On September 30, a flydubai co-pilot named Hamam al-Hammami attempted to seize control of a Dubai-to-Tel Aviv flight and crash it into Ben Gurion Airport's passenger terminal, modeling his plan on the September 11 attacks. He was restrained by the captain and passengers before the attempt could unfold. UAE investigators have traced his radicalization to 2017, when he began consuming extremist content while studying in Australia — a quiet ideological transformation that unfolded across nearly a decade, through multiple employers, and ultimately into the cockpit of a commercial aircraft. The inc
9/11 inspired flydubai co-pilot's alleged plot to crash plane into Ben Gurion Airport
The idea of carrying out a similar operation using an aircraft became firmly established in his mind
So he actually made it into the cockpit? He was working as a co-pilot on a real flight?
Yes. He was hired by flydubai in January 2026 and was serving as co-pilot on the September 30 flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv. He had a valid pilot's licence, passed all the standard checks, and nothing in flydubai's vetting process flagged him.
But Oman Air had already removed him from flight training because of concerns about radical views. Why didn't that show up?
That's the central question now. There's no indication that flydubai knew about Oman Air's decision. Employment records don't automatically transfer between airlines, especially across different countries and regions.
And he'd been planning this for years?
The UAE investigation found he started moving toward extremism in 2017 while studying in Australia. He consumed extremist content deliberately, trained in boxing, and according to his confessions, decided to become a pilot specifically because he wanted to use an aircraft to carry out an attack modeled on 9/11.
That's a confession, though. We're relying on what he told investigators. Has that been independently verified?
The investigation is preliminary. They found evidence of his exposure to extremist material and his employment movements, but you're right—the psychological motivation comes from his own statements.
He'd flown to Ben Gurion twice before, right?
Correct. Two earlier flights to familiarize himself with the route and the airport. That shows premeditation across multiple trips.
And the actual attempt—what stopped him?
The captain and several passengers physically restrained him and regained control of the aircraft. It was stopped before he could take full control.
So the question now is whether airlines can actually catch this kind of thing.
Exactly. He met every formal requirement. The gap is in what happens between employers, and in what you can detect from someone's behavior before they act.
And authorities are still investigating whether he acted alone?
Yes. He's claimed he did, but they're still verifying that.
Le Pouls
- A co-pilot with years of deliberate, documented radicalization came within a cockpit door of executing a mass-casualty attack modeled on the deadliest terrorist operation in modern history.
- Al-Hammami had flown the same route to Ben Gurion twice before as reconnaissance, revealing a level of premeditation that stretched across years of physical and psychological self-preparation.
- Oman Air had already removed him from flight training over concerns about his radical views, and Royal Air Maroc declined to retain him — yet neither warning reached flydubai before it placed him in command of a passenger aircraft.
- The captain and passengers physically overpowered al-Hammami mid-flight, restoring control of the plane and averting what investigators believe was intended as a suicide attack on a crowded terminal.
- Aviation authorities now face an urgent structural question: how a man who spent years preparing for mass violence passed every formal screening checkpoint and was cleared to fly commercially as recently as January 2026.
On September 30, a flydubai co-pilot named Hamam al-Hammami attempted to seize control of a Dubai-to-Tel Aviv flight and crash it into Ben Gurion Airport's passenger terminal, modeling his plan on the September 11 attacks. He was restrained by the captain and passengers before the attempt could unfold. UAE investigators have traced his radicalization to 2017, when he began consuming extremist content while studying in Australia — a quiet ideological transformation that unfolded across nearly a decade, through multiple employers, and ultimately into the cockpit of a commercial aircraft. The incident now forces a reckoning with what aviation security can and cannot see.
On September 30, a flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv was diverted from catastrophe when the captain and several passengers physically restrained co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami, 29, who had attempted to seize control of the aircraft and crash it into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion Airport. UAE attorney general Hamad Saif Al Shamsi confirmed that al-Hammami's plot was modeled directly on the September 11, 2001 attacks — a template he had spent years studying and preparing to replicate. He had flown to Ben Gurion on two prior occasions specifically to familiarize himself with the route and airport layout.
His radicalization began in 2017 while he was a student in Australia, where he began consuming extremist publications and online content glorifying terrorist groups and suicide operations. He later told investigators that his decision to pursue a career as a pilot was inseparable from his ideological intent — the aircraft was always meant to be the instrument. He also undertook boxing training under a private coach, describing it as psychological and physical preparation for carrying out the attack.
