Trust had been lost, and many young voters resolved never to vote again
Since 2019, the European Union has directed more than €100 million toward elections in five African nations under the banner of democratic strengthening — yet investigative findings suggest this investment has largely fortified the institutions it was meant to temper. When the machinery of democracy is funded without the independent forces that give it meaning, the result is not democracy but its performance. The deeper question this raises is one humanity has long struggled to answer: whether external support for governance can ever be neutral, or whether money, by its nature, flows toward power.
- Nigeria's 2023 election collapsed in real time — biometric systems funded by €18 million in EU money failed on election day, leaving voters stranded and opposition parties alleging fraud as the ruling party's candidate was declared winner regardless.
- The damage was not only procedural: young Nigerians who had believed in the process walked away resolving never to vote again, a quiet catastrophe of democratic disillusionment that no observer report can fully measure.
- ZAM's investigation exposes a structural tilt — EU funds flow predominantly to government electoral bodies, civil servants, and security forces, while civil society organizations that monitor abuses and mobilize marginalized voters receive a fraction of the support.
- Intermediary organizations like the IOM and UNDP absorb tens of millions as conduits, creating layers of distance between EU intentions and African realities, and making accountability nearly impossible to trace.
- The European Commission has not responded to the findings, and its own observation missions — which have documented fraud and violence in funded elections — appear to have no corrective influence on subsequent funding cycles.
- Civil rights advocates are calling on the EU to redirect support toward independent media and civil society, warning that without that shift, Brussels risks being seen not as a champion of democracy but as a guarantor of its facade.
The European Union has spent over €100 million since 2019 supporting elections in Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Nigeria, with the stated aim of deepening democratic participation. But investigative research by the media platform ZAM tells a different story — one in which that money has largely reinforced the power structures it was meant to challenge, flowing to ruling parties, government bureaucracies, and security forces while civil society organizations received comparatively little.
Nigeria's 2023 presidential election stands as the sharpest example. The country's electoral commission, backed by €18 million in EU funding, promised biometric voting machines and a real-time results portal. On election day, the technology failed. Opposition parties alleged fraud. International observers documented violence, voter intimidation, and vote-buying. The ruling party candidate was declared the winner. An EU observation mission later concluded the election had not ensured a transparent or inclusive democratic process — yet that conclusion changed nothing.
The human cost was profound. Journalist Idris Akinbajo described a generation of young voters so disillusioned by what they witnessed that many resolved never to vote again. Trust, once broken at that scale, does not easily return.
ZAM's analysis identifies a structural flaw at the heart of EU election funding: grants flow overwhelmingly to institutional actors — government bodies, civil servants, police — through training programmes and workshops, while the organizations best positioned to hold power accountable receive far less. Researcher Evelyn Groenink concluded that EU money helps construct 'a façade of democracy' that ultimately serves those already in power.
Accountability is further obscured by the use of intermediaries. UN agencies including the IOM and UNDP, along with European companies and NGOs, absorb large portions of the funding before it reaches the ground. In Nigeria alone, the IOM received €7 million of the EU's election support budget. When asked why democracy funds were routed through a migration-focused agency, the IOM described its role as 'purely operational' — an answer that avoids the harder question of transparency.
Civil rights advocate Auwal Rafsanjani offers a clear alternative: redirect EU support toward civil society organizations and independent media, so that funding strengthens the institutions capable of holding power to account rather than those that benefit from its concentration. Until that reorientation happens, the money will keep flowing in the same direction — and young voters across the continent will keep learning to live without hope.
The European Union has spent more than €100 million since 2019 to support elections across five African countries—Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Nigeria—with the stated goal of strengthening democratic processes. Yet investigative research by the media platform ZAM suggests the money has largely ended up reinforcing the very power structures it was meant to check, funneling resources to ruling parties, government bureaucracies, and the security apparatus while leaving civil society organizations scrambling for scraps.
Nigeria's 2023 presidential election offers a stark illustration of how this plays out on the ground. The country's electoral commission promised voters "the best election ever," backed by €18 million in EU funding for state-of-the-art biometric voting machines and a real-time results portal. The consultancy firm DAI Global, which received more than a third of that money, trained thousands of electoral officers to operate the new systems. When election day arrived on February 25, 2023, the technology failed. The system designed to upload results immediately after polls closed malfunctioned. Opposition parties cried fraud. International observers documented violence, voter intimidation, closed polling stations, and vote-buying. The ruling party candidate, Bola Tinubu, was declared the winner anyway. An EU observation mission later concluded the election "did not ensure a well-run transparent, and inclusive democratic process as assured by the INEC."
The damage extended beyond the immediate controversy. Idris Akinbajo, a journalist with Premium Times, captured the deeper wound: "The disappointment was so great that many young voters resolved never to vote again—trust had been lost." That loss of faith is not incidental. It is the human consequence of an election process that, despite hundreds of millions in international support, failed to deliver on its most basic promise.
ZAM's analysis reveals a structural problem. The EU's election funding in these five countries flows overwhelmingly to institutional actors—government bodies, civil servants, police forces, and ruling parties—through expensive training programmes and workshops. Civil society organizations that work to expand voter participation, encourage women and young people to engage, and monitor for irregularities receive significantly less. The result, ZAM concluded, is that EU money helps construct "a façade of democracy" while ultimately serving the interests of those already holding power. "EU support contributes to their legitimacy," said Evelyn Groenink, who coordinated the research.
The funding architecture obscures accountability. Most EU grants do not go directly to African governments but flow through intermediaries: UN agencies like the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Development Programme, as well as European companies and NGOs. In Nigeria alone, the IOM received €7 million of the EU's election support budget. Across four African nations, the agency took in more than €11 million between 2020 and 2022. When asked why funds designated for "democratic governance" were being routed through an organization primarily focused on displaced persons and migrants, the IOM's spokesman described the role as "purely operational and non-political," arguing that stable elections help prevent migration crises. The answer sidesteps the question: whether channeling democracy funding through such intermediaries obscures where money actually goes and who benefits.
The European Commission did not respond to requests for comment on ZAM's findings. Yet the pattern is clear enough. EU observation missions have documented serious problems—fraud, violence, intimidation—in elections the Commission has funded. Those critical reports are largely ignored, meaning shortcomings are never addressed in subsequent cycles. The system perpetuates itself.
Auwal Rafsanjani, a leading Nigerian civil rights advocate, sees a path forward: "If the EU can change their perspective and focus their support on civil society organisations and independent media, their support will not be seen as legitimising a failed system." That reorientation would require the EU to accept a harder truth—that funding the machinery of elections, without simultaneously strengthening the independent institutions that hold power accountable, amounts to bankrolling the status quo. For now, the €100 million continues to flow in the same direction, and young voters in Nigeria and elsewhere are learning to live without hope.
Citações Notáveis
The disappointment was so great that many young voters resolved never to vote again—trust had been lost— Idris Akinbajo, Premium Times journalist
If the EU can change their perspective and focus their support on civil society organisations and independent media, their support will not be seen as legitimising a failed system— Auwal Rafsanjani, Nigerian civil rights advocate
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why would the EU fund elections in a way that actually strengthens the people already in power? That seems backwards.
It's not intentional malice—it's structural. When you fund the electoral commission, the training of officials, the voting machines, you're funding the institutions that exist. Those institutions are controlled by whoever is already in charge. You're making their system work better, not changing who runs it.
But couldn't the EU just say no? Demand reforms before the money flows?
They could, but then they'd have to admit the elections they funded didn't work. There's a reputational cost. It's easier to observe, document problems, and move on to the next cycle.
What about the civil society groups—the ones actually trying to make elections fair?
They get a fraction of the funding. The big money goes to government bodies and consultancies. Civil society works on the margins, underfunded, while the machinery of power gets upgraded.
So the young voters who stopped voting—that's the real cost?
Yes. When you invest €18 million in an election and the technology fails, and nothing changes, you break something in people. Trust doesn't come back easily.
What would actually work?
Redirect the money toward independent media, election monitors, civil society. Make accountability the priority, not the appearance of a functioning system.