In wartime, cables can get cut. Normal rules do not apply.
Beneath the ocean floor, a web of fiber optic cables carries nearly all of humanity's digital exchange — yet the legal architecture meant to protect it has not meaningfully changed since the age of the telegraph. As geopolitical conflict, deliberate sabotage, and the ambitions of technology giants converge on this invisible infrastructure, the International Telecommunications Union is working in Geneva and beyond to close governance gaps that leave hundreds of millions of people vulnerable to sudden digital silence. The effort raises a question as old as shared civilization: how do nations agree to protect what belongs to everyone when the rules were written for a world that no longer exists?
- A direct strike on a UAE cable landing station and Iran's threats to mine the Strait of Hormuz have transformed a chronic vulnerability into an acute crisis, with insurance costs rising and major cable projects already suspended.
- A single drifting anchor from a Houthi-struck vessel severed three cables in the Red Sea, cutting internet access for over 100 million people — a stark reminder that the consequences of cable damage are not technical abstractions but human emergencies.
- The legal framework governing these cables — rooted in an 1884 convention — offers no mechanism to board suspected vessels on the high seas and imposes penalties so inconsistent that the US maximum fine for cable damage is a mere $5,000.
- The ITU has assembled 42 government and industry leaders into an advisory body that is pushing for streamlined repair permits and unified national contact points, attempting to make existing rules functional rather than wait for new treaties.
- Tech giants are accelerating the stakes by building private global cable networks at double the previous investment pace, concentrating control while demanding faster regulatory approvals that critics warn could increase both accidents and sabotage risks.
- A final set of recommendations arrives in June, and governments will decide in November whether to make the advisory body permanent — a choice that will determine whether this moment of urgency produces lasting governance or fades into institutional memory.
Beneath the world's oceans, thin fiber optic lines stretching 1.5 million kilometers carry nearly all of the planet's digital traffic — yet the rules protecting them were written in 1884 and have barely changed since. As geopolitical tensions rise and technology companies race to build competing private networks, the International Telecommunications Union is working to modernize protections for infrastructure that has never been more exposed.
The fragility became undeniable when a vessel struck by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea drifted for two weeks before sinking, its anchor severing three cables and cutting internet access for over 100 million people across West and North Africa. A second incident months later damaged four more cables. In the Baltic, suspicious cuts have prompted investigations into possible sabotage linked to Russian and Chinese vessels. Taiwan jailed a Chinese captain for allegedly severing a cable as part of what authorities called a grey-zone pressure campaign. Most damage globally — around 200 faults per year — remains accidental. But as one senior industry official put it, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is effectively wartime, and normal rules do not apply.
The legal gaps are stark. There is no mechanism to board a suspected vessel on the high seas, no obligation on flag states to cooperate when a vessel flees, and penalties range from a $5,000 maximum in the United States to hundreds of thousands of dollars elsewhere. When a cable breaks, specialized repair ships — few in number globally — must locate a break sometimes thousands of meters deep, haul it to the surface, splice it, and return it to the ocean floor. Permits alone can take years.
The ITU responded by assembling roughly 42 government and industry leaders into an advisory body focused on submarine cable resilience. Its early recommendations call for governments to designate a single contact point for cable operators, cutting through the fragmented approval processes that slow repairs. "Everyone has bought into the fact that this is our common infrastructure," said ITU deputy secretary general Tomas Lamanauskas. The body is not pursuing new treaties — a process he calls tempting but slow — but rather better implementation of what already exists.
The urgency is sharpened by explosive private investment. Meta has completed the world's longest submarine cable system and is planning an even larger one spanning five continents. Google and Amazon are expanding across entire ocean basins. Global investment in new cables is expected to reach $13 billion between 2025 and 2027, roughly double the previous pace. Critics warn that faster approvals could oversaturate the market and concentrate control in few hands, even as the ITU insists the goal is smarter regulation, not less of it.
Final recommendations will be presented to member states in June in Nassau. In November, governments will decide whether to make the advisory body permanent — a decision that will shape how the world protects the hidden infrastructure on which nearly all cross-border digital life now depends.
Beneath the world's oceans lies a network so vital that its disruption can silence entire continents, yet so fragile that a fishing net or a drifting anchor can sever it in seconds. Nearly all of the planet's data travels along submarine cables—thin fiber optic lines stretching 1.5 million kilometers across the ocean floor, nearly four times the distance to the Moon. For decades, these cables operated largely out of public view, governed by rules written in 1884 and only incrementally updated since. Now, as geopolitical tensions spike and tech giants race to build competing networks, the International Telecommunications Union is scrambling to modernize protections for infrastructure that has never been more exposed to deliberate harm.
The vulnerability became impossible to ignore in March, when a direct strike damaged a cable landing station in the United Arab Emirates. The Strait of Hormuz, where five major fiber optic systems connect Europe, Asia, and the Gulf, has become a flashpoint. Iran's Defence Council has threatened to deploy sea mines across the waterway. In April, Meta suspended sections of its 2Africa submarine cable project. Insurance costs are climbing. At an ITU council meeting in Geneva this week, Gulf nations formally raised alarms about the escalating risks to their digital lifelines.
This is not a new problem, but conflict has changed its character. In 2024, a vessel struck by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea drifted for two weeks before sinking, its dragging anchor severing three cables and cutting internet access for more than 100 million people across West and North Africa. A second incident in September 2025 damaged four additional cables, one of which remains out of service. In the Baltic Sea, a series of suspicious cable cuts has triggered investigations into possible sabotage, with suspected vessels linked to Russia's shadow fleet and Chinese operations, though conclusive proof remains elusive. Taiwan jailed a Chinese captain in June for allegedly severing a cable connecting the main island to the Penghu islands, characterizing it as part of Beijing's "grey zone" campaign of pressure. Most damage globally—around 200 faults per year—remains accidental, caused by fishing nets or stray anchors. But as one senior cable industry official told Geneva Solutions, "In wartime, cables can get cut. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is wartime, and normal rules do not apply."
