Empowerment without resources may simply transfer failure from Westminster to the regions.
Andy Burnham, newly elected MP and former mayor of Greater Manchester, has staked his political vision on a sweeping redistribution of economic power from Westminster to Britain's regions, arguing that no nation can grow unless every corner of it is empowered to contribute. It is an old and honourable idea — that proximity to a problem produces better solutions than distant authority — yet the quarter-century record of devolution in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland offers a sobering counterpoint: power transferred without resources invested has left those nations' productivity gaps largely unchanged. The deeper question Burnham's proposal raises is not whether devolution is desirable, but whether empowerment alone, unaccompanied by the scale of public investment that genuinely transformed divided economies elsewhere, can bear the weight of the promise being made.
- Burnham is staking his opening act as an MP on a bold claim: that handing regions control over their own economic destinies is the missing key to Britain's stalled growth.
- The evidence from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland cuts against that optimism — after 25 years of devolved power, their productivity gaps relative to the UK average have barely moved.
- Greater Manchester's genuine gains since 2015 complicate the picture, suggesting that leadership quality and available resources may matter as much as the devolution framework itself.
- Germany's post-reunification lesson looms large: closing regional divides cost roughly €2 trillion over two decades, a scale of investment Burnham has explicitly ruled out by committing to existing fiscal rules.
- The risk crystallising around his proposal is that devolving responsibility without devolving sufficient resources simply relocates the blame for failure from Whitehall to the regions themselves.
Andy Burnham arrived at his first major policy speech as a newly elected MP with a sweeping promise: to pursue what he called the biggest rebalancing of power Britain had ever seen, shifting authority from Westminster to every region of the country. His argument was economically direct — Britain cannot reach the growth levels it needs unless every postcode is set up to contribute. He pointed to Greater Manchester as his proof of concept, noting that since 2015 the city region had outpaced other English urban centres, including London, with notable productivity gains since 2020.
Some economists find the Manchester case persuasive. Analysts at the Centre for Cities note that its leadership identified the city's potential and acted — building housing, backing universities, developing transport infrastructure — and that investment followed. But when the broader historical record is examined, the picture grows more complicated. Scotland's GDP per capita relative to the UK average stands at roughly 93 percent today, almost exactly where it was when devolution began in 1998. Wales remains at around 74 percent of the UK average; Northern Ireland at 83 percent. Decades of devolved power over health, education, housing, and taxation have not closed these gaps.
Economists are reluctant to call devolution a failure outright. These regions might have fallen further behind without it, and Brexit may have distorted the picture. But the stagnation raises an uncomfortable question for Burnham's thesis. The answer may lie in investment. Across Europe, major regional cities maintain productivity levels far closer to their national capitals than Manchester or Birmingham do to London — a gap economists attribute not only to stronger devolution frameworks but to sustained state spending. Germany's effort to bring East Germany toward West German productivity levels cost approximately two trillion euros over roughly two decades.
Burnham has invoked Germany's constitutional commitment to equivalent living conditions across all regions as his aspiration. But he has also pledged to respect current fiscal rules and the existing Labour manifesto, constraints that sharply limit the resources available to him. The previous government's five-billion-pound levelling-up fund was widely judged inadequate to the task. The distance between Burnham's ambition and the investment he has committed to deploy is considerable, and the historical record suggests that devolution without resources may transfer not opportunity to the regions, but simply the burden of disappointment.
Andy Burnham arrived at his first major policy speech as a newly elected MP with an ambitious promise: a radical redistribution of power from Westminster to every corner of the United Kingdom. The former mayor of Greater Manchester, sworn in just days earlier, declared he would pursue what he called the "biggest rebalancing of power our country has seen." His argument was straightforward and economically grounded. Without empowering every region to contribute to growth, he said, Britain would never achieve the economic expansion it needed. "We will never get growth up to the level Britain needs unless every single postcode in the land is set up to contribute to it," he told his audience.
The proposal sounds compelling in theory. Burnham pointed to Greater Manchester itself as evidence that devolution works. Since 2015, the city region has grown faster than other English urban centers, including London. The statistics show impressive productivity gains, particularly since 2020. Burnham's argument rests on this foundation: give regions control over their own futures—transport, housing, planning, investment attraction—and they will flourish. Some economists agree. Andrew Carter of the Centre for Cities think tank notes that Greater Manchester's leadership recognized the city's potential and acted on it, building housing, supporting universities, and creating transport systems that draw investment. The results, by some measures, speak for themselves.
