Strategic value can outweigh documented crimes
Along the contested shores of the Red Sea, the United States is weighing whether to lift sanctions on Eritrea — a nation whose government has, for over three decades, subjected its own people to indefinite forced labor, silenced dissent, and whose forces carried out documented atrocities in Ethiopia's Tigray region as recently as 2022. The diplomatic recalculation is driven by maritime security concerns and the rising strategic value of Eritrea's coastline, yet it arrives without any demonstrated change in Asmara's conduct at home or accountability for crimes abroad. What hangs in the balance is not merely a bilateral relationship, but the signal sent to the world about whether documented atrocity can be quietly retired when geopolitical convenience demands it.
- The US is actively considering lifting 2021 sanctions on Eritrea's ruling party and military, joining the EU and Canada in a broader diplomatic pivot toward a government with one of the world's most documented repression records.
- Eritrean forces committed massacres, systematic sexual violence, and mass abductions in Tigray between 2020 and 2022 — and credible reports indicate abuses continue in territories they still occupy, with no commander held accountable.
- The strategic pull is real: Eritrea's Red Sea position has become increasingly valuable as Houthi attacks threaten global maritime corridors, giving Asmara leverage it has never before commanded on the world stage.
- Human Rights Watch warns that lifting sanctions without human rights benchmarks or accountability mechanisms would effectively normalize impunity, emboldening future violations across the region.
- For generations of Eritreans trapped in indefinite forced conscription, for Tigray survivors, and for families of the disappeared, a sanctions lift without conditions would constitute a form of institutionalized forgetting.
In April, reports emerged that Washington was weighing a significant diplomatic reset with Eritrea — potentially lifting sanctions imposed in 2021 for the government's role in documented atrocities during the Tigray conflict. The EU and Canada have already begun cautious overtures, driven by concerns over maritime security and migration. But beneath these calculations lies a decades-long record of systematic abuse that human rights advocates say cannot be set aside for geopolitical convenience.
Since President Isaias Afwerki took power in 1993, Eritrea has operated one of the world's most repressive states. Indefinite national service conscription has trapped generations in conditions amounting to forced labor. Independent media has been dismantled, and perceived dissidents — including 11 officials and 10 journalists who called for democratic reforms in 2001 — remain imprisoned a quarter-century later, held without trial or contact with the outside world.
The strategic logic behind the US reconsideration is clear: Eritrea's Red Sea coastline has grown in importance as Houthi attacks threaten global maritime traffic. Securing influence there offers Washington a foothold in a region of mounting consequence. The logic is transactional, and it is not unique to American policymakers.
Yet the human record in Tigray resists any clean diplomatic transaction. Eritrean forces committed massacres, deployed sexual violence as a weapon of war, and carried out mass abductions between 2020 and 2022. The conflict has formally ended, but Eritrean troops remain in parts of Tigray, and abuses are reported to continue. No commander has faced accountability. No victim has received restitution.
To lift sanctions now — without accountability mechanisms, without human rights benchmarks, without any demonstrated change in domestic repression — would signal that documented violations carry no lasting cost. For survivors of Tigray, for Eritreans in forced conscription, for families of the disappeared, it would amount to institutional forgetting. The choice between transactional diplomacy and principled engagement will send a message that echoes far beyond the Red Sea.
In April, word began circulating that the United States was weighing a significant diplomatic reset with Eritrea—one that could mean lifting sanctions imposed in 2021 on the country's ruling party and military for their role in documented atrocities during Ethiopia's Tigray conflict. The move would not be made in isolation. The European Union and Canada have already begun cautious overtures toward the Red Sea nation, driven largely by concerns about maritime security and migration flows. Yet beneath the diplomatic calculations lies a record of systematic abuse that human rights advocates argue cannot simply be set aside in the name of geopolitical convenience.
Eritrea's government, led by President Isaias Afwerki since 1993, operates one of the world's most tightly controlled states. The country's policy of indefinite national service conscription has effectively trapped generations of Eritreans in conditions that amount to forced labor, with severe punishment—including family reprisals—reserved for those who refuse or attempt to flee. Independent media has been dismantled. Perceived dissidents, religious leaders, and journalists have vanished into detention without trial, many held incommunicado for years or even decades. In 2001, the government arrested 11 officials and 10 journalists who had called for basic democratic reforms. Those individuals remain imprisoned a quarter-century later.
The strategic calculus driving the US reconsideration is straightforward: Eritrea sits along the Red Sea corridor, a waterway of mounting importance as conflict roils the Middle East and the Houthi armed group in Yemen threatens to choke off maritime traffic. For Washington, resetting relations with Eritrea offers a way to secure influence over a territory that could prove vital to regional stability and global commerce. The logic is transactional, and it is not unique to American policymakers.
But the human record in Tigray complicates any clean diplomatic transaction. Between 2020 and 2022, Eritrean forces operating in the region committed massacres, deployed sexual violence as a weapon of war, carried out mass abductions, and systematically looted civilian property. The conflict has formally ended, yet Eritrean troops remain in parts of Tigray they control, and credible reports indicate abuses continue. No Eritrean commander has faced accountability. No investigation has been completed. No victim has received restitution.
To lift sanctions now—without mechanisms for accountability, without clear human rights benchmarks tied to the normalization of relations, without any demonstrated change in Eritrea's domestic repression—would effectively signal that such violations carry no lasting cost. It would suggest to other governments that strategic value can outweigh documented crimes, and that time and diplomatic pressure can erase the need for justice. For Eritreans trapped in indefinite conscription, for survivors of sexual violence in Tigray, for families still searching for the disappeared, such a move would amount to a form of institutional forgetting.
The question facing the United States and its allies is whether the benefits of Eritrean cooperation on maritime security and migration management justify the message sent by abandoning pressure for accountability. It is a choice between transactional diplomacy and the harder work of conditioning engagement on measurable human rights improvements. The answer will reverberate far beyond the Red Sea.
Citas Notables
Easing sanctions without accountability for grave violations and clear human rights benchmarks would signal tolerance for unchecked abuses in the future— Laetitia Bader, Director of Horn of Africa operations
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Eritrea matter enough to the US that they'd consider lifting sanctions at all?
Geography and timing. Eritrea sits on the Red Sea, and right now that corridor is under threat from Houthi attacks. The US needs stable access to those waters. It's about leverage and control.
But the sanctions were imposed for specific crimes—massacres, sexual violence in Tigray. Doesn't lifting them without accountability just erase those crimes?
That's exactly the concern. It signals that if you're strategically useful, your past violations don't matter. It tells other governments they can commit abuses and wait out the pressure.
What about the Eritrean people themselves—the ones still trapped in indefinite military service?
They're invisible in this calculation. The government has been running forced conscription for decades. Lifting sanctions doesn't change that. It might even entrench it, because the regime faces less pressure to reform.
Is there any precedent for conditioning sanctions relief on human rights improvements?
Yes, but it requires political will. The US and EU could say: we'll normalize relations, but only if you release political prisoners, end indefinite conscription, allow independent media. Instead, they're moving toward engagement without those demands.
What happens if sanctions are lifted and nothing changes?
Then we've normalized a repressive government without getting anything in return except access to a port. And we've told every other authoritarian regime in the region that time and strategic value are enough to wash away accountability.