competition between Washington and Beijing carries the constant risk of stumbling into actual conflict
Two of the world's most consequential military powers are preparing to speak directly to one another — not as a gesture of friendship, but as an acknowledgment that rivalry, left unattended, can become catastrophe. In early January, senior American and Chinese defense officials will meet virtually, a conversation born from the Biden-Xi summit's quiet admission that competition and conflict are not the same thing, and that the distance between them must be actively managed. The agenda — hypersonic weapons, nuclear arsenals, Taiwan — reads like a map of every place the world could go wrong.
- China tested hypersonic weapons twice this summer, the U.S. has its own programs advancing, and both nations are modernizing nuclear forces — the arms spiral is no longer hypothetical.
- For months, Pentagon officials have struggled to reach Chinese counterparts who actually matter, warning that a communications gap at the highest levels is itself a security risk.
- The November Biden-Xi summit cracked that door open, producing an agreement to hold direct talks between Defense Secretary Austin and China's top military figures, Xu Qiliang and Wei Fenghe.
- Beijing has attached a condition to any arms control framework: Russia must be included, transforming an already complex bilateral negotiation into an uncertain three-way equation.
- A quiet signal offers modest hope — China has eased its public opposition to U.S. warships transiting the Taiwan Strait, suggesting both sides are, for now, choosing room to breathe over escalation.
The machinery of great-power diplomacy is grinding back to life. In early January, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will meet virtually with China's Vice Chair Xu Qiliang and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe — the senior military figures closest to Xi Jinping — for talks both nations have acknowledged are long overdue. The meeting emerged from November's Biden-Xi summit, a three-and-a-half-hour conversation in which both leaders confronted a shared reality: the competition between Washington and Beijing carries a constant risk of sliding into actual conflict.
Reaching these men has itself been a challenge. Earlier in the year, Pentagon officials complained that the Chinese counterparts available to them were far removed from Xi's inner circle — a gap that could prove dangerous when military decisions hang in the balance. White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell put it plainly: accessible Chinese officials were nowhere near the people who actually shaped Xi's thinking.
The agenda is crowded. Taiwan will loom large. But the most urgent item may be the arms race both nations are plainly engaged in. China tested hypersonic weapons twice this summer; the U.S. has its own programs underway. Nuclear arsenals on both sides are being modernized. Arms control talks might offer a path to slowing the spiral — but Beijing has set a condition: Russia must be at the table, adding a third player to an already intricate negotiation.
Amid the tension, one small sign of easing has emerged. China's military has softened its public opposition to American warships transiting the Taiwan Strait, passages Beijing once treated as deliberate provocations. Whether a practical calculation or a deliberate signal, it suggests both sides are searching for room to breathe. The January talks will test whether that space can grow into something more lasting.
The machinery of great-power diplomacy is grinding back to life. In early January, the Pentagon's top official will sit down with China's highest-ranking military figures for talks that both nations have agreed are overdue. The meeting, to be conducted virtually over secure lines or video, emerged from November's summit between President Biden and Xi Jinping—a three-and-a-half-hour conversation in which both leaders acknowledged a hard truth: the competition between Washington and Beijing carries the constant risk of stumbling into actual conflict.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will represent the United States. Across the digital divide, he will face Xu Qiliang, the vice chair of China's Central Military Commission and one of Xi's closest military advisers, and Wei Fenghe, China's defense minister. The Pentagon has been wrestling with how to reach these men for months. Earlier in the year, officials complained of a communications gap—that the Chinese diplomats available to them were nowhere near Xi's inner circle, a distance that could prove dangerous when decisions about military matters hung in the balance. White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell had put it bluntly in May: the accessible Chinese officials were "nowhere close" to the people who actually shaped Xi's thinking on foreign policy and defense.
The agenda is crowded and consequential. Taiwan will loom large, as it did during the Biden-Xi talks. The island's government is watching closely, confident that American support remains steady, though the calculus of U.S.-China relations shifts constantly. But the most urgent item may be the arms race itself—the one both nations are plainly engaged in, whether they call it that or not. This summer, China tested hypersonic weapons twice. Austin acknowledged the tests publicly, noting they raised regional tensions. The U.S. has its own hypersonic programs underway. Both sides are modernizing nuclear arsenals. Conventional forces are being upgraded. The spiral is real.
Arms control talks might offer a way to slow it. But Beijing has already signaled a condition: it will not negotiate weapons limits with the United States alone. Russia must be at the table. That demand complicates matters considerably, adding a third player to an already intricate negotiation. Whether such a three-way framework is even possible remains unclear.
There is one small sign of easing. In recent months, tensions have ticked down slightly. China's military has softened its public opposition to American warships transiting the Taiwan Strait—those passages that Beijing once treated as provocations. The ships, it turns out, are simply using international waters on a route that cuts a third off their journey from the South China Sea to their base in Japan. A practical calculation, perhaps, or a deliberate signal. Either way, it suggests that even in the midst of competition, both sides are looking for room to breathe. The January talks will test whether that breathing room can expand into something more durable.
Citações Notáveis
Competition should not veer into conflict— President Biden, during November summit with Xi Jinping
The accessible Chinese officials were nowhere close to Xi's inner circle— White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell, May 2021
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that Austin is meeting with these two specific Chinese officials rather than others?
Because Xu and Wei sit closest to Xi's actual decision-making. For months, the Pentagon couldn't reach them. You can talk to lower-ranking diplomats all day, but if they're not in the room when Xi decides whether to escalate or hold back, you're essentially talking to the wall.
And Taiwan is definitely going to come up?
It has to. Taiwan is the flashpoint. The U.S. keeps sending ships through the strait, China keeps objecting, and both sides are trying to figure out where the actual red lines are without crossing them. The Taiwanese government is paying close attention because their security depends on this conversation not breaking down.
What's the significance of China insisting Russia be included in arms control talks?
It's a way of saying: we're not going to let you isolate us. If you want to talk about limiting weapons, you have to bring Russia in. It makes negotiations much harder—three countries instead of two—but it also reflects how Beijing sees the world now: as a bloc against the West.
Is there any reason to think these talks will actually produce something?
The fact that they're happening at all is something. Both sides agreed after Biden and Xi met that they need to keep talking, that competition shouldn't tip into conflict. That's the floor. Whether they can agree on hypersonic weapons or Taiwan or anything else—that's the harder question. But at least the channel is open.
What does it mean that China has toned down its opposition to U.S. ships in the strait?
It could mean they're being pragmatic—accepting that the ships are going to transit anyway. Or it could be a deliberate signal that they're willing to find a way to coexist without constant friction. Either way, it's the kind of small shift that makes space for bigger conversations.