The legal framework protecting these cables has barely evolved. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables criminalized damage, and elements were incorporated into the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, now ratified by 170 countries—though notably not the United States. Critical gaps remain: there is no clear mechanism to board and inspect a vessel on the high seas suspected of cable damage, and no obligation on a flag state to cooperate when a suspected vessel flees. Penalties vary wildly. The US maximum penalty for cable damage is only $5,000, while Australia, Colombia, New Zealand, and Uruguay impose penalties reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars plus compensation to cable owners. When a cable snaps, specialized repair ships must locate the break sometimes thousands of meters deep, haul it to the surface, splice it, and lay it back. With few ships available globally, repairs can take weeks even after permits are granted and weather permits.
The ITU, founded in 1865 to regulate cross-border communications, is taking on a more prominent role. The shift accelerated in March 2024, when a cable failure off Nigeria knocked out internet access across West Africa, prompting the government to turn to the UN agency. Within months, the ITU and the International Cable Protection Committee assembled roughly 42 leaders and experts from government and industry into the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience. In February, the body released initial recommendations, calling on governments to designate a single contact point for cable operators to speed up permits and repairs that otherwise can take years. "Everyone has bought into the fact that this is our common infrastructure and we need to figure out how to jointly protect it together," says Tomas Lamanauskas, ITU deputy secretary general and co-executive secretary of the advisory body.
The urgency is compounded by explosive growth in the system itself. For decades, submarine cables were financed and governed by consortia of telecom operators sharing costs and capacity. Now, tech giants are building and controlling their own infrastructure. Meta completed the world's longest submarine cable system at 45,000 kilometers, encircling Africa and connecting Europe and Asia, with a planned Project Waterworth stretching over 50,000 kilometers across five continents. Google and Amazon are expanding private networks across entire ocean basins. According to US research firm TeleGeography, global investment in new cables is expected to reach $13 billion between 2025 and 2027, roughly double the pace of the previous three years. Even the most powerful tech companies require government approval to lay a cable, and historically this approval process has been fragmented across different agencies and jurisdictions. The advisory body aims to streamline coordination, though critics warn that faster approvals could oversaturate the market, raising risks of accidents and sabotage while concentrating control in the hands of a few firms.
Lamanauskas pushes back against the idea that the initiative is a vehicle for deregulation. "The discussion about more or less regulation is sometimes a bit misguided," he says. "It's really about what type of regulation." The goal is not to remove rules but to make them work. On whether new international law is needed, he is cautious. "Treaty-making processes can be very tempting, but they are really long processes," he says. "Sometimes it is better to look at improvements and better implementation than to start from scratch." A final set of recommendations will be presented to ITU member states in June in Nassau at the World Telecommunication Policy Forum, ahead of the agency's major conference in November, where governments will decide whether to make the advisory body permanent. What emerges from those meetings will shape how the world protects the hidden backbone that now carries nearly everything that moves across borders in digital form.
Citas Notables
Everyone has bought into the fact that this is our common infrastructure and we need to figure out how to jointly protect it together.— Tomas Lamanauskas, ITU deputy secretary general
It's really about what type of regulation. The goal is not to remove rules but to make them work.— Tomas Lamanauskas, on the advisory body's approach
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does it matter that these cables are so thin? Couldn't they be made more robust?
The thinness is actually a feature, not a bug—it keeps costs manageable for laying thousands of kilometers. But it does mean they're vulnerable to anything sharp or heavy. A fishing net, an anchor, a deliberate cut. The real problem isn't the cables themselves. It's that we've built the entire global economy on infrastructure we barely protect.
You mentioned that most damage is accidental. So why are governments suddenly treating this like a security issue?
Because accidents and deliberate attacks look the same when the cable goes dark. In peacetime, you can investigate, assign blame, maybe recover costs. But in the Strait of Hormuz right now, with active conflict, there's no time for investigation. A cable gets cut and 100 million people lose internet. The question becomes: was it an accident or an act of war? And if it's war, what's the response?
The article mentions that tech giants like Meta and Google are now building their own cables instead of sharing consortia. Is that a problem?
It's complicated. On one hand, it accelerates investment and innovation. Meta's 45,000-kilometer cable is remarkable engineering. On the other hand, when a handful of companies control the infrastructure, they also control who gets access and at what price. And if those cables get damaged or cut, the impact is concentrated. You're not spreading risk anymore.
What's the actual gap in the law? It sounds like there are already rules from 1884 and 1982.
The rules say you can't damage cables, but they don't say how to stop someone who's doing it. If a ship is suspected of cutting a cable on the high seas, there's no clear legal mechanism to board it and inspect it. And if the ship's flag state—the country it's registered under—doesn't cooperate, there's no enforcement. It's like having a speed limit but no way to pull someone over.
Why is the ITU the right body to handle this? They regulate telecommunications, not maritime security.
That's the real question. The ITU has convening power and legitimacy with governments. But this problem touches maritime law, national security, corporate interests, and geopolitics. The ITU can coordinate, but they can't enforce anything. The recommendations they're drafting in June are really just asking governments to talk to each other better and move faster on permits. It's modest, but it might be all that's possible right now.
What happens if the recommendations fail?
Then you're back to the status quo—fragmented rules, slow repairs, and cables getting cut during conflicts with no clear accountability. The next time a major cable goes down, it could be worse than 2024. And with AI and cloud computing demanding more bandwidth, the cables are only getting more critical.