We are marching in place at best. We may be backsliding.
In the long and unresolved struggle against extremism in the Horn of Africa, the United States has quietly reversed course — returning troops to Somali soil after a year of absence and resuming airstrikes against al-Shabaab, the militant group that has endured for nearly two decades. President Biden's May decision to undo his predecessor's withdrawal reflects a recurring tension in American foreign policy: the difficulty of sustaining commitment to distant conflicts whose consequences, though real, remain largely invisible to the public. Seventeen fighters killed in a single week signals not a conclusion, but a resumption — the latest chapter in a conflict that has never truly paused.
- A year of 'commuting to work' — rotating troops in and out of Somalia from other African bases — left commanders warning that the mission was not just stalling, but sliding backward.
- The gap between 63 airstrikes in 2020 and just 5 so far in 2022 tells the story of what the withdrawal cost in operational momentum against a group that never stopped fighting.
- Defense Secretary Austin pressed the White House to reverse course, arguing that advise-and-assist missions require physical presence — relationships, trust, and continuity that rotating deployments cannot build.
- With troops back on the ground, strikes resumed swiftly: 17 al-Shabaab fighters killed across two operations in a single week, including 13 caught mid-attack near Teedaan on Sunday.
- No civilians were reported killed, and the legal framework for strikes in defense of Somali forces was already in place — what had been missing was the personnel and political will to use it.
On a Sunday in central Somalia, thirteen al-Shabaab fighters died in an American airstrike near Teedaan while in the middle of attacking Somali National Army forces. It was the second such operation in less than a week — four fighters had been killed in three separate strikes just days earlier. Seventeen dead in seven days marked a visible return to active counterterrorism work that, not long ago, had been effectively suspended.
The suspension began in the final days of 2020, when President Trump ordered the withdrawal of roughly 700 U.S. special operations forces from Somalia. For over a year, those troops rotated in from other African bases — training local forces, then leaving. General Stephen Townsend, head of U.S. Africa Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that the arrangement wasn't working. "We are marching in place at best," he said. "We may be backsliding."
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made the case to the White House for a reversal. An advise-and-assist mission, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby explained, depends on sustained presence — on relationships built over time, not interrupted by constant rotation. The safety risk to troops moving in and out was real, but so was the operational cost. In May, President Biden ordered the troops back.
The results were immediate. Strike frequency, which had collapsed under the rotating model, began climbing again. The contrast with 2020's 63 strikes was stark, but the direction had shifted.
Al-Shabaab has operated as a persistent insurgency since 2007, when it survived the defeat of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts from which it emerged. U.S. Africa Command describes it as a long-term threat to Somali, regional, and American interests — language that carries a quiet acknowledgment that this conflict has no near horizon. No civilians were killed in the recent strikes, which were authorized under an existing framework permitting operations in defense of Somali partner forces. The architecture was always there. What returned, with the troops, was the will to use it.
In the remote scrubland near Teedaan, in central Somalia, thirteen fighters from al-Shabaab died in an airstrike on Sunday. They were in the middle of attacking Somali National Army forces when American warplanes struck. It was one of two separate operations that killed seventeen members of the militant group over the course of a single week—a visible return to active counterterrorism work that would have been impossible just months earlier.
The reversal began in May, when President Biden ordered American special operations troops back into Somalia. This undid a decision made by his predecessor in the final days of 2020, when roughly seven hundred U.S. forces were withdrawn from the country. For more than a year, those troops had been rotating in and out of Somalia from other African bases, conducting training missions and advising local forces. It was a compromise arrangement that satisfied no one. General Stephen Townsend, who commanded U.S. Africa Command at the time, called it "commuting to work" during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March. The strategy, he said, was not working. "We are marching in place at best. We may be backsliding."
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made the case for reversal to the White House. The rotating deployment model, he argued, was putting American troops at unnecessary risk. Pentagon spokesman John Kirby explained the logic in May: an advise-and-assist mission works best when advisors are actually present, when relationships can be built and maintained over time. Coming and going, he said, made that harder. The safety concern was real, but so was the operational one. Troops on the ground could do their job more effectively than troops who showed up, trained, and left.
The airstrikes that followed showed what a sustained presence could accomplish. Four days before the Sunday strike near Teedaan, American forces had launched three separate airstrikes that killed four al-Shabaab fighters who had attacked Somali forces on August 9th. These were the fourth and fifth strikes of the year against the group. The contrast with the past was stark. In 2020, the year before Trump's withdrawal, the U.S. had conducted sixty-three strikes against al-Shabaab. The number had collapsed under the rotating model. Now, with troops back on the ground, the pace was picking up again.
Al-Shabaab itself is not new. The group emerged as the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, which briefly controlled southern Somalia in late 2006. When that council was defeated the following year, al-Shabaab did not disappear. Instead, it evolved into a persistent insurgency that has operated for more than a decade and a half. U.S. Africa Command described the group as presenting "long-term threats to Somali, regional and U.S. interests." The language was measured, but the implication was clear: this was not a problem that would solve itself.
No civilians were killed in any of the strikes. The airstrikes were authorized under a framework that allows American forces to conduct operations "in defense of designated partner forces"—in this case, the Somali National Army. The legal and operational architecture was already in place. What had been missing was the personnel and the political will to use it. Biden's decision to reverse the withdrawal provided both. Whether that presence will be sustained, and whether it will actually degrade al-Shabaab's capabilities over time, remains an open question. For now, the strikes have resumed.
Notable Quotes
We are marching in place at best. We may be backsliding.— General Stephen Townsend, U.S. Africa Command, on the rotating deployment strategy
The advise-and-assist mission is best done when you're on site and can develop relationships and keep conversations going. When you're coming and going, that contact is harder to work.— Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby, explaining the rationale for reversing the withdrawal
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Biden reverse Trump's withdrawal so quickly? It seems like a significant shift.
It wasn't really quick—it took months. But the Pentagon made a straightforward argument: rotating troops in and out was actually more dangerous and less effective than keeping people there. You can't build relationships with local forces if you're constantly leaving.
And the strikes we're seeing now—are these new operations, or just a return to what was happening before?
They're a return to a higher tempo. In 2020, before the withdrawal, the U.S. was doing sixty-three strikes a year against al-Shabaab. That dropped to almost nothing under the rotating model. Now it's picking back up.
So the presence itself matters. It's not just about having troops there—it's about what they enable.
Exactly. The general in charge at the time said the rotating strategy was "commuting to work." You can't advise effectively if you're not there. You can't coordinate strikes if you're not on the ground.
What about al-Shabaab itself? Is this group actually weakening, or are we just managing a permanent problem?
That's the harder question. Al-Shabaab has been around since 2007. It's evolved, adapted, survived. These strikes kill fighters, but the group persists. The Pentagon calls it a long-term threat, which is their way of saying this isn't going away soon.
And the civilians? I notice the statement says none were killed.
That's what the military reported. No civilian casualties in these particular strikes. But that's always worth noting separately—it's not automatic.
What comes next? Is this a permanent redeployment, or could it change again?
That depends on politics and strategy. For now, Biden's decision stands. But these things can shift with administrations, with budget pressures, with how the mission is perceived. The troops are back, the strikes are happening. Whether that lasts is another question.