In the shack settlements of South Africa, where poverty is most concentrated and services most absent, Abahlali baseMjondolo leader Thapelo Mohapi has spent years watching a familiar pattern repeat: when the state fails its poorest citizens, officials arrive not with solutions but with scapegoats. Mohapi argues that xenophobia in South Africa is not a spontaneous eruption of community grievance but a manufactured instrument — wielded by politicians to redirect the anger of the dispossessed away from the structures that dispossess them and toward the migrants who share their suffering. His warn
Abahlali baseMjondolo leader: Xenophobia is a tool to divide the poor, not a solution
The reason you are poor is not another poor person
Why does Mohapi think xenophobia has taken hold so widely if it's being manufactured from above? Doesn't that suggest something deeper is resonating with people?
He's saying it resonates precisely because people are desperate—they lack jobs, housing, services. Officials exploit that desperation by offering a simple explanation: the migrant. It's not that the desperation isn't real. It's that the diagnosis is false.
But we should be careful here. Mohapi is describing a top-down mechanism, but the source material doesn't give us evidence of how widespread that mechanism actually is. We know officials blame migrants. We don't know how many communities have actually accepted that framing versus how many are genuinely divided.
He mentions that 300 Ghanaians were deported and unemployment rose. That's a powerful empirical claim. But is that causal? Could unemployment have risen for other reasons?
That's his point—the deportations didn't solve the problem they were supposed to solve. Whether unemployment rose because of other factors or would have risen anyway, the fact remains: removing migrants didn't deliver what was promised.
Right, but the source doesn't tell us what the unemployment rate was before and after, or what the timeline was. We're working with a claim that needs verification. It's compelling as rhetoric, but we need the actual numbers.
What about the violence he describes? A Malawian burned alive in Mayville. A Tsonga-speaking South African killed. Are these isolated incidents or part of a pattern?
He's positioning them as evidence of a broader escalation—that xenophobia is becoming more violent and more systematic. The fact that he mentions both a foreign-born and South African victim suggests the violence is already crossing the boundary he warns about.
The source confirms those deaths happened, but it doesn't give us a count of xenophobic violence incidents, dates, or whether they're increasing or decreasing. We know they occurred. We don't know from this material whether they're representative of a trend or tragic outliers.
He invokes the UDF and "each one teach one." Is he being nostalgic, or is there something concrete he's proposing?
He's saying the Left abandoned grassroots political education and that's why the right wing gained ground. Abahlali baseMjondolo is his example of what that education looks like—conducted in community languages, on the ground, building principled members who understand the analysis.
That's a diagnosis and a model, but the source doesn't tell us whether Abahlali's approach is actually persuading people away from xenophobia or just insulating members who already agree. We know they do political education. We don't know its reach or effectiveness.
Der Puls
- Xenophobic violence has killed people from Malawi, Zimbabwe, and beyond — including a Malawian man burned alive in Mayville — while a young Tsonga-speaking South African was also killed in the same wave of unrest, exposing how quickly the logic of exclusion turns on its own.
- Municipal officials and politicians have systematically told shack-dwellers that blocked sewage, absent water, and joblessness are caused by migrant overcrowding — a deliberate misdirection that converts governance failure into ethnic hostility.
- The empirical record dismantles the premise: mass deportations, including 300 Ghanaians, produced no new jobs and unemployment continued to rise, demonstrating that migrants are a distraction from the real drivers of poverty.
- Mohapi warns that the mobilization of amabutho regiments in anti-migrant marches echoes the ethnic destabilization tactics of the 1980s — and that once foreign Africans are expelled, the exclusionary logic will fracture South Africans along Zulu, Xhosa, and Sotho lines.
- Abahlali baseMjondolo is modeling a counter-strategy: mandatory political education grounded in the philosophy of ubuntu, conducted in community languages, rebuilding the grassroots organizing culture that once unified a nation against apartheid.
In the shack settlements of South Africa, where poverty is most concentrated and services most absent, Abahlali baseMjondolo leader Thapelo Mohapi has spent years watching a familiar pattern repeat: when the state fails its poorest citizens, officials arrive not with solutions but with scapegoats. Mohapi argues that xenophobia in South Africa is not a spontaneous eruption of community grievance but a manufactured instrument — wielded by politicians to redirect the anger of the dispossessed away from the structures that dispossess them and toward the migrants who share their suffering. His warning is ancient in its logic and urgent in its timing: a people taught to devour the stranger will eventually devour themselves.
Thapelo Mohapi has lived through South Africa's xenophobic cycles — 2008, 2015, and the more systematic version now unfolding — and as General Secretary of Abahlali baseMjondolo, the shack dwellers' movement, he speaks from the settlements where the shortages are sharpest. He has watched the machinery work up close.
After a fire destroyed the Briardene informal settlement in 2010, displacing South Africans and migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe alike, the community made a collective decision: no rent during rebuilding, shared land for everyone. The distinction between citizen and foreigner briefly dissolved. Then officials arrived. They told residents that the blocked sewage and absent water were not failures of governance but consequences of migration — migrants had exceeded the population the system was designed for, they were not in the budget. Hate followed the explanation.
This is the mechanism Mohapi insists must be named. Xenophobia is not spontaneous. Poor people do not naturally turn on other poor people; they are directed to. The real causes — neoliberal policy, concentrated wealth, deliberate underfunding of services — remain invisible while the migrant becomes the scapegoat. When critics suggest that deportations might at least ease pressure on services, Mohapi answers empirically: three hundred Ghanaians were deported, no jobs appeared; record deportations have coincided with rising unemployment. The evidence is unambiguous.
What distinguishes Mohapi's position is that it rests not on abstraction but on organized political education. Abahlali baseMjondolo requires members to study before joining, grounding the movement in ubuntu — a person is a person through other people — as the foundation of struggle, not sentiment.
His alarm extends beyond the present violence. The mobilization of amabutho regiments in anti-migrant marches echoes the ethnic destabilization tactics Inkatha used in 1980s Natal. Once migrants are expelled, Mohapi warns, the logic will turn inward: Xhosas told to leave, Sothos blamed, the unity forged against apartheid shattered into tribal fragments. The path back, he argues, runs through the grassroots political culture — street committees, community education, principled accountable leadership — that the post-apartheid era abandoned, leaving a vacuum the right wing has been eager to fill.
Thapelo Mohapi has watched xenophobia rise and fall and rise again in South Africa. He lived through the violence in 2008, again in 2015, and he has seen it metastasize into something more systematic—a tool wielded by politicians and municipal officials to explain away their own failures. As General Secretary of Abahlali baseMjondolo, the shack dwellers' movement, Mohapi speaks from the ground where the poorest South Africans live, where the shortages are most acute: jobs, housing, land, water. He knows the desperation. He also knows where it is being deliberately misdirected.
In 2010, a fire swept through the Briardene informal settlement where Mohapi lived. Homes burned. People lost everything—possessions, photographs, the material traces of their families. Among those displaced were migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe who had been renting space in the settlement. The community made a collective decision: no one would pay rent while rebuilding. Everyone would own their own piece of land. For a moment, the distinction between South African and migrant dissolved. They were simply people trying to recover from catastrophe.
That unity became a problem for officials. Mohapi describes what happened next with the clarity of someone who has watched the machinery work: municipal authorities, working alongside ruling party politicians and right-wing parties, began telling residents that their lack of services—the blocked sewage, the running human waste, the absence of water—was not a failure of governance but a consequence of migration. The sewage system, they said, was designed for a certain population. Migrants had exceeded that number. They were not in the budget. The blame shifted from the state to the foreigner. Hate followed.
This is the mechanism Mohapi wants named: xenophobia is not spontaneous. It is manufactured. Poor people do not naturally turn on other poor people. They are told to. "People live in harmony and peace amongst themselves, regardless of which country they come from," Mohapi says. "It is when the government, through officials, through politicians, come into the community" that the division takes root. The real enemy—neoliberal policy, the concentration of wealth, the deliberate underfunding of services—remains invisible. The migrant becomes the scapegoat.
When pressed on whether even a partial solution—removing migrants to ease pressure on services—might be worth considering, Mohapi's response is empirical and unsparing. Three hundred Ghanaians were deported. No jobs were created. The country has experienced record migrant deportations in recent years. Unemployment has increased. The evidence is plain: migrants are not the problem. They are a distraction from the problem. "The enemy is giving us wrong information so that we fight amongst ourselves," he says.
What makes Mohapi's position distinctive is that it is rooted not in abstract principle but in lived experience and organized political education. Abahlali baseMjondolo requires members to undergo political education before joining. The organization teaches that human dignity—not South African dignity, not African dignity, but human dignity—is the foundation of struggle. "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu," he invokes: a person is a person through other people. This is not sentiment. It is the basis on which the movement organizes.
But Mohapi also sounds an alarm about what xenophobia portends. The violence targeting migrants today—a Malawian burned alive in Mayville, a young Tsonga-speaking South African killed in recent attacks—is a preview of a larger fracturing. The amabutho, traditional Zulu regiments, have been mobilized in these marches, echoing tactics used in the 1980s by Inkatha to destabilize Natal through ethnic violence. Once migrants are expelled, Mohapi warns, the logic of exclusion will turn inward. Xhosas will be told to leave. Sothos will be blamed. The unity forged against apartheid—when Black South Africans fought not as Zulus or Xhosas but as a single oppressed people—will be shattered into tribal fragments.
The path forward, as Mohapi sees it, requires a return to grassroots political organization and education. The culture of "each one teach one," the street committees and community conscientization that characterized the United Democratic Front era, has been abandoned. Without it, the right wing fills the vacuum. Abahlali baseMjondolo demonstrates an alternative: political education conducted in the languages and on the terms of the communities themselves, leadership that is principled and accountable, members who listen because they understand the analysis beneath the position. The Left, he argues, must reunite around what actually makes people poor—not around the petty divisions that have fractured it—and rebuild the organic organizing that once held a nation together.
Bemerkenswerte Zitate
People live in harmony and peace amongst themselves, regardless of which country they come from. It is when the government, through officials, through politicians, come into the community and divide them that xenophobia takes root.— Thapelo Mohapi
The enemy is giving us wrong information so that we fight amongst ourselves.— Thapelo Mohapi