But when BBC Verify examined the broader historical record, a more complicated picture emerged. Over the past quarter-century, devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland has not produced the economic growth surge one might expect. Scotland's GDP per capita relative to the UK average sits at around 93 percent today—almost exactly where it stood in 1998, when devolution began. Wales has remained at roughly 74 percent of the UK average. Northern Ireland at 83 percent. These figures have barely budged despite decades of devolved power over health, education, housing, justice, and taxation. The nations have not caught up with the rest of Britain, nor have they pulled away. They have stalled.
Economists are cautious about declaring devolution a failure, however. It is possible, they argue, that these regions would have fallen further behind without the powers they gained. Brexit may have hit some parts of the UK harder than others, making it difficult to isolate devolution's true impact. And some nationalists in Scotland and Wales contend that the solution is not more devolution but full independence. Yet the raw numbers raise an uncomfortable question for Burnham's thesis: if devolution has worked so well in Greater Manchester, why hasn't it worked in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland?
The answer may lie partly in investment. Across Europe, cities like Lyon, Toulouse, Munich, Frankfurt, Barcelona, and Madrid maintain productivity levels much closer to their national capitals than Manchester and Birmingham do to London. Economists attribute this partly to greater devolution in those countries—but also to sustained, massive state spending. Germany's post-reunification effort to bring East Germany closer to West German productivity levels cost roughly two trillion euros between 1990 and 2014, or about seventy billion pounds annually. That is the scale of investment required to genuinely rebalance an economy.
Burnham has acknowledged this challenge obliquely. He invoked Germany's constitutional commitment to "equivalent living conditions" across all regions and said he would strive for the same. But he also committed to respecting current fiscal rules and the existing Labour manifesto—constraints that would severely limit how much his government could borrow or raise in taxes to finance such ambition. The Conservative government under Boris Johnson had attempted something similar with a five-billion-pound levelling-up fund, which analysts widely regarded as insufficient to the task. The gap between Burnham's rhetoric and the resources he has pledged to deploy is substantial.
What emerges is a tension at the heart of his proposal. Devolution alone—the transfer of decision-making power to regions—does not appear to generate growth without accompanying investment. Greater Manchester's relative success may owe as much to the specific choices its leadership made and the resources available to it as to devolution itself. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have had devolution for decades without closing the productivity gap. And the historical precedent from Germany suggests that genuinely rebalancing a national economy requires state spending on a scale Burnham has not committed to providing. His plan rests on the belief that empowering regions will unlock growth. The evidence suggests that empowerment without resources may simply be a transfer of the burden of failure from Westminster to the regions themselves.
Citações Notáveis
We will never get growth up to the level Britain needs unless every single postcode in the land is set up to contribute to it.— Andy Burnham
They're prepared to do what is required—build the housing, support the expansion of the university, support research and development, try to introduce a transport system which really supports all of that kind of stuff.— Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities think tank, on Greater Manchester's approach
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Burnham points to Greater Manchester as proof devolution works. But the numbers from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland suggest it hasn't moved the needle much in twenty-five years. How do you square that circle?
You don't, really. Greater Manchester is an outlier, and even then, some economists question whether the recent productivity figures are reliable. The broader pattern is that devolution transfers power but doesn't automatically generate growth. It depends entirely on what you do with that power—and what resources you have to do it with.
So what's the missing ingredient?
Money. Germany spent seventy billion pounds a year for decades to bring East Germany up to Western levels. Burnham is promising to work within existing fiscal rules. That's a different order of magnitude entirely. You can devolve all the housing decisions you want, but if you don't fund the housing, nothing changes.
Does that mean devolution is pointless?
Not pointless. It may have prevented things from getting worse in Scotland and Wales. And Greater Manchester shows that with the right leadership and some real investment, devolution can contribute to growth. But it's not a substitute for state spending. It's a tool that only works if you're willing to use it properly.
What should Burnham be saying instead?
He should be honest about the cost. Say: we will devolve power, and we will invest substantially in regions that have been left behind. That's a real commitment. Instead, he's promising both devolution and fiscal restraint, which is a contradiction. One of those things has to give.