True friendship can only be revealed after undergoing challenges together
For the first time in seven years, Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang to remind North Korea that history and proximity still carry weight in the calculus of survival. The visit comes as Kim Jong Un has grown measurably closer to Moscow — trading soldiers for resources in Ukraine's shadow — and Beijing has watched its traditional leverage quietly erode. Great powers do not often announce their anxieties openly; they send their leaders on planes instead. What unfolds in these two days may quietly reshape the triangle of dependency that has governed Northeast Asian stability for decades.
- North Korea's deployment of roughly 11,000 soldiers to fight in Ukraine has given Kim Jong Un a new patron in Moscow, breaking Beijing's long-held monopoly on Pyongyang's survival.
- China's influence over its closest neighbor has slipped visibly — North Korea rewrote its own constitution in 2024 to erase reunification language, signaling it no longer feels bound by old diplomatic scripts.
- Beijing has been quietly rebuilding the infrastructure of closeness: resumed airline routes, restarted passenger trains, and a foreign minister's visit to Pyongyang all preceded Xi's arrival.
- Xi published a pointed essay in North Korean state media on the eve of his visit, invoking gold tested in fire — a warm metaphor carrying an unmistakable undercurrent of expectation.
- The two-day summit is Beijing's most direct attempt yet to pull Pyongyang back into its orbit before a potential end to the Ukraine war dissolves Russia's need for North Korean troops — and with it, Kim's leverage.
Xi Jinping landed in Pyongyang on a Monday morning in early June, greeted by rigid soldiers, motorcycle escorts, and a banner proclaiming unbreakable friendship in Korean and Mandarin. It was his first visit since 2019, and the choreography announced its purpose plainly: this was not routine diplomacy but a reassertion of something that had begun to slip.
The world had changed considerably since Xi's last visit. Russia had invaded Ukraine, and North Korea had sent an estimated 11,000 soldiers to fight in that war — receiving food, fuel, and technical assistance in return. For the first time in decades, Kim Jong Un had a patron that was not Beijing. The resources that had traditionally flowed from China were now arriving from Moscow, and Pyongyang had grown correspondingly less deferential. In 2024, North Korea rewrote its constitution to remove all mention of reunification with South Korea, signaling a hardening of its posture and a quiet departure from the diplomatic language that had long anchored its relationship with China.
Beijing had not been idle. China's foreign minister Wang Yi traveled to Pyongyang in April, the first such visit since 2019. Airline routes and passenger train service between the two countries were quietly restored. These were not dramatic gestures — they were the patient reconstruction of influence. Western diplomats told the BBC that Beijing had grown increasingly concerned about the depth of the Pyongyang-Moscow partnership, and Xi's two-day visit, accompanied by his wife, foreign minister, and chief of staff, was meant to address that concern directly.
The timing carried its own message. Xi had just hosted both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Beijing — meetings heavy with ceremony and global significance. North Korea watches such moments carefully. On the eve of his arrival in Pyongyang, Xi published an article in North Korean state media invoking an old proverb: true friendship is revealed only after enduring challenges across a long passage of time, like gold tested in fire. The warmth was genuine, but the reminder was firm. Beijing had not forgotten what it meant to be North Korea's oldest ally — and it intended to make sure Kim had not forgotten either.
Xi Jinping stepped off his plane in Pyongyang on a Monday morning in early June, the first time he had set foot in North Korea since 2019. State media captured the moment—soldiers standing rigid on the tarmac, motorcycle escorts flanking the motorcade, a banner strung overhead in Korean and Mandarin declaring the "unbreakable friendship" between the two nations. It was a carefully choreographed arrival, the kind that signals not casual diplomacy but a reassertion of something that has begun to slip.
The timing was deliberate. Just days earlier, Xi had hosted two of the world's most consequential leaders in Beijing: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, each visit heavy with ceremony and the kind of personal warmth that gets broadcast to the world. Those meetings mattered because they told a story about who held sway in the global order. But they also created a problem. North Korea watches these things closely. Pyongyang had spent the last seven years drawing closer to Moscow, and that bond had become something Beijing could no longer take for granted.
