U.S. Navy Operations in Chinese Waters: Freedom of Navigation or Provocation?

A nine-thousand-ton American destroyer slipped through the Taiwan Strait on a Tuesday in late November, and within hours, the diplomatic temperature between Washington and Beijing had risen another notch. The USS Milius, a guided-missile destroyer, was conducting what the U.S. Navy calls a Freedom of Navigation Operation—a deliberate transit through waters that China claims as its own. From the Pentagon's perspective, the move reaffirmed America's commitment to keeping the Indo-Pacific region open and accessible. From Beijing's vantage point, it was a reckless provocation, a crossing of lines that risked igniting something far more dangerous.

These operations, known by the acronym FONOPS, have been official U.S. policy since 1979. The stated purpose is straightforward: to exercise and defend the right of all vessels—military and civilian alike—to navigate freely through international waters and disputed zones without seeking permission from coastal states. The legal foundation rests on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1994 treaty that established the principle of "innocent passage." Under this framework, any ship can transit through territorial waters extending twelve nautical miles from a nation's coast, provided the passage does not threaten peace, order, or security. One hundred fifty-eight countries have signed the convention, including China, Russia, and most of Europe and Latin America. The United States, notably, has not—though it claims to respect the convention's core principles.

What counts as an "excessive maritime claim" in American eyes often looks entirely reasonable to other nations. Algeria requires fifteen days' advance notice before a warship can pass through its waters. Ecuador demands permission for military exercises in its exclusive economic zone. Malaysia insists on prior authorization for nuclear-powered vessels. These requirements, from Washington's perspective, overstep what international law permits. China's state media has pushed back hard, arguing that such claims are actually lawful under the convention itself, and that FONOPS are really about maintaining American naval dominance and challenging other nations' sovereignty.

The frequency of these operations has accelerated sharply since 2015, concentrated overwhelmingly in waters China claims in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In 2020 alone, American destroyers crossed the Taiwan Strait thirteen times—a record that surpassed even 2016, when the Obama administration conducted twelve transits. The pattern suggests FONOPS have become a bipartisan fixture of U.S. strategy. The operations target the Spratly Islands, which China claims but Washington does not recognize, and overlap with territorial assertions by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In October 2015, a U.S. destroyer sailed within nineteen kilometers of the Spratly Islands. Two more operations followed in 2017, and another in 2019, this time involving two destroyers. In February 2021, the USS John S. McCain transited the Taiwan Strait—the first such operation under President Joe Biden. Nine months later came the USS Milius.

China has condemned each operation with escalating rhetoric. After the February transit, Beijing declared it a grave violation of Chinese sovereignty that undermined regional peace and deliberately poisoned the atmosphere of cooperation in the South China Sea. The underlying dispute is existential: Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province, part of its territory. Washington does not recognize Taiwan as independent but treats it as a crucial ally and has pledged to defend it militarily if China attacks. This contradiction sits at the heart of every FONOPS transit.

The American military footprint in East Asia has been substantial since the end of World War II. The Seventh Fleet maintains twelve warships at its base in Yokosuka, Japan—eight destroyers, three cruisers, and an auxiliary vessel. Another nine ships are stationed in Sasebo, including an amphibious assault ship, landing craft, transport vessels, and minesweepers. Beyond these permanent deployments, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines based in Pearl Harbor and along the American West Coast conduct regular patrols. This infrastructure, combined with the recurring FONOPS, creates a permanent assertion of American power in waters China increasingly views as its own sphere.

The question driving these operations remains unresolved: Is the U.S. Navy defending a principle of international law that benefits all maritime nations, or is it deliberately needling a rival power in a region where the two countries' strategic interests collide? The answer likely depends on where you stand. What is certain is that as long as China claims these waters and the United States refuses to acknowledge those claims, the USS Milius will not be the last American destroyer to sail through the Taiwan Strait.