An overseas trip signals he's secure enough to leave
After three years of self-imposed diplomatic absence, Chinese President Xi Jinping travels to Central Asia in September 2022 — first to Kazakhstan, then to Uzbekistan — to attend a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit and meet Vladimir Putin face to face. The journey is not merely logistical; it is a declaration. On the eve of securing an unprecedented third term as Communist Party leader, Xi steps onto the world stage to signal that China's alignment with Russia endures, that Western pressure has not altered Beijing's course, and that the man at the center of the world's most populous nation remains firmly, visibly in command.
- Xi's three-year absence from international travel had quietly raised questions about China's global standing — his departure now carries the weight of a statement, not just a schedule.
- The face-to-face with Putin revives and reinforces the 'no limits' partnership forged in January, even as Russia's war in Ukraine has fractured alliances and drawn near-universal condemnation from the West.
- At home, Xi faces real friction — a slowing economy, zero-COVID fatigue, and unease over his consolidation of power — making this trip a performance of strength directed as much at the party faithful as at foreign leaders.
- The SCO summit itself has become contested ground, with most member states offering only lukewarm support for Moscow, forcing Xi to project unity where genuine fractures exist.
- Planned appearances at the G-20 in Indonesia and potentially APEC in Bangkok signal a broader campaign to reassert China's economic centrality after years of pandemic-era isolation.
- A quiet coincidence in Kazakhstan — where Pope Francis also travels, yet will not meet Xi — underscores the hard boundaries Xi has drawn between party authority and the world's religious institutions.
For three years, Xi Jinping has not left mainland China. He conducted diplomacy by video link, sent subordinates in his place, and remained physically absent from a world stage where China's influence was increasingly questioned. Now, in mid-September 2022, he travels to Kazakhstan and then Uzbekistan for a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit — and a first in-person meeting with Vladimir Putin since the two men declared their partnership had 'no limits' weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine.
The timing is deliberate. Xi, at 69, is approaching the Communist Party's national congress, where he is expected to claim an unprecedented third five-year term — a break with the precedents designed to prevent the kind of concentrated power that defined Mao's era. No open rival exists, yet discontent has surfaced: a slowing economy, punishing zero-COVID lockdowns, and unease over Xi's total consolidation of authority. Traveling abroad at this delicate moment is itself a message — to the party, to the public, and to the world — that Xi is secure enough to leave.
The SCO has long served as a vehicle for Chinese influence in Central Asia, a counterweight to NATO and US alliances. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine has strained the bloc's cohesion; most members have offered only tepid support for Moscow. Xi's visible solidarity with Putin allows him to project nationalist resolve at home, even as China has refused to call the war an invasion and instead blamed the United States and NATO for provoking it.
Beyond Uzbekistan, Xi is expected at the G-20 in Indonesia in November and may attend APEC in Bangkok shortly after — a cumulative reassertion of China's global presence after years of isolation. One quiet detail adds texture: Pope Francis is also in Kazakhstan for a religious congress, yet the two leaders will not meet. China has had no diplomatic relations with the Vatican since 1949, and Xi has pressed religious communities to pledge loyalty to the party above all foreign ties. Their parallel presence in the same country, without contact, says something about the walls Xi has chosen to maintain.
What happens in Samarkand and Astana will be read in Beijing as a measure of Xi's grip on power. The party will watch. So will the world.
For three years, Xi Jinping has not left mainland China. The president of the world's second-largest economy has conducted his diplomacy by video link, sent subordinates to represent him at international gatherings, and remained physically absent from the global stage at a moment when China's influence has been questioned and its relationships strained. Now, in mid-September 2022, he is preparing to travel to Central Asia—first to Kazakhstan on the 14th, then to Uzbekistan on the 15th and 16th—to attend a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and meet face-to-face with Vladimir Putin for the first time since January, when the two leaders declared their partnership had "no limits" and Russia invaded Ukraine weeks later.
The timing matters enormously. Xi, now 69, is approaching the Communist Party's national congress, where he is expected to secure an unprecedented third five-year term as party leader. This breaks with decades of precedent designed to prevent the concentration of power that characterized Mao Zedong's rule. No open challenge to Xi exists within the party's 96 million members or among his six colleagues on the Politburo Standing Committee. Yet discontent has surfaced over his consolidation of total authority, the economy's sharp slowdown, a relentless anti-corruption campaign that has targeted political rivals, and the "zero-COVID" lockdowns that have ravaged both the economy and public life. Relations with the United States, Australia, and much of Europe have deteriorated over human rights concerns, China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, threats toward Taiwan, and its abrasive diplomatic style. An overseas trip—his first in three years—signals to the party apparatus and the public that Xi commands the confidence and security to leave the country at this delicate political moment.
The SCO itself is a vehicle for Xi's ambitions. The eight-member bloc, which includes Russia, India, Pakistan, and most of the former Soviet Central Asian states, has become a tool through which China expands its influence in what was historically Moscow's sphere of influence. The organization serves as a counterweight to NATO and US alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China has used SCO platforms to conduct multinational military exercises that showcase its rapidly modernizing armed forces. But the geopolitical landscape has shifted. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have fractured the bloc's unity; most SCO members have offered only tepid support for Moscow's actions. A visible meeting between Xi and Putin at the summit allows Xi to project strength at home—to appear as a nationalist leader standing firm against Western pressure over Ukraine, even as China has refused to criticize Russian aggression or even call it an invasion, instead condemning sanctions against Moscow and blaming the United States and NATO for provoking the conflict.
Xi's travel plans extend beyond Uzbekistan. He is expected to attend the Group of 20 summit in Indonesia in mid-November, reinforcing China's position as a major economic power and critical node in global supply chains. China has also indicated to Thailand that Xi may attend an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in Bangkok shortly after the G-20, though Beijing has not formally confirmed either attendance. The cumulative effect of these trips—if they materialize—would represent a dramatic reassertion of China's global presence after years of isolation.
One detail adds an unexpected layer: Xi's visit to Kazakhstan will overlap with a trip by Pope Francis, who is attending a Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. China has had no formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican since the Communist Party seized power in 1949 and expelled all foreign priests. Though the party lifted its ban on religion more than thirty years ago, Xi has pushed religious leaders—Christian, Islamic, and others—to pledge loyalty to the party and follow its directives in dealings with overseas organizations. The two leaders will be in the same country but will not meet, a silence that speaks volumes about the boundaries Xi has drawn around faith and state power.
What unfolds in Samarkand and Astana over the next weeks will be read in Beijing as a measure of Xi's confidence and his grip on power. The party, which tolerates no opposition and controls all information and media, will watch closely. So will the world.
Citas Notables
In January 2022, Xi and Putin issued a joint statement declaring their relationship had 'no limits,' just weeks before Russia's invasion of Ukraine— Joint China-Russia statement
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Why does it matter that Xi is leaving China now, at this particular moment?
Because he hasn't left in three years. That absence—conducting diplomacy by video, sending deputies to international summits—has cast doubt on China's global standing at a time when the country faces economic slowdown and deteriorating relations with the West. An overseas trip signals to the party that he's secure enough to leave, that he's not worried about threats to his position.
But he faces no real opposition within the party, does he?
Not openly, no. The party is tightly controlled. But discontent exists—over his consolidation of power, the zero-COVID lockdowns that have hurt the economy, the anti-corruption campaign that looks like it targets political rivals. A trip abroad says: I'm confident enough to go. I don't need to be here watching my back.
What does meeting Putin accomplish for him domestically?
It allows him to appear as a nationalist leader standing firm against Western pressure. China has refused to criticize Russia's invasion of Ukraine or even call it an invasion. By meeting Putin visibly at this summit, Xi can tell the party and the public: I'm not bowing to American pressure. I'm standing with Russia.
Is that actually popular within China?
It plays well with nationalist sentiment. But it's complicated. Most other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have offered only tepid support for Russia's actions. Xi is betting that the domestic political benefit of appearing strong outweighs the diplomatic cost.
What about the Pope being in Kazakhstan at the same time?
They won't meet. China has no formal relations with the Vatican and has spent decades controlling religious organizations within its borders. The fact that both leaders are in the same country but will not acknowledge each other is its own kind of statement—about the boundaries Xi has drawn around faith and state power.
So this trip is really about domestic politics, not international diplomacy?
It's both. But the domestic message is primary. He's signaling to the party that he's secure, confident, and in control. The international dimension—meeting Putin, reasserting China's role in global forums—reinforces that message.