Al-Hammami's employment history traces a path through the aviation industry that, in retrospect, carried visible warning signs. Oman Air, where he worked from 2020 to 2024, removed him from flight training due to concerns about his radical views and reassigned him to a non-flying role. Royal Air Maroc declined to hire him permanently after a three-month training period in 2025. In January 2026, flydubai hired him. He held a valid pilot's licence, a certificate of good conduct, and had passed all required examinations — and none of the concerns raised by his previous employers were visible to flydubai's vetting process.
The incident has exposed a structural gap in aviation security: the formal mechanisms designed to screen pilots have no reliable way to surface radicalization that occurs outside the employment record, or concerns that employers hold but do not formally transmit. A man who spent nearly a decade preparing for violence, and who had been flagged by at least one prior airline, was nonetheless cleared to sit in the cockpit of a commercial aircraft. Authorities are continuing to verify his claim that he acted alone.
On September 30, a flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv never reached its destination as planned. The co-pilot, Hamam al-Hammami, 29, attempted to seize control of the aircraft with the stated intention of crashing it into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion Airport, Israel's primary international hub. The captain and several passengers physically restrained him and regained command of the plane, preventing what could have been a catastrophic loss of life.
According to preliminary findings released by the UAE attorney general Hamad Saif Al Shamsi, al-Hammami's plot was modeled directly on the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Those attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people across four hijacked commercial aircraft, had lodged themselves in his mind as a template for action. The UAE investigation concluded that al-Hammami wanted to replicate that operation using his position as a pilot, deliberately targeting the passenger terminal to inflict maximum casualties. This was not an impulsive act. He had flown to Ben Gurion Airport on two separate occasions before September 30, familiarizing himself with the route and the airport's layout in preparation for what he intended as a suicide attack.
The radicalisation that led to this moment began years earlier. In 2017, while studying in Australia, al-Hammami started consuming extremist publications and online content that glorified terrorist groups and suicide operations. He did not passively absorb this material. Investigators found that he deliberately exposed himself to radicalising content and underwent boxing training under a private coach, describing his actions as psychological and physical preparation for carrying out his plot. The decision to become a pilot, according to his own confessions to authorities, was directly connected to this ideological commitment. Flying an aircraft became, in his mind, the instrument through which he would execute his attack.
Al-Hammami's employment history reveals a pattern of movement through the aviation industry. He worked for Oman Air from 2020 to 2024, a period during which the airline removed him from flight training due to concerns about his radical views and reassigned him to a different role. He then joined Royal Air Maroc in 2025 but remained there only a few months before the airline declined to hire him permanently following a three-month training period. In January 2026, he was hired by flydubai, the low-cost carrier based in the United Arab Emirates.
Flydubai's hiring process is now under investigation. The airline conducted standard security and professional vetting: al-Hammami held a valid pilot's licence, possessed a certificate of good conduct, and passed required examinations. According to the UAE attorney general, nothing in those procedures revealed his extremist inclinations or his intention to carry out a terrorist attack. He met every documented requirement. Yet the airline had no visibility into the concerns that had prompted Oman Air to remove him from flight training, nor into the fact that Royal Air Maroc had declined to employ him. The question now facing aviation authorities is whether existing screening mechanisms are sufficient to catch individuals whose radicalization occurs outside the formal employment process.
Al-Hammami has told investigators that he acted alone. Authorities are continuing to verify that claim. The attempted hijacking was stopped before it could unfold further, but the incident has exposed a gap in how the aviation industry identifies and prevents individuals with extremist commitments from accessing positions of operational control. A man who spent years consuming material that glorified mass casualty attacks, who deliberately trained himself physically and psychologically for violence, and who had been flagged by at least one previous employer, was nonetheless cleared to sit in the cockpit of a commercial aircraft carrying passengers to one of the world's busiest airports.
Citations marquantes
The idea of carrying out a similar operation using an aircraft became firmly established in his mind, which, according to his confessions, was connected to his decision to pursue a career in aviation.— UAE attorney general Hamad Saif Al Shamsi
There were no indications emerging during those procedures that revealed his extremist inclinations or his intention to carry out a terrorist plot.— UAE attorney general Hamad Saif Al Shamsi, regarding flydubai's hiring vetting