.5 out of 100, with biosecurity and biosafety registering in the teens, reminds us that the architecture of protection is only as strong as its weakest chamber. Africa has built momentum; it has not yet built safety.
A new continental health assessment, released this week as Central Africa manages an active Ebola outbreak, offers a portrait of Africa that is simultaneously encouraging and alarming. The Africa Health Security Index measured all 54 African nations across 190 benchmarks — from laboratory capacity to political will — and found that the continent is nearly 30 percent better prepared than it was five years ago. Fifty-two of 54 countries improved their scores. Yet the average sits at just 41.5 out of 100, and no country achieved adequate overall preparedness.
The most troubling findings involve the systems designed to prevent biological accidents and deliberate threats. Biosecurity averaged 14.9 out of 100. Biosafety protocols averaged 18.2. Oversight of dual-use research — work that could theoretically be weaponized — barely registered at 1.9. These numbers matter because African nations are simultaneously expanding their laboratory infrastructure at pace, meaning the capacity to handle dangerous pathogens is growing faster than the safeguards meant to contain them.
Elsewhere, the picture is more hopeful but still uneven. Fifty-three countries have expanded biosurveillance. Wastewater monitoring operates in 52 countries. Genomic sequencing exists in 48. These are the early-warning systems that catch outbreaks before they spread — but some countries have robust programs while others have infrastructure without the funding or training to use it. A similar gap haunts medical countermeasures: African nations score reasonably well on developing vaccines and treatments, but only 22 percent have concrete plans to manufacture and distribute them at scale during a crisis.
Financing casts a long shadow. The average score for health security funding commitments declined over the assessment period, and 18 countries no longer show evidence of sustained investment. As international development assistance contracts globally, African governments face the challenge of sustaining five years of hard-won progress with domestic resources stretched by competing demands. The index gives leaders a precise map of where their systems are strong and where they remain dangerously exposed — the question now is whether that evidence will translate into action before the next outbreak tests the gaps it has found.
A new assessment of health security across Africa reveals a continent that has made genuine strides in preparing for disease outbreaks—yet remains dangerously unprepared. The Africa Health Security Index, released this week as Central Africa grapples with an active Ebola outbreak, measured all 54 African nations against 190 benchmarks covering everything from laboratory capacity to disease surveillance systems to the political will to respond to crises. The results are mixed in a way that matters: progress is real and measurable, but the gaps that remain could transform a contained outbreak into a continental catastrophe.
The numbers tell a story of momentum interrupted by persistent weakness. Over the past five years, African governments and their international partners have invested heavily in health security infrastructure in the wake of COVID-19. That work has paid off. The continent is nearly 30 percent better prepared than it was half a decade ago. Fifty-two of the 54 countries assessed showed improvement. Yet the average preparedness score across Africa sits at just 41.5 out of 100—a number that sounds less like progress and more like a warning. No single country achieved adequate overall preparedness. The index was developed by a coalition of African research organizations, global health experts, and security analysts specifically to measure African priorities rather than impose external standards, and it shows a continent that has built momentum but not yet reached safety.
The most alarming findings concern the infrastructure that prevents biological accidents and deliberate threats. Biosecurity capacity averaged 14.9 out of 100. Biosafety—the protocols that keep dangerous pathogens contained—averaged 18.2. The capacity to oversee dual-use research, work that could theoretically be weaponized, barely registered at 1.9 out of 100. This matters because African nations are expanding their laboratory infrastructure rapidly. New facilities are coming online across the continent. But the safety systems and security protocols that should accompany those labs are lagging far behind. Lab capacity is growing faster than the ability to keep what's inside those labs from escaping or being misused.
Other areas show more encouraging trajectories. Fifty-three of 54 countries have expanded their ability to detect disease outbreaks through biosurveillance. Wastewater surveillance—a tool that proved invaluable during COVID-19—now operates in 52 countries. Genomic sequencing, the ability to identify and track virus variants, exists in 48 countries. These are the systems that catch outbreaks early, before they spread. Yet even here, progress masks uneven capacity. Some countries have mature, well-resourced programs. Others have the infrastructure but lack the funding or training to operate it effectively.
A different kind of gap emerged in medical countermeasures—vaccines, therapeutics, and treatments. African nations have built stronger capacity to develop these tools, with an average score of 56.5 out of 100. But deploying them during an emergency is another matter entirely. The deployment score averages just 20.7 out of 100. Eighty-five percent of countries have an agency to approve new vaccines or drugs. Only 22 percent have concrete plans for how to manufacture, distribute, and administer those tools at scale when a crisis hits. The ability to make something is not the same as the ability to get it to the people who need it.
Regional cooperation has strengthened, though unevenly. The number of countries meeting staffing standards for field epidemiologists—the boots-on-the-ground disease detectives—has nearly doubled. Fifty-two countries now have Emergency Operations Centres, the command centers that coordinate outbreak response. Thirty-six countries have formal agreements with animal health agencies, recognizing that most emerging diseases jump from animals to humans. Yet only eight countries are tracking where the most dangerous pathogens are stored. The infrastructure exists in pieces, but the connections between those pieces remain fragile.
Financing presents a shadow over these gains. The average score for health security financing commitments dropped from 52.5 to 50.5 out of 100. Eighteen countries no longer show evidence of active, sustained funding for health security work. Seven new countries have stepped up their commitments, but the net movement is backward. International development assistance for health is declining globally. African governments will need to prioritize domestic resources for health security, but many face competing demands and limited budgets. The question now is whether the progress of the past five years can be sustained without the external funding that helped build it.
The timing of this index release—amid an active Ebola outbreak in Central Africa—underscores what's at stake. The gaps identified in the assessment are not theoretical. They are the difference between a contained outbreak and a spreading one, between a regional crisis and a continental emergency. African leaders now have evidence of where their systems are strong and where they are vulnerable. The challenge is whether they will use that evidence to drive investment and policy change, or whether the momentum of recent years will slow as funding tightens and attention drifts.
Citazioni salienti
The measurable increase in capacity is the result of dedication and investment, but much more is needed. Substantial gaps remain that can mean the difference between a small outbreak and an international pandemic.— Dr. Wilmot James, senior adviser to the Brown University Pandemic Center
The AHS Index measures our unique strengths and strategic opportunities and provides the evidence base for African controlled health investments and policy decisions.— Judith Omumbo, Head of Partnerships and Resource Mobilisation for the Science for Africa Foundation