When Xi last visited North Korea in 2019, the world looked different. Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine. North Korea had not yet sent an estimated 11,000 of its soldiers to fight in that war. The calculus of survival that governs Pyongyang's foreign policy had not yet shifted so dramatically eastward. But the Ukraine conflict changed everything. In exchange for troops and ammunition, North Korea received food, money, and technical assistance from Russia—resources that had traditionally flowed from China. For the first time in decades, Kim Jong Un had a patron that was not Beijing.
This shift was not subtle. In 2024, North Korea rewrote its constitution to remove any mention of reunification with South Korea, signaling a hardening of its stance toward Seoul and a pivot away from the diplomatic language that had long defined its relationship with China. The message was clear: Pyongyang was no longer bound by the old scripts. A professor of international relations at the National University of Singapore observed that Kim had "consolidated ties with Russia" through military cooperation, which meant "Pyongyang less reliant on China, since they can secure oil, gas, and other raw materials confidently from Moscow."
Beijing had seen this coming and had begun to move. In April, China's foreign minister Wang Yi traveled to Pyongyang for the first time since 2019, meeting with Kim and his foreign minister Choe Son Hui. The visit was framed in diplomatic language about "in-depth exchanges" on international issues, but the subtext was unmistakable: China was trying to reassert itself. That same year, after years of suspension, China's national airline resumed direct flights to Pyongyang, and passenger train service between the two countries restarted. These were not grand gestures. They were the infrastructure of influence, quietly rebuilt.
Xi's two-day visit, accompanied by his wife, his foreign minister, and his de facto chief of staff, was meant to do something more direct. Western diplomats told the BBC that Beijing had grown "increasingly concerned" about the deepening partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow. The worry was not abstract. If the war in Ukraine ended, Russia's need for North Korean soldiers would evaporate, and with it, the flow of resources that had made Kim less dependent on China. But there was another calculation at work. Kim himself could not afford to alienate his largest source of aid. China remained the pragmatic choice, the partner whose support would endure long after the Ukraine conflict faded. The two leaders had last met in September 2025, when Kim traveled to Beijing for a military parade marking eighty years since the end of World War Two. In a photograph that stunned observers, Kim stood in Tiananmen Square alongside both Xi and Putin—the first time all three had appeared together in public. It was a moment that seemed to capture the new geometry of global power. But it also revealed the precariousness of Kim's position. He could not afford to be seen as choosing one patron over another.
On the eve of his arrival, Xi had published an article in North Korean state media. "True friendship can only be revealed after undergoing challenges together over a long passage of time," he wrote, invoking an old metaphor about testing gold in fire. The message was layered: we have history, we have endured, and that matters. But it was also a reminder, gentle but firm, that Beijing had not forgotten what it meant to be North Korea's oldest ally. The two-day visit would determine whether that reminder was enough.
Notable Quotes
Kim has consolidated ties with Russia through military cooperation, making Pyongyang less reliant on China for oil, gas, and raw materials— Professor Ian Chong, National University of Singapore
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter that Xi is visiting now, rather than waiting?
Because the window is closing. Every month that passes, North Korea becomes more entangled with Russia. If that relationship deepens much further, China loses leverage it may never get back.
But Kim needs China more than China needs Kim, doesn't he?
On paper, yes. But Kim also has options now. That's new. Russia is offering him things China can't—military technology, raw materials, a partner that isn't worried about what Washington thinks. Xi has to remind him why Beijing still matters.
What happens if this visit doesn't work?
Then China becomes a secondary player in North Korean strategy. That's not just about Korea. It's about whether Beijing can maintain influence in its own backyard while managing relationships with Washington and Moscow.
Is Kim actually considering moving away from China?
Not abandoning it. But diversifying. He's learned that relying on one patron is dangerous. The Ukraine war showed him that Russia could be useful in ways China wasn't. He's trying to keep both doors open.
What does the constitution change—removing reunification language—what does that signal?
That Kim is done with the old diplomatic scripts. Reunification was always something China and Russia could theoretically support. By removing it, he's saying: I'm not playing that game anymore. I'm focused on survival and strength, not unification.
So this visit is Xi trying to rewrite the script?
Exactly. He's saying: we have history, we have stability, we have resources. Don't forget that. It's not a threat. It's a